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Abstract 
The question of who ought to have control of the curriculum was 
a dormant issue poked alive by a succession educational ideologues, 
government commissions and concerned segments of the public, since the 
1960s. For the free school movement, community education movement, 
Plowden Report, Great Debate and Taylor Report each had recommendations 
for who ought to determine the aims, content and methods of curriculum 
- an issue that in earlier days had been of rather less concern than 
the matter of what ought to be on the curriculum. 
The most frequently supported contenders for control of the 
curriculum are students, parents, the teaching profession, educational 
experts, the state or some form of participatory arrangement that 
would include some or all of these. What is of particular interest 
to the philosopher in this are the lines of justification that can 
be offered for these potential decision-makers. There are, of course, 
different sorts of argument, for example moral and political 
justifications. But fundamental is the issue of competence. If we 
are concerned about the quality of education we provide children, we 
must know who is the most competent to determine curriculum. 
This thesis considers the question 'Who is most competent to 
control the curriculum? ', and in doing so takes, one by one, the 
various potential decision-makers and considers from the point of view 
of competence the case that can be made in their favour. This is 
facilitated by an analysis of the concept of competence and the nature 
of knowledge required by a curriculum decision-maker. The position 
taken in the thesis is that, all things considered, the teaching 
profession is more likely to be competent than the other alternatives. 
Consequently, curriculum, for most part, ought to be left in the hands 
of the teaching profession. 
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Chapter I 
CONTROL OF THE CURRICULUM 
1. Introduction 
The question to be answered is 'Who is most competent to determine 
curriculum? ' . This is a part of the larger matter of curriculum con- 
trol - only a 'part' because competence is not the sole grounds upon 
which the case for entitlement might reasonably be made. However, as 
I will endeavour to show presently and throughout the thesis, the 
larger question is very complex and could not be satisfactorily dealt 
with in a single thesis, and in any case the issue of competence is of 
central importance as a philosophical concern and perhaps even of greater 
importance to the practical difficulty we, in Western industrialized 
nations, seem now to have with regard to control of curriculum. 
'Control' or 'determination' in curriculum matters can be manifest 
in a great many ways. It can be formal control such as a government 
might have to dictate to schools the details of the syllabus; it could 
be informal influence such as an authority on curriculum matters might 
have over policy makers in government; or it can be indirect control 
such as book publishers, external examiners and university entrance 
requirements have, insofar as each restricts what is taught. There are 
other ways of course, and this will be mentioned throughout the chapters 
to follow. Our main concern, though, is with the matters of formal en- 
titlement to set curriculum. 
The question of who ought to have control of. the curriculum seems 
to have reached the British public rather dramatically and in consequence 
of the Great Debate and subsequent report of the Taylor Commission on 
school government of 1976-7. However, the matter of curriculum control 
is anything but new, and the recommendations of a proper controller are 
greatly varied. 
I Taylor, for instance, abhorred the autonomy of the 
school , that is to say curriculum control 
by the school head and staff, 
and recommended that some combination of parents, members of the communi- 
ty and even students ought to join with teachers in decision-making. 
Yet only a decade before the Plowdon Report made recommendations for the 
I For a good synoptic view of this see Tim Devlin and Mary Warnock, 
What Must We Teach? (London: Temple Smith, . 
1977), Chapter One explains 
the British situation with regard to curriculum control. for the last 
century . Chapter two gives a comparative view throughout 
Europe and 
North America as things _are today. 
2 
junior schools which were very much in the 'progressive' spirit of the 
1920s and 30s. That is, it emphasised the part that children should 
play in determining what it is they want to learn. The early progres- 
sives, though differing among themselves, at least gave the impression 
that they felt children ought to determine their own curriculum for the 
most part. Dewey, for instance, was never very clear about how much 
' leadership'2, hence decision-making, should be in the province of the 
teacher; but it was the same international progressive movement that he 
helped to sustain, despite his criticisms of it, that spawned Homer 
Lane3 and after him A. S. Nei ll4, both of whom were quite clearly in 
favour of child freedom - in Neill 's case even to the extreme in saying 
that children should not only decide what to study, when and how, but 
whether or not to study anything. Ironically, Neill, an Englishman, 
probably had greater impact in North America, and perhaps Australia, 
than in Britain. 
5 The f reeschool i ng movement of the 1960s very much 
supported, and with a good deal of popular as well as academic backing, 
the notion that children ought to be self-determinate in curriculum. 
Though a portion bf the argument in North America was moral and polit- 
ical, there was still much agreement over the belief that children ought 
to decide on the basis of felt-interests and self-assessed needs, and 
in these matters they were supposed to be more competent than teachers, 
parents or any others. 
The dispute about curriculum control in Britain has, in recent 
years, been a revolt against the authority of the teaching profession 
and the individual school; and this has been reflected in the current 
debates and Taylor's recommendation of community involvement. For the 
progressives of the 1920s and 30s, the fight was rather more against 
overnment .6In America, control of curriculum 
has been control by the government. 
6 
2See Experience and Education (1938) (New York: Collier Books, 
1963), P. 59. 
3For 
an introduction to Lane's Views see Talks to Parents and 
Teachers (1928) (New York: Schocken Books, 1969). 
4See 
Summerh ill (London: Pelican Books, 1968) . 
5Th is was evidenced. by the enormous outpouring of f reeschool 1i ter- 
ature in North America during the 1960s from such people as Holt, Kozol, 
Kohl, Silberman and many others who, in their books and articles, men- 
tioned with gratitude the writings and practical achievements of Neill. 
6According 
to Devlin and Warnock,. op. cit., pp. 2-8, the 1944 Ed- 
ucation Act opened control of curriculum to the local authorities and, 
as a matter of practice, to the schools, hencee; 
'to teachers. *Prior to that, 
syllabus details were regulated by government "through a series of policy 
suggestions and regulations in 1904,1926 and 1933. 
3 
traditionally denied the teaching profession and certainly denied to 
individual schools in favour of centralized governmental control. (In 
the United States control is with each state and in Canada, each pro- 
vince) . So, in America, progressives who were not enthusiastic about 
complete child control were, in any case, in favour of more autonomy for 
the teacher - autonomy that would allow the teacher to lead or guide 
the student toward fulfillment of his, the student's, needs. Again 
the grounds would be competence. The trained professional would, better 
than others, know how to determine the needs and interests of the child- 
ren and to utilize them in curriculum choices. 
More recently in North America, and to some extent Europe (to 
judge from the enormous amount of discussion following the Taylor Re- 
port), the notion that the community should have considerable say in 
curriculum, or even have direct control of it, has been gaining in pop- 
ularity. In the past five years a considerable literature, most of it 
not very erudite, has grown up around the rather vague notion of 'com- 
munity education' . Its main principles are difficult to pin down be- 
cause they are usually neither clearly expressed nor uniform throughout 
the movement. Very generally, though, a coherent position seems to 
have emerged (from the modern day version of this ancient concept). 
8 
In order to bring the school and the community closer together so as to 
allow the community to utilize the school's facilities (e. g. classrooms 
and sports facilities) and as well to make the school sensitive and re- 
sponsive to the needs of the community (i . e. in terms of community 
services it could provide, e. g. daycare and assistance programmes in 
local hospitals, and courses to suit the community's commercial needs, 
e. g. business oriented curriculum in an industrial area and earth science 
and agronomy in agricultural regions) it is suggested that parents and 
members of the community ought to have a role in decision-making. 
9 The 
nature and scope of this role varies. Some argue that the community 
ought to have a participatory role, perhaps something along the lines 
suggested by Taylor. Others support outright community control such 
that the teachers become' employees of the community and do 
7Dewey's 
position was much like this. See Experience and Education, 
op. cit., Chapters 4,5, and 6. 
8Two 
unusually good sources on this are Cyril Poster, The School 
and the Community (London: Macmillan, 1971) and the contributions to 
School and Communit , O. E. C. D., Paris: Centre 
for Educational Research 
and Innovation, 1975 .A more substantial listing of sources will 
be 
given in Chapter IX. 
9See Stuart Maclure's Introduction in School and Community, op. cit. 
4 
their bidding. ' As for the scope of involvement, it ranges from non 
curriculum matters, such as the school budget, uniforms and boys' hair 
length, to determination of the curriculum itself - what is to be taught, 
when and how. On what grounds? Again, there are political arguments. 
The community could be said to have a legitimate interest in the schools, 
given that the community benefits, or does not, as the case may be, in 
consequence of the sort of training and instruction students are given; 
so, this,, not to mention the financial interest the community has in the 
schools, seems prima facie to entitle the community to some degree of 
input into the decisions of schooling. 
1l 
Now I will say something about 
the complexity of these sorts of problems later. For now, though, I 
want to point out that a very large portion of the argument, and a very 
convincing portion in favour of participation and control, is on the 
basis of competence. The point is, roughly, that a greater breadth and 
depth of information pertinent to curriculum decisions, and perhaps 
even more efficient decision-making, is consequent of collective decision- 
making by some assemblage of teachers, parents and ordinary members of 
the public (usually from the local community). 
12 
Sometimes the community education position has a different, or 
perhaps additional, twist. For in some schools parents are invited into 
the classroom to give optional courses to students or to act as teacher 
aids. 
13 
In such cases parents are directly involved in decisions about 
curriculum - sometimes more, sometimes less. And, as 'community educa- 
tion' shades into 'alternative education', that is to say, into schools in 
which groups of parents organize themselves (perhaps because they have 
some common political, religious or cultural interest in common), the 
decision-making role can be one of control, and, as regards scope, for 
all curriculum matters. In other, words, 'li ke-minded parents might them- 
selves form a school whose curriculum and manner of execution they 
determine. They may hire teachers to carry out the directives and they 
may do some of the teaching themselves. 
14 
How justified? Well, on the 
one hand, there are moral considerations such as the alleged parent's 
10This is most common with religious and political extremists. 
II See Charlotte Ryan, The Open Partnership (New York: McGraw-Hi 11, 
1976). Especially Chapter Two. 
12Ibid. 
13See for example Jonathan Kozol, Free Schools (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin, 1972) . 
14 Macl ure, op. cit. , p. 13. 
5 
natural right to determine the activities of his or her child. On the 
other hand, there is 'the argument from competence. For it is often 
claimed (sometimes even in support of moral claim to parental authority) 
that a parent, in vi rtue of the intimate relations he has with the 
child, is more competent than the teacher, expert or any other to deter- 
mine the needs, interests and most desirable means of satisfaction of 
them for his or her own child. Alternatively, a group of parents whose 
children allegedly have a need in common might make this claim collect- 
ively. For example, parents of exceptionally bright children might 
claim that as a group they know what is best for their children (collect- 
ively). In addition, parents (and community members too) of an interest 
group, e. g. cultural or religious, sometimes suppose that they are more 
competent than others to assess and accommodate the interests of their 
group. Insofar as the schools (local schools) are seen to have impor- 
tant consequences for the interests (e. g. promulgation of' beliefs) of 
the group, it is usually felt that the group is correspondingly most 
competent to determine what happens in the school. 
15 
There has long been the feeling in North America, and there are 
many in Britain who would share the-feeling, that matters of curriculum 
content and instruction ought to be in the hands of our best approxi- 
mations to the philosopher-kings, namely educational experts. The 
point is, if it is important that in curriculum matters we get things 
right, then the most competent decision-makers ought to be enlisted. 
One contender for this title would be the like of curriculum experts in 
university departments of education, government or private research 
corporations. In many countries, of which both Canada and the United 
States would be examples, curriculum is centrally determined (at the 
state level in the U. S. and provincial level in Canada) by groups of 
experts who may be drawn from universities, the teaching profession and 
other sectors of society to make plans for the entire area within their 
jurisdiction (i. e. state or province). Now it is not hard to imagine 
other configurations of academics and so forth who might be called 
experts (e. g. the Schools Council in Britain) and who could on grounds 
of competence claim title to determine the curriculum. Against this 
claim there could be raised moral or political objections - objections that 
would stem from the positive claims to authority by, for example, parents 
or the community. But a prior concern, and one that will be of central 
15Militant Black. ' feminists, Quebec separatists and sundry religious 
sects (e. g. Amish, Mennonities and Hutterites). frequently take this 
view. This will be discussed further in Chapter VIII. 
6 
importance for us, is whether or not these experts are indeed the most 
competent alternatives we have available. Are they more competent than 
students and parents, given the concern about felt-interests and needs? 
Are they more competent than some form of collective arrangement which 
might even include experts among their number? 
In this thesis it will be my intention to show that on grounds of 
competence the teaching profession rather than the other alternatives 
we have been discussing ought to have control of most, though not all, 
curriculum decisions. Of course, precisely what we mean by the 'teach- 
ing profession', i. e. whether the profession as a whole, individual 
classroom teachers, or the teachers in a school or region, and which 
decisions they are competent to make, are matters we must deal with. 
But, those discussions will be postponed until we come to make the 
arguments for teachers. However, there are some preliminaries yet. 
For instance, I want to say a bit more about why competence is to be our 
dominant concern; what is to be meant by the phrase curriculum decision, 
which to this point has been so cavalierly tossed around; and, most 
important, I want to explain something about the approach to be taken 
in the demonstration of competence. 
2. Curriculum Control and Competence 
It would be a great mistake to think that the only important con- 
sideration in determining who ought to have control of the curriculum 
is competence. For there are a great many problems, which I alluded 
to earlier in several places, of politics and ethics. Just to remind, 
one could say that if control of curriculum is to be granted to, say, 
teachers, then an ethical matter arises in regard to the personal free- 
dom of students that is thereby at a tension. Paternal rights, the 
right of the parent to determine what shall be done with their children, 
might thus be violated. 
16 And what about the community? Since they 
support (financially) the schools through taxation and have an interest 
in the knowledge, understanding, practical skills and social and moral 
development of those who are educated - in the new generation that will 
soon determine the 'good life', it seems at least reasonable to claim 
that they have a right to a say in curriculum? Then, -of course, the ethical 
questions shade into political questions about, for example, democracy. 
16Moral 
rights to paternal- control. have been variously claimed by 
Aquinas, Hobbes and Locke. A very useful essay in the topic of pater- 
nal rights is Francis Schrag, 'The Right to Educate', School Review, May 
1971, pp. 359-378. 
7 
One could reasonably take the view that classrooms ought to be partici- 
pant democracies even in the choice of what is to be learned. Or it 
could be suggested that the state ought to control all or part of the 
curriculum. For it may be claimed that what is learned in schools 
affects the way in which the new generation sees the 'good life'; and, 
since the entire society will evolve in accordance with this as the new 
generation assumes control of government, industry, the media and 
academe, hence the 'good society' as they see it will emerge; it follows 
that the society, through their democratic agents, namely the govern- 
ment, ought to have the determining say in curriculum - in view of the 
fact that they are to be so profoundly affected. 
17 
Apart from ethical and political problems that directly bear on 
the question 'Who ought to control curriculum? ', there is another set 
of ethical questions, questions on a different footing because they seem 
to be prior to the question about curriculum control. That is, control 
of the curriculum more or less assumes that there ought to be a curric- 
ulum in the first place. This gives rise to whether or not children 
have a moral right to an education. If so, and if this right requires 
a positive performance on the part of someone else, that is to say, a 
duty to provide that education, then on whom does this duty fall - who 
is morally obliged to provide an education to children? 
Each of these issues is highly complex. If children have a right 
to be free and hence to determine their own curricula, or if parents 
have rights to direct the actions of their children and against outside 
interference with this, or if communities have rights or children have a 
right to education, then what kind of rights are they and what sort of 
justifications can be offered? For example, is the right to education 
a natural right? Is it a moral right supported by some further moral 
principles such as a respect for persons? Is it a welfare right? 
18 
And, if there are political questions about democracy then conceptual 
17See 
John White, 'Teacher Accountability and School Autonomy' in 
Proceedings of the Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain, 
Vol. X, July 1976, pp. 58-78; and my reply 'John White on State Control 
of the Curriculum',, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Vol. 12,1978, 
pp. 63-8. 
18For 
two interesting debates in which these issues are raised see 
I. M. M. Gregory, 'The Right to Education' and C. A. Wringe 'Pupils' Rights' 
both in Proceedings of the Philosophy- of Education Society of Great 
Britain, Vol. VII, No. 1,1973 and Fredrick A. Olafson 'Rights and 
Duties in Education' and A. t. Melden. 'Ola-fson_ on the Right to Education' 
both in James F. Doyle ed., Educational Judgments (London: Routledge 
& Kegan Paul, 1973). 
8 
problems arise about the meaning of democracy; and then there is the 
matter of justification. 
19 
Plainly, the moral and political consider- 
ations are themselves worthy of a thesis - probably more than one. 
It would, therefore, be a great injustice and of little philosophical 
value to cram them into a thesis which is primarily concerned with 
competence. In consequence, 
_1 
will not deal with these matters; not, 
obviously, because they are unimportant, but rather because they are too 
important to be given short shrift. 
Why, then, should the matter of competence be taken so seriously? 
Perhaps the point from which to start in a demonstration of this is 
one of the ethical matters, namely the child's right to an education. 
As I said before, it is a nice philosophical question to determine the 
moral status and justification of such a right (alleged right). But, 
whether or not it is a genuine moral right in advanced industrialized 
nations, those with which this thesis is concerned, there are legal 
rights to education; indeed there are strictures requiring that children 
go to school and remain in school almost to the point where secondary 
school is completed. (Usually the age of compulsory schooling is six- 
teen,. ) And, there are corresponding duties of positive performance on 
the part of parents that they should ensure regular attendance and pro- 
vide children with the necessary clothing, pens, pencils and so forth; 
and it is incumbent upon the state to provide for adequate schools, 
teachers and other necessary facilities. Not only are these rights 
and duties matters of law but they are generally seen to be morally 
required and of absolute practical necessity. That children ought 
(whether morally or legally ought is unimportant here) to have an educa- 
tion and that society is bound to provide it, are not matters in dispute 
either by the general public or educational theorists (most especially 
philosophers). This is not, of course, to say that there is no objection. 
Some individuals and minority groups are totally opposed to education 
or anything that does more than provide skill training. However, these 
views are not widely accepted. For it is commonly seen that twentieth 
century life requires an education. It is no longer just a matter of 
children learning to read and write, as might have been adequate (at a 
minimum) in the early part of the twentieth century. Nor is education 
seen as properly concerned solely with a study of the disciplines for 
nothing more than their own intrinsic value. The world has become too 
19See for example, P.. Scrimshaw, 'Should Schooi. s be Participant 
Democracies? ' in D. Bridges-and P. Scrimshaw- Values and Authority in 
Schools (London: Hodder and Straughton, 1975^" 
9 
complex for this. Societies need citizens with particular skills. 
Someone has to fix the drains, staff the hospitals and schools, discover 
new sources of energy, determine how best to handle the economy so that 
needed products are provided and masses of people are not put out of 
work, deal with world economy problems in an age when. national economies 
are so interrelated that a slowdown in the production of something in 
one country can put thousands out of work in another (e. g. production of 
oil), understand domestic and world political matters well enough to 
participate in the activities directly or elect or appoint others to 
handle them, And there is much else besides. Societies need people of 
skill, expertise and good judgment. Individuals in society need-these 
qualities to contribute to the society, and they need sufficient knowledge 
and understanding to make the best of the activities, opportunities and 
resources of their society. They need education for work and for lei- 
sure. Thus construed, education is widely believed to be vital for both 
the individual and society as a whole. Accordingly, it is felt by all 
but a very small minority that children ought to be educated. 
The point about competence follows on the heals of this recognized 
need for an education. It is simply that to provide an education for 
children which falls short of the best that circumstances will reasonably 
permit, given the profoundly important consequences of education, would 
be absurd. It would be logically inconsistent, not to mention foolish 
from the practical point of view, to recognize the great importance of 
education on the one hand, and not to deal with it in the most competent 
manner possible, on the other. Indeed,, this seems to be generally recog- 
nized by Western nations. Enormous portions of national expenditure go 
to the provision of schools and institutions to educate teachers and do 
research into matters pertaining to the improvement of education and 
teaching. Further evidence of national concerns about the competent 
running of the schools would surely be the various governmental commis- 
sions that investigate school decision-making (e. g. the Plowden and 
Taylor Reports in Britain) and such public inquiries as the Great Debate. 
What I am claiming is that., for the most part, we do in fact think 
that children ought to have an education and we believe that whoever is 
to make the arrangements and carry them out ought to be the most compe- 
tent, given the present state of understanding, technology, availability 
of relevant materials, availability of individuals (such as teachers) to 
make the decisions and the relative importance of educational needs to 
other social needs. (On the latter point, it may be that our most com- 
petent performance in educational matters ought to be denied in favour 
of those decision-makers and resources being needed in another sphere 
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which is seen as (from a legal an, d moral point of view) more pressing). 
And, in consequence of this, it is a very important matter to determine 
who is likely to be most competent. 
As a concluding note: I am not saying that because we do in fact 
regard education as a moral, practical and legal necessity that we mor- 
ally ought to. What I am saying is that if there is such a moral right, 
and since we do think that children ought (morally, practically and 
legally) to have an education, it follows that we should plan and execute 
this education in the most competent manner possible, given of course 
that education is subject to practical limitations of human and material 
resources and that education (and a right to it) must take its place in 
society with other social needs and functions (and rights to them). 
Why is competence implied? It would be logically inconsistent to say 
that 'X has a right to the best education we can provide, but we are 
not obliged to do our most competent job in providing it'. And, it 
would be most unwise from the practical standpoint to recognize the 
vital importance of education to society and the individual, yet to 
assign the decision-making function to anyone but the most competent 
decision-maker available. 
3. Curriculum Decisions 
We have, so far, used the phrase 'curriculum decision' rather 
broadly and without explanation, though I think the context and examples 
have given it a rough definition. In what is to follow, the scope of 
'curriculum decision' is to be greater than usual . Normally it applies 
to matters of content - what is actually taught. However, we will take 
it to include not only what is taught but why and how. Curriculum 
decisions, that is, will entail those to do with content and, as well, 
aims and methods. 
Questions about aims, for example, would be the like of 'in schools 
should we endeavour to make students happy or creative or rational or 
mentally healthy or culturally sophisticated or simply literate and num- 
erate? ' 'Should children be initiated into the various disciplines because 
they are worthwhile in themselves? ' 'Should we try to prepare children 
for future occupations in the work force? ' 'Should we make them vir- 
tuous? ' 'Should we educate them in such a way that they are well prepared 
to use their leisure time (given that our unemployment problems may 
worsen to the point where some people may in their life-time have: very 
little work)? ' And, there are many more questions of this sort. 
Decisions about content could involve such matters as 'Which of the 
disciplines are to be studied? ' 'How deeply is each discipline to be 
gone into? ' 'At what ages are students to be introduced to each? ' 'What 
balance is to be struck between, for example, arts and sciences? ' is 
each student to be compelled to study certain things? ' 'Is the balance 
to be the same for all students? ' 'Within each discipline what is to be 
studied? ' (For example, if a student is to study history,. -then which 
histories? World history, or British history or European history? 
Should these be social or economic or political histories? What sort 
of interpretations should be given - Marxist? And within each history, 
what are to be the syllabus details - i. e. topics? ) 
About methods one could ask 'What overall approach is to be used in 
teaching, for example, geography? ' 'Is it to be predominantly lecture, 
discussion, project work, etc.? ' 'If project work is to be used, how 
independently wi 11 the students be al lowed to work? Wi 11 they work 
individually or in groups? ' 'How will the blackboard space be used? ' 
'Will films be used? ' And so on. 
It is questions such as these, and of course many more like them, 
that we want competently dealt with, and which, accordingly, press the 
need for a competent decision-maker. What logical conditions, then, are 
we going to propose that we may apply in consideration of the case for 
each of the candidate curriculum decision-makers - students, parents, 
educational experts, teachers or some combination of them? 
4. The Conditions of Competence and Education as an Activity 
Now are we to assess competence? To start with, one is not simply 
competent, one is competent to do something. The 'something' with 
which we are concerned is decision-making in the spheres of curriculum. 
What must be done, therefore, is an analysis of decision-making as it 
pertains to curriculum; and in light of this, a further analysis of 
competence. To be derived is a set of conditions, conditions of com- 
petence in curriculum decision-making, which can be applied in consider- 
ation of each of the candidates for curriculum control. 
Still, there is something else. If I might anticipate one condi- 
tion of competence to be worked out in our analysis, it would surely be 
that a curriculum decision-maker have relevant knowledge. By their very 
nature, decisions are (among other things) choices among alternatives. 
One must therefore have a knowledge of the reasonable alternatives. 
But stated thus, 'knowledge' is a formal condition of competence, i. e. we 
have not specified that any particular body or area of knowledge be 
known. This is a problem , given our intention to consider particular 
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candidates as decision-makers in a particular sphere, namely curriculum. 
Surely each of the, candidates will have some sort of knowledge creden- 
tials. But will- his knowledge be relevant to curriculum decisions? 
We would not know unless we gave a substantive account of the knowledge 
required by a curriculum decision-maker. 
I want to deal with the specification of knowledge in two stages. 
First, 'education', by which I mean formal schooling, will be construed 
as an activity of a special sort. Activities will be shown to have a 
characteristic structure, and curriculum decisions will be shown to be 
activity decisions - decisions that are made within the structure and 
decisions that are made about the structure (i. e. to change it in some 
way). Now the point of doing this will be to demonstrate that because 
the components of structure bear certain relationships to one another; 
and because the whole structure has certain other relations with the 
context, or circumstances in which the activity takes place; there are, here, 
very important implications for the knowledge which a decision-maker 
must have. Second, in the case of the educational activity, understand- 
ing the components of structure and context, and acting (deciding) with- 
in and about them, presupposes specifiable areas of knowledge. Con- 
sequently, a decision-maker must not only understand the structure and 
context of the activity in 'question but must, as well, have an under- 
standing of these areas of knowledge. So, by providing accounts of 
education as an activity and of the areas of knowledge that are under- 
lying, we are thereby in a position to set out in some detail a sub- 
stantive knowledge condition of competence which can be used in choosing 
among the various candidates. 
The treatment of education as an activity is not entirely new and 
some strong objections have been raised to doing so. 
20 
Nevertheless, I 
believe the objections can be overcome, and to great advantage. For one 
thing, it will show the enormous interdependency of elements of curri- 
culum and the equally significant dependency of curriculum upon local 
circumstances. Both have profound implications for decision-making. 
There is, of course, much else to be said about the utility of the activity 
analysis but this will come in due course. 
20Glenn Langford has construed education as an activity in 'The 
Concept of Education' and 'Values in Education (1)', both in Glenn 
Langford and D .J. -O'Connor , eds ., 
New Essays in the Philosophy of Educa- 
tion (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973). R. S. Peters has in many 
places said that education is-not an activity 
(see, for example, Ethics 
and Education (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1966) Chapter One); -and 
in 'Values and Education (2)' in Langford and O'Connor, op. cit., he 
argues directly against Langford on this point. Peters' arguments will 
be examined in detail in Chapter IV. 
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5" Plan of the Thesis 
The substantive occupation of the thesis is to answer the question 
'Who is most competent to determine the curriculum - students, parents, 
educational experts, teachers or some participatory combination of 
them? '. The set of conditions for use in evaluating the cases to be 
made on behalf of each of these candidates wi 1"1 come from two major analyses: ar 
analysis of competence in decision-making and an analysis of education 
as an-activity. The plan to be followed will be this. After the 
present chapter will be the analysis of competence in decision-making. 
Then, three chapters will be devoted to 'activities'. The first will 
analyse and interrelate the concepts of 'activity' and 'context'. The 
second will argue that education is an activity. The third will re- 
categorize curriculum decisions as activity decisions and will explain 
the areas of knowledge that underlie the categories of activity deci- 
sions in education. There will, then, be five chapters devoted to 
assessing the candidates for curriculum control. One chapter each 
will be given to students and self choice in curriculum, parents as 
decision-makers, institutional experts and control of curriculum, par- 
ticipatory decision-making, and, finally, teachers as most competent 
to control most matters of curriculum. 
Chapter 11 
COMPETENCE AND CURRICULUM DECISION-MAKING 
I. Introduction 
With regard to the making of curriculum decisions, how can we tell 
if someone is competent? The 'taste-test' would be one way - i. e. 
observe the results of his decisions. But there has to be more to com- 
petence than success. For we would not give that designation to some- 
one who was simply lucky. There has to be something underlying the 
success, something about the individual himself which accounts for his 
success. It is the underlying features - attributes, characteristics, 
or qualities - in virtue of which we say that someone is competent. 
Ultimately our objective is to be in a position to choose among 
competing alternatives the most competent curriculum decision-maker. 
To do this we need a criterion -a list of empirical credentials which 
could be applied against each candidate. Still to devise a criterion 
is to have established an empirical means of assessing competence, but 
the criterion itself presupposes certain principles or conditions which 
are constitutive of the meaning of competence. It is these conditions 
which are of paramount importance to us at the moment, and the object 
of our attention in this chapter. The matter of criterion will be 
taken up only after this has been accomplished. 
How are we to get started? I think we should begin by looking at 
the logical composition of 'decision' and 'competence' . 
2. Formal Structure of Reasoned Curriculum Decisions 
Curriculum decisions are practical choices of action, e. g. should 
we include, exclude, or modify something in the structure or content of 
the curriculum? Should we employ this, that, or the other teaching 
strategy, technique or piece of audio-visual equipment? If reasoned, 
decisions are expressed in the conclusions of valid argument forms, i. e. 
are implied by premises; and this is true whether the conclusion is 
reached from the premises or simply justified by them - the form in 
either case is the same. The conclusion, moreover, prescribes the 
action decided upon, e. g. the conclusion that history ought (practically 
or morally) to be on the curriculum prescribes that it be. Furthermore, 
the inference from premises to conclusion may be deductive, in which 
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case the premises logically imply the conclusion, or inductive in 
which case the conclusion follows, but not as a matter of logical 
necessity. 
Since the conclusions which house decisions (a) prescribe and in 
so doing (b) select a specific course of action (or range of them), two 
formal requirements of the premises (which constitute the 'reason' for 
acting) are: first, a prescriptive statement must appear, or be 
implied, somewhere among them; and second, there must be a description 
of the action selected. 
So, in terms of formal structure, a reasoned curriculum decision 
which prescribes an action is expressed in the conclusion of a valid 
argument structure (whether deductive or inductive) the premises of 
which include a description of the chosen action and a prescription 
that it be done. Now this structure is simply a vehicle for assessing 
the validity of a decision;,, however, it tells us nothing of the logical 
character of what we take a decision to be and how we go about making 
them. If we knew something about this logical character it might give 
some valuable insight into the epistemic credentials essential to a 
decision-maker, i. e. what sort of propositional knowledge, intellectual 
capacities, and pragmatic abilities he would need in dealing with 
curriculum decisions. Let us consider such a characterization. 
3. The Character of Reasoned Curriculum Decisions' 
(a) The Object-of-Decision 
To begin with, a decision is about some issue; each has what I will 
call an object-of-decision. Our decision to grab the child off the 
tracks rather than allow it to meet a grisly demise with the arriving 
train is about, i. e. has the object-of-decision of, 'what should be done 
about the child on the tracks'. Similarly, a teacher's decision to 
show slides of art reproductions rather than simply describe the works 
in an art history class, has the object-of-decision of 'employing what- 
ever method of teaching art history is most suitable under the circum- 
stances. 
2 
IThis 
characterization owes a great deal to R. M. Hare's The 
Language of Morals, (London: 0 .U .P., 1964) 
(first published by The 
Clarendon Press, 1952), Chapter 4; and indirectly to Aristotle (see 
Ni chomachean Ethics, 111 3,1113a-5; V(I 3,11476) from whose notion of 
the practical sy l og i sm Hare took the idea for this sort of analysis. 
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am after a conceptual point here but is interesting to note 
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(b) Alternatives 
Going on to a second characteristic: if someone is making a 
decision there must be more than one alternative open to him, even if 
the only available choices are between doing X and not doing X. For 
there is no deciding to be done when something is mandatory. No 
suggestion is being made here that all possible alternatives be 
that some philosophers have taken normative positions with regard to the proper objects-of-decision of the social scientist (hence the 
educational theorist) . Karl Popper in 'Towards a Rational Theory of Tradition', Conjectures and Refutations (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963) suggested that the social scientist's main concern ought to be with the unintended (especially unwanted) consequences of social 
action. Presumably, therefore, the central concern is not with such things as means and ends, but with what might go awry in our attempts to achieve them. 
Michael Oakeshott in 'Political Education', Rationalism and Politics (London: Methuean & Co., 1962) takes quite a different view. For him, decision-making is inextricably wound-up in the knowledge one has of past traditions and experiences. Decisions and their objects- 
of-decision, therefore, are presented to one through one's own tinted 
glasses - tinted by the past. Thus, Oakeshott thinks decision-makers 
are wisely advised to seek-out dominant trends, or 'intimations', 
in the ongoing tradition of one. 's life and to allow these to suggest 
the object-of-decision. 
Finally, John Dewey in 'Experience and Education (1938) (New York: 
Collier, 1963), Chapter 3, and Democracy and Education (1916) 
(New York: The Free Press, 196 , Chapter , inclines toward seeing as 
proper objects-of-decision the problems children have in mind that they 
want to solve. The objects-of-decision from the child's point of view, 
then, would be the problem itself; and for the teacher it would be 
the practical matter of facilitating the student's investigation. 
As a brief comment on Popper's view one might point out that some, 
but surely not all, concerns of the educational decision-maker should 
be with unintended outcomes. Aims, course content, and teaching methods 
are areas, for example, which require concern about intended outcomes. 
As a normative recommendation, Oakeshott's conservatism can be rather 
insidious. If the intentions of one's traditions are immoral then 
one is not well advised to allow them to suggest objects-of-decision. 
If, on the other hand, we are alleged to be conceptually chained to 
traditions of thought, the position seems false. The transformation 
from absolutism to communism in Russia and China would surely speak 
against this. And, Dewey's concern with the problem solving aspect of 
education leaves very little room for seemingly proper objects-of- 
decision such as those to do with the enlightenment of the student on 
matters of which he knows nothing. And, as R. S. Peters says of Dewey's 
pragmatism 'The dimensions of speculative curiosity, of wonder and 
awe, are missing: ('John Dewey's Philosophy of Education', R. S. Peters, 
ed. John Dewey Reconsidered, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977), p. 120. 
In the next chapter, what I take to be the proper focus of objects- 
of-decision will be discussed. 
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considered (either logical or pragmatic), nor a wide range of them, 
nor that they be good ones, nor even clearly understood or articulable 
by the decision-maker. My claim is simply that it makes no sense to 
talk about a decision (at least in any sense relevant to our concerns 
about selecting curriculum decision-makers) unless the decision-maker 
believes there to be alternatives to a single course. That one should have a 
wide variety and clear understanding of appropriate alternatives is a 
normative claim to be dealt with later. 
Now, as a corollary, if coming to or justifying a decision 
entails having alternatives then a description of them must be part of 
the reasoning involved in adopting one of them and hence it must appear 
among the premises (whether explicitly or implicitly). This would 
satisfy the formal requirement, mentioned earlier, of the prescribed 
action being stated in the premises. 
Interestingly, the notion of alternatives links in an important 
way with the object-of-decision. How? If an option being considered 
by a decision-maker is not relevant to the 'object' (i. e. what is being 
decided about) it seems odd to imagine it as a bona fide 'alternative' 
at all. Clearly, if in the 'child on. the tracks' example, we supposed 
that the potential rescuer also had the option of reaching into his 
pocket for a cigarette, it would be absurd to claim this as one of his 
alternatives regarding 'what to do about the child on the tracks' com- 
mensurate with such other possibilities as 'hold the child down between 
the tracks allowing the train to pass over', 'shout a warning to "Get 
Off! '''. etc. Necessarily, therefore, alternatives must be relevant to 
the object-of-decision. 
Another very important aspect of alternatives is the matter of what 
counts as the statement or exposition of the alternative? It is not 
so obvious as it seems. For I want to claim that a full statement of 
any alternative has three parts: (a) a theoretical description of 
the proposal (b) consideration of the usual consequences were that 
alternative to be chosen, and (c) consideration of the consequences 
that are likely in this particular case. Pragmatic outcomes is a term 
I wi 11 use for (b) and (c). 
Consider a decision to introduce religious education (R. E. ) into 
schools where it has not previously been taught. Suppose there are two 
basic alternatives: (A) implement the new programme; (B) refrain from 
doing so. What would it be to give an account of (A)? Clearly, (A) 
would have to be described. The components of the programme would have 
to be set out, its place in the time-table indicated, mention of who 
would be qualified to teach it, and so forth (i. e. (a), the theoretical 
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description . But is that all there is to it. To be sure, the alterna- 
tive is, thus, stated. Still , we usually do something more in order to 
understand clearly what the alternative entails, and that is, we consider 
what normally happens when R. E. is introduced in a school. What sub- 
jects will have to be sacrificed? How will the teaching staff react? 
What problems are usually encountered with gathering appropriate 
materials? How do students and parents usually perceive R. E.? Other 
questions are raised of course, but these, or something akin to them, 
provide answers that help us to understand in a richer way than would 
otherwise be the case what the alternative, in a full-blown sense, is 
(i. e. pragmatic outcomes, of type (b)). Still there is something 
further. When working out just what an alternative entails, we would 
not only ask ourselves about the usual consequences of introducing 
R. E.; we would be concerned as well about the likely ramifications of 
starting it in the school (s) in question. Since circumstances of 
resource and personality (group and individual) vary, it would not do 
just to consider usual outcomes only; so the latter seems quite a proper 
and normal query. My claim is that a full account of the alternative 
(A), of introducing R. E., would include it as well (i. e. pragmatic out- 
comes of type (c)). 
In speaking of this tripartite account of alternatives as being a 
'full' account, the question arises as to whether consideration of prag- 
matic outcomes (or either part of them) is logically necessary to the 
statement of our alternative. 
3 
I incline to think that inclusion of 
them is part of the very notion of our alternative in practical decision- 
making. That is, I find it hard to conceive of an alternative being 
stated without such consideration. I would not however want to argue 
the point too strenuously for very little rests on it. Ifa conceptual 
connection will not hold without difficulty, it is an easy normative 
claim to substantiate. For who would argue that in deciding on practi- 
cal matters one ought to make some effort to set out, not only the 
theoretical description of an alternative, but the likely consequences 
of it being implemented - not just in general, but in the particular 
case at hand? 
3Hare does not distinguish 'theoretical description' from 
'pragmatic' outcomes, but treats them instead as conjointly consti- 
tutive of what an 'alternative' entails. His view is that, as a 
matter of fact, we do think of both aspects of alternatives when 
decision-making. 
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(c) Justifying Principles 
Decision-making requires more than just knowledge of alternatives 
and their hypothetical outcomes. Earlier I mentioned that decisions 
, 
at least those we are concerned with, are (a) prescriptive, and (b) 
inferred- from premises: this being true, a formal requirement of the 
premises is that a prescriptive statement be among them. Now when 
anything is prescribed (ruling out an arbitrary prescription, if such a 
thing makes sense to say) the individual doing it needs some evaluative 
basis or justification for rating it more highly than its alternatives. 
That is, to make a reasoned prescription requires some grounds which 
incline us to choose one alternative over the other as the thing we 
should do (morally or practically, as the case may be). 
What would perform this role? In games like chess, for example, 
one decides between moving the bishop diagonally or horizontally, by 
appealing to the rules. Whether or not one should capture an opponent's 
piece in a given move, however, is not settled by the rules but in 
being part of some strategy, a conventional one or perhaps a newly 
created one, depending upon whether the player in question has previous- 
ly learned or is- imagining a new one. Now, to some extent, there is a 
i 
parallel between the evaluative-prescriptive role played by the rules 
and strategies in chess and something similar in curriculum decisions. 
For instance, custom and social norms are largely responsible for the 
justification (i. e. evaluative-prescriptive role) of deciding what 
structure and content the curriculum should have and how teaching 
should be carried out. To the extent that tradition and custom form 
rule-like procedural directives in the way that chess rules function, 
the two parallel one another. However, the important way in which 
they differ is that the formal rules of chess themselves not only re- 
gulate the game but they officially define it and hence require no 
external justification (e. g. it would be absurd to ask what justifica- 
tion we have for the rule stating that bishops must move diagonally). 
On the other hand, the traditions, conventions and norms which regulate 
(evaluate-prescribe) curriculum decisions are surely subject to higher 
order justification by various branches of educational theory and 
morality. Therefore, specific rules, norms, etc- 2 or 
justifying princi- 
ples as I shall call them from now on, mediate 
between our hypothetical 
knowledge of the outcomes of-alternatives providing a required 
basis 
upon which we can evaluate and then prescribe one as preferable 
to the 
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others. 
4 
This seems an opportune point at which to look back at our account 
of alternatives and make an observation which, had to be foregone unti l 
justifying principles had been introduced. It is simply this. Decisions 
are made on the basis of -a consideration of descriptions and pragmatic 
outcomes of alternatives: unless one were always in a position to 
have complete foreknowledge of how things were going to turn out, 
which we rarely ever are - particularly in the social sciences - it 
would be necessary to make predictions. But since predictions involve 
the employment of techniques of weighing evidence and making judgments, 
they too depend upon justification by appeal to relevant principles. 
Alternatives are themselves decisions, unless, of course, the outcomes 
are known in advance, and no judgments are required. 
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Returning to justifying principles: [ want to fill in this 
characterization a bit further by pointing out that collections of 
predetermined rules, traditions, customs or social norms, are not the 
only ways of regulating behaviour by functioning as mediators between 
alternatives. Sometimes we concoct a principle of sorts. for the occa- 
sion at hand. A moral decision may have been made on the grounds of 
some moral directive we created to suit our particular decision circum- 
stance, which itself is derived from, or justified by, appeal to higher 
order principles, or else because it coheres with a larger body of 
moral beliefs we hold. So when I say that justifying principles mediate 
between alternatives and our actual choice among them is the making of 
a decision, I am not claiming that, to put it metaphorically, we reach 
into our bag of preestablished codes and pull out the appropriate one; 
often we have to make one up, and if it can be justified at all, or if 
we are concerned that it should be, this is done by establishing its 
connection with other principles or bodies of them. A similar example, 
where a justifying principle is 'invented' for an occasion is where a 
decision is justified by one's personal tastes. 
6 
When X relishes 
lobster' rather than steak on the menu his decision to order the 
former 
is justified by his preference or personal taste for it. Of course we 
could endeavour to explain this choice, i. e. find the reasons perhaps 
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found Israel Scheffler's paper 'Justifying Curriculum Decisions' 
in his book Reason and Teaching (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1973), pp. 11 -25, quite helpful here. 
5See Hare, p. 59. 
6Th 
The idea for this point also comes from Hare. 
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psychological or social for his wanting lobster, but his reason for 
the selection need go no further than reference to his taste buds. 
There is a further point. If bits and pieces of larger bodies of 
beliefs like specific rules, customs, or tastes can be developed to 
suit a particular occasion and to enable us to make a decision then it 
follows as well that they can pass from our use as quickly as they came. 
The fact that our preference for lobster enables us to decide between 
it and steak on one occasion does not thereby mean that this particular 
preference must guide all similar choices on other occasions, or ever 
again for that matter. Tastes can change; and so can regulatives of 
other sorts that are non constitutive of activities (like chess rules). 
(d) Surnnary 
So far then our view is that a reasoned decision is an action 
prescription about some object-of-decision which is stated in the con- 
clusion of a valid inductive or deductive argument structure. The 
inference is made from two (sets of) premises. One of these describes 
(either explicitly or implicitly) the alternatives between or among 
which the decision is being made and says something about the outcomes. 
The other describes a just i fy i ng'pri nci ple(s) (e. g. rule, norm, pre- 
ference, or abstract principle) which performs the essential function 
of mediating between or among alternatives enabling the decision-maker 
to assign priority to his selection. To sum this up: a reasoned 
decision is a choice among alternatives which is justified by some 
'principle'. 
If this is the formal structure and accompanying characterization 
of 'decisions' then what characterization attaches to 'competent' 
decisions? 
4. Principles Which Guide the Making of Correct Decisions 
Rather than trying to analyse what is normally meant by speakers 
of English when they use 'competence' correctly let us simply ask 
ourselves what principles would govern the making of ideal decisions. 
In other words, what constitutes quality in decision-making? From this 
vantage point we can look at gradations downward from the ideal when we 
get to the point of considering who ought to make decisions. We will 
look for those most closely approximating the ideal. 
22 
(a) Principles and Correct Decisions 
A word about strategy. 1t is one thing to understand the structure 
of a reasoned decision but quite another to see what principles guide 
the selection of its components. That is, while it may be necessary 
for a 'decision' to have alternatives and some justifying principle, 
the question still remains: What governs the selection of them, i. e. 
How do we know when something qualified as an alternative or a justi- 
fying principle? And this question subdivided into (1) What principles 
are logically necessary? and (2) What principles best promote correct 
decisions? (i. e. where conclusions follow from premises which are 
optimally relevant and true). One is a logical question and the other 
normative. Why should either concern us? If we could find answers to 
both it might help us to determine necessary and desirable epistemic 
characteristics of individuals who select alternative and justification 
in the making of curriculum decisions. 
I want to get underway by re-introducing the term object-of-decision. 
As stated earlier, I take this to be specifically what a decision is 
about. The 'object' in a teacher's dilemma between alternative A, 
sending a student to a remedial reading specialist, and alternative B, 
keeping him in the general class-but giving him extra help, is 'what is 
to be done about this student's reading problem? '. The reason for 
bringing this up here is what I want to show how both structural features 
of a decision (i. e. alternatives and justifying principles) must relate 
in a certain way to the 'object' in order to (a) satisfy the logical 
requirements necessary to qualify as 'alternatives' or 'justifying 
principles', and in another way to (b) satisfy certain normative stip- 
ulations which shall be posited'as principles, the satisfactory. 
appeal to which is vital to ideal, or logically correct, decisions. 
I want to get at the two logical principles which are compatibility 
and consistency by showing how they bear upon first, alternatives, and 
then justifying principles, both in relation to objects-of-decisions. 
Let us start with 'objects' and alternatives. 
(b) Principles Logically Necessary for Decision-Making 
(i) Compatibility 
Procedural options, in my opinion, are not the same thing as 
decision- 
making alternatives. Compatibility with an object-of-decision 
is what 
makes two or more options, alternatives: this can 
be clarified by an 
illustration. Imagine a chess game situation in which one's 
king is in 
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check and there are two possible escaping moves. As a player, one has 
three 'options': A, concede defeat, B, move out of check using the 
first escape, C, use the second escape. As a decision-maker, however, 
one cannot get started at treating these as competing' ompet i ng ' 'alternatives' 
until one assumes an object-of-decision, i. e. what is to be decided 
about. For instance, if we take as the 'object' 'avoid defeat' then 
both B and C could compete as alternatives, one of which to be adjudged 
superior (or at least preferable) by its being justified by some point 
of strategy; but option A is not even applicable to this decision. In 
other words, it may be a player's option, but it does not make sense as 
a decision-maker's alternative. On the other hand, if we change the 
object-of-decision to something like 'end the game' then option A seems 
plausible as alternative A. Formerly, A was incompatible with the 
'object' but now it is compatible with the new object. Therefore, if 
an option is to qualify as an alternative the first requirement to be 
met is compatibility with the object-of-decision. 
At this point it looks as though a decision-maker needs to do a 
preliminary justification of whatever options seem presentable, in 
order to determine whether they warrant bona fide status as alternatives 
I think this is correct: the business of selecting alternatives is a 
normative one even at its roots. However, deciding among the alterna- 
tives thus selected entails a more sophisticated normative operation; 
but we will talk about this later. For now I want to say a bit more 
about the other principle which is logically necessary to the selection 
of alternatives: or to put it another way, the conditions which must 
be fulfilled for options to be granted the status of 'alternatives'. 
(i i) Consistency 
To demonstrate that 'consistency' is the second principle, consider the 
chess game situation again. Part of what enables us to consider options 
B and C as alternatives open to the player endeavouring to save the 
trapped king and avoid defeat is that both moves are consistent with 
the rules of chess in general and with their application in this partic- 
ular context. In short, the rules of chess restrict the ways in which 
pieces can move, and if we want to continue playing the game of chess 
we cannot accept as viable alternatives, options which violate the rules. 
I do not intend this as a normative point, but a logical one. 
Chess examples are tidy ones - too tidy - so we ought to consider 
a decision-making situation in which the governance of rules 
is not 
obvious. 
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(iii) Compatibility and consistency once again 
Picture a student asking himself 'what should I decide to do when I 
get my degree? '. ' He considers the following options: Do postgraduate 
work, seek employment in industry, enter the civil service, or go to 
lunch. Clearly, the last of these seems out of place with the others, 
not because it fails to present an option, but because it is inappro- 
priate to the obvious decision-making issue (object) 'what should be 
the student's career choice? '. This is an application of the compati- 
bility principle: we have noticed the offending option does not link 
with the object-of-decision inasmuch as the former is simply not 
relevant to the latter. How about consistency? Unlike chess, constitu- 
tive and strict regulating rules are inconspicuous, though not entirely 
absent. Just as alternatives in chess must be possible within the 
rules, alternatives in social affairs are subject to legal, moral, 
social, economic, and biological constraints (just to mention a few). 
A moral man cannot consider as alternatives, options which he believes 
to be immoral (i. e. inconsistent with his moral principles, rules, or 
whatever) any more than any of us, as mortals, could consider as alter- 
natives biological impossibilities like walking on water. So, regard- 
ing our student, whether or not remaining items above can, in fact, be 
alternatives for him depends upon-their being consistent with the 'rules' 
which govern his life. 
I see no reason why the alternatives of any decision-making situa- 
tion could not be accounted for by sorting out options in to alternatives 
in virtue of being consistent and compatible with their objects-of- 
decision. 
'Justifying principles' require more or less the same treatment. 
it is obvious that each must be compatible with the object-of-decision, 
e. g. the strategy which justifies taking one rather than the other move 
out of check in our earlier example, must be compatible with the 'object' 
of 'preventing defeat' . Furthermore, 
it must be consistent with what- 
ever body of rules, norms, or beliefs, govern the formation of these 
sorts of justification. For example, a particular strategy which 
justifies the chess move indicated above must be consistent with further 
stages of the overall strategy, and, as well, it must be consistent 
with the body of beliefs which constitute the formation rules of chess 
strategies generally. Similarly, in the example of the student's 
career choice, whatever justifies his particular selection 
itself 
must be consistent with the body of beliefs which justify other 
like 
decisions. 
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(C) Normative Principles 
Necessarily, a decision-maker must be capable of sorting out 
alternatives and justifications in accordance with these formal princi- 
ples, but much more could be hoped for, indeed expected, in a good, 
as opposed to simply 'competent', decision-maker. Three offshoots from 
the principle of compatibility could promote` better quality decision- 
making - i. e. greater frequency of 'correctness' .. J suggest that branch- 
ing out from the notion of compatibility, alternatives and justifications 
should have (a) breadth in terms of the variety and number, (b) depth 
as regards the decision-maker's understanding of outcomes of alterna- 
tives and theoretical basis of justifications, and (c) centrality, by 
which I mean the decision-maker, ideally, should be capable of ascertain- 
ing those alternatives and justifications which are of greatest impor- 
tance. These should be discussed in terms of both alternatives and 
principles. 
(i) Alternatives and breadth, depth and centrality 
Alternatives first. Concerning breadth: establishing the object-of- 
decision opens the gates to the possibility of differing alternatives 
limited only in number and variety to the point where the human imagina- 
tion will carry no further (within the confines of consistency and com- 
patibility of course) - an indefinite number of alternatives. In other 
words, a formal requirement of decision is that there be choice between 
at least two alternatives: that we might have a great deal of choice, 
so long as it is manageable in practical terms, seems to me obviously 
desirable. 
The depth of understanding of alternatives and their outcomes is 
also an important consideration in ideal decisions. Remember, we seek 
not only theoretical understanding of the ceteris peribus outcome but 
pragmatic implications bearing in mind all of the variable features of 
time, place, and individuals involved in the specific decision at hand. 
For example, sending a child for remedial reading classes may have 
pragmatic implications which go far beyond the pedagogical aspects: the 
child's ego may suffer, insensitive parents might take this as 
failure 
on the part of the child to work hard and punish 
him, and so on. The 
possibility of ever increasingly sophisticated and refined 
theoretical 
descriptions of the alternatives, and never ending pragmatic 
implica- 
tions makes complete knowledge of outcomes 
highly improbable. From 
this point of view an ideal decision-maker, 
I suppose, would be clairvoy- 
ant. But short of that, gradations of 
knowledge from more to less are 
26 
what ought to incline us toward one decision-maker rather than others, 
at least in this regard. 
That an alternative be compatible with the object-of-decision, it 
be one among a great range of them, and its outcomes completely known, 
still provides no assurance that this particular alternative is vitally 
important - that it is central to the object. To some extent this 
condition is encroaching on the justification of one alternative as 
opposed to others, but I do not intend it as having reached the stage 
of formal justification. I want to make the distinction between saying 
X is compatible with Y: X is central to Y: X is necessary for Y. 
That a good decision-maker be capable of sifting his alternatives for 
central ones suggests that he is performing a prima facie justification 
perhaps; yet, I believe we can usefully separate the important cons i d- 
erations_from the vital one, -that which we eventually justify as the 
most important, essential, necessary, or vital. 
(i i) Justifying principles and breadth, depth and centrality 
All three categories are important to justifying principles though in a 
slightly different way. In a given decision it is to be hoped that, 
relative to the object-of-decision, one could provide a wide range 
of alternatives which are central in importance and understood as regards 
outcomes, i ndepth . The optimum, regarding justifications, for such a 
decision however, would not be in having a great number: we do not seek 
a large number and variety of justifications as we do alternatives to 
choose from; rather we seek the one justification, or interconnected 
grouping of them, which is better than all other possibilities. Remember, 
'decisions' require Hore than one alternative but only one justification. 
Where breadth comes in, therefore, is not in range of justifications, 
but range of knowledge of possibilities for justification. In chess, 
for example, the strategy which justifies move B rather than C, as a 
matter of logic, need not come from the player's widely ranging cognitive 
storehouse of strategies - it may be the only one he knows and good 
luck makes it appropriate here. But as a normative stipulation it seems 
clear that his promise as a high quality decision-maker improves with 
the breadth of his understanding of uniform strategies and the appro- 
priate procedural rules of strategy-making that would enable him to 
devise further ones of his own. 
As for depth: that one should understand the theoretical basis of 
the justifications - what justifies a justification - is a further 
normative stipulation which seems valuable, if only instrumentally, 
in 
providing the decision-maker with even higher order grounds 
for 
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choosing as he does. Educational theory provides apt illustrations. 
Pedagogical choices are frequently made on the grounds of compatibility 
and consistency with a supporting educational theory which itself is a theoretician's product and possibly, therefore, fallible - inadequate or 
simply false. For example, the decision to send a child to a remedial 
reading specialist may have been made on the basis of a specialized 
test given the child; yet the test itself may have been inadequate to 
test the deficiencies for which it was designed. Clearly, one's 
ability to assess the quality of the test as well as be aware that it, 
or some test of reading ability, is, prima facie, a useful justification 
for selecting one alternative over another (e. g. sending a student to 
a remedial specialist rather than keeping him in the general class) 
seems to boost the competence of a decision-maker. 
The notion of centrality is less applicable here than with alterna- 
tives because something would only count as a justification for a 
particular decision if it were absolutely central (or be seen as such) 
to the object-of-decision. However, to the extent that one sifts 
through possible justifications (e. g. strategies in chess) looking 
only among those which are obviously pertinent - central - one does 
employ the idea of centrality in justifying principles. 
Naturally our authorization of a curriculum decision-maker should 
be directed toward he whose decisions are most frequently 'correct'. 
Having established the character of a competent decision it behooves us 
now to consider the epistemic credentials of decision-makers and formu- 
late clearly a set of minimum necessary conditions for the competent 
decision-maker. Whether this will lead us to a criterion, i. e. empiri- 
cally verifiable credentials, remains to be seen. 
5. Necessary Conditions of Competence 
Three epistemic credentials are necessary to making competent 
curriculum decisions: (a) knowledge of alternatives (i. e. theoretical 
descriptions and pragmatic outcomes) and justifying principles (b) 
cognitive ability to perform the deductive and inductive operations of 
reasoning and judging consistency and compatibility (and perhaps also 
depth, breadth and centrality) and the affective ability to adhere to 
decisions once made (c) pragmatic capability of economically accurate- 
ly gathering vital data about theoretical descriptions and practical 
outcomes of alternatives. 
That (a) above is a decision-making requirement is obvious. How 
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could one decide about the content of curriculum without having the 
slightest inkling of what might count as an alternative, or what would 
justify one of the alternatives, if we knew them? Really, the question 
is 'What must we know in order to know the alternatives and justifica- 
tions? ' This question is crucial to assigning decision-making compe- 
tence., yet very complex. It will, therefore,. be. left to the next 
chapters. Items (b) and (c) can be expeditiously 'dealt with here. 
(a) The Cognitive and Affective Abilities Condition of Competence 
A number of abilities, both cognitive and affective, underly the 
whole enterprise of rational decision-making: formulating alternatives 
and coming to conclusions which express decisions. Think of the cogni- 
tive requirements for drawing an inference from some state of affairs 
and understanding its modality as being necessary or contingent (and 
thereby, probable, possible, etc. ). Projecting a consequent from the 
antecedent involves imagination, intuitive power, orginality, and a 
sense of relevance. Conceiving of the inferred consequence as necessary 
would entail -considerable maturity of conceptual development notably 
in the areas of causality, temporal relations, a priori, analyticity, 
consistency, and compatibility. Understanding it as contingent would 
require such notions as probability, possibility, evidence, confirma- 
tion, and proof. Along. with these features of conceptual maturity are 
a number of dispositions or awarenesses, which are, to some extent, 
matters of intellectual maturity (or the final stage of intellectual 
development as we would understand from Piaget and Kohlberg), and to a 
further degree 'excellences', or virtues in the Aristotelian sense, 
which, in either case, are components of competence and good quality 
decision-making. They are such things as consistency, precision, 
clarity, accuracy, objectivity, rigour, impartiality, and respect for 
facts and arguments. 
Equally, emotional, or affective, components are germane to. 
decision-making, though they are frequently ignored. For example, a 
certain amount of confidence is necessary, not so much for 
drawing 
conclusions but for sticking to the decisions which they 
house even in 
the face of challenges from authorities and external pressures. 
Such 
traits as self-esteem, firmness, uninhibitedness, _ 
integrity, courage 
and determination are central here. Yet, a 
decision-maker must be 
flexible and in order to do so need be cautious, conscientious, and 
constructive. 
Mentioning all of this seems to me important because it is ignored 
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by some who would nominate children as curriculum decision-makers 
(-cf. the free school and deschool ino movements) when clear. ly they lack 
sufficient intellectual maturity; others, as I shall argue in another 
chapter, make far too much of it, wanting to extend the claims of 
intellectual incapability to adolescents so as to exclude them from 
nomination even when this appears factually incorrect. The features 
of intellectual maturity and ability necessary for the making of 
reasoned decision is often inappropriate to support the claims and 
disclaims of competence in the candidacy of children; more will be said 
of this later. 
Marginal intellectual competence may be a precondition of making 
reasoned decisions, but is the ideal, i. e. our ideal of perfection in 
a curriculum decision-maker, one whose intellectual capabilities are 
the polar opposite, namely brilliance? It is tempting to say yes, but 
within the scope of 'curriculum decisions' are a great many mundane 
issues of little consequence which require the mental talents of little 
more than a child (e. g. Should the curtains be open or closed when the 
overhead projector is in use? ). That a decision-maker be able to see 
the most profound and subtle theoretical justification for the mundane 
reflects well on the ingenuity of the individual in question but no. 
significant benefits to the educational enterprise are necessarily 
incurred. When sorting through alternative decision-makers in later 
chapters we would be well advised to bear in mind the importance of 
the decision and the requirements (intellectually) of making satisfac- 
tory decisions, as well as concerning ourselves with simply assessing 
intellectual prowesse. 
(b) Adequate Access 
For the most part, this topic relates more closely to problems of 
execution, i. e. ways of overcoming practical obstacles in the 
implemen- 
tation of decisions (e. g. convincing others to go along with one's 
decision) than it does to the activity of decision-making, but there 
is, however, one capacity which anyone making a decision must have. 
One 
must be capable of availing oneself of accurate 
data which is vital to 
assessing pragmatic outcomes of alternatives. 
Adequate access to data 
is essential in the gleening of information which 
is peculiar to a 
given situation - that which differentiates 
it from all others - which 
pertains to the infinite variations having to 
do with the social, 
psychological, and economic circumstances of 
the individuals involved. 
And what sort of access is adequate? In some cases 
it must be first 
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hand observations; someone else's report necessarily filters and inter- 
prets first hand observations in terms of what is thought to be impor- 
tant, thereby transmitting to the decision-maker impressions and evalua- 
tions and summari zat i ons . For some types of decision-making second- 
hand reports are a necessary economy. I will attempt to show that in 
many curriculum areas such economy is often counterproductive - too 
much valuable detail is lost. Adequate access can also entail a form 
of information gathering of a more 'personal' type than of simply 
'detached observation' . By this I mean a subtle understanding of the 
probable reactions of another person to particular stimuli and to their 
less outwardly apparent beliefs and emotional sensibilities. Obvious 
examples of such close personal relationships are those often found in 
intensely emotional couplings like husband and wife, parent and child, 
and even between bitter enemies. To a lesser extent such relationships 
can arise among friends and teachers and students. 
6. The Feasibility of Developing a Criterion 
It is one thing to claim that a competent decision-maker must ful- 
fi ll certain logical conditions but quite another to have a criterion, 
a rule, or set of them, which enables us to tell who actually fulfills 
these conditions and who does not. Clearly these are logically distinct: 
X may know that p even if Y has no way of determining this - perhaps 
X just will not let on. For our part, however, a checklist of some 
description is necessary. How should we go about it? 
We could do two things: develop a criterion abstractly and then 
use it to deal with our alternative decision-makers, or simply investi- 
gate the candidates straight-away, asking ourselves if and 
how each 
could fulfill the conditions. The former would have an advantage inso- 
far as the quality, or rather the extensiveness of a newly developed 
criterion, or set of rules, would be concerned, for presumably, if we 
came up with a comprehensive set of rules for distinguishing the com- 
petent from the charlatans we could use it to deal with any number of 
candidates, even some with whom we are not concerned in this thesis. 
But this I fear is the failing point of this plan. For while the 
criterion would be extensive and complete if worked up 
in abstraction, 
independent of those candidates with whom we are specifically concerned, 
it 
would be a more powerful device than we really need, and quite 
time 
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consuming to construct. It seems more practicable for our purposes 
simply to take the short cut by fastening ourselves only on the candi- 
dates who are of direct interest to this thesis. After all, we are not 
really interested in working out all of the ways the conditions of 
competence might be fulfilled, hypothetically; we only want to know 
if our candidates can be competent and how. So our future task wi ll 
be to direct our attention to considerations of competence as they 
pertain to students, parents, experts, and teachers as potential 
cur. riculum decision-makers. 
I 
Chapter III 
ACTIVITIES AND CONTEXTS (1) 
1. Introduction 
Having in mind the general problem of determining who ought to 
have authority to make curriculum decisions, we attempted in. the last 
chapter to clarify the meaning of 'competence' as it pertains to 
decision-making. We discussed the structure of competent decision- 
making and then argued that individuals would have to meet certain 
standards if they were ever to qualify; though we left it for a future 
chapter to determine exactly how. Just to review: it was claimed 
that rational decision-making involves sifting through random options 
for genuine alternatives, then choosing among them, relative to an 
object-of-decision, (i. e. whatever is being decided about), on the 
basis of a justifying principle - something which enables the chooser 
to assign preference to one alternative over the others. As for the 
intellectual requirements of those who would be capable of this, we 
said that one must have a whole host of cognitive and affective abili- 
ties which are essential to performing the operation of inference and 
keeping to decisions once made - something which deep--seated insecuri- 
ties and external emotional pressures can make very difficult. These 
abilities, however, are insufficient in themselves for decision-making. 
One must have knowledge of what is being decided about. That is, one 
must know what the object-of-decision is, what the alternatives are, 
and what justifying principles are relevant. 
How is one to know the proper ranges of alternatives and justifica- 
tions? What sort of knowledge background must the decision-maker have? 
I want to agree with the prevailing view that a knowledge of subject 
content, educational theory, teaching methodology and practical exper- 
ience are logical prerequisites - the particular decision, of course, 
determining the type of knowledge to be emphasized. But I want to make, 
as well, a further and more unusual claim. It is that education, that 
is to say formal schooling, is an activity and as such has a particular 
sort of structure. It is an understanding of this structure and how its' 
components relate to one another that is vital to decision-making. In 
addition, activities exist within particular sorts of circumstances 
which I will call context. This, I will endeavour to show, has an enor- 
mous bearing upon decisions. Consequently, a knowledge of the activity 
structure must be supplemented by an understanding of the context. 
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There is a connection between understanding the activity of formal 
education and its context and knowledge of subject content, educational 
theory and so forth. My intention in this chapter and the next two is 
to unpack the notion of education as an activity and then link this 
with knowledge of subject content, etc. The purpose in doing this is 
to show the sort of knowledge that is required of a competent curriculum 
decision-maker. In light of this we will be able to ask, later, who 
is likely to have this sort of knowledge? Who, therefore, ought to 
control curriculum? 
2. Activities and Contexts 
I want to begin by analysing the logical structure, or form, of an 
'activity' and then go on to discuss 'context' and its relationship to 
activities. Considerable use will be made of these concepts in this 
and later chapters so the detailed accounts to be given will, I hope, be 
justified. 
(a) Activities 
(i) The concept of an activity 
l 
The position to be taken is that activities are comprised of actions 
which, in turn, are fundamental units of intentional behaviour, and 
which are strung together into a coherent whole by a programme and set 
of procedures. 
First, a general point about activities. Golf, tennis, soccer, 
monopoly and chess are characteristic activities. Equally, within any 
of these we could identify sub-; activities. In golf, for example, it 
would not seem odd to speak of putting as an activity in its own right, 
though quite definitely part of the supra-activity of golf. Indeed, 
golf is made up of many activities, of which putting is only one. The 
1There is an enormous literature in action theory which has a hearing 
on many of the issues raised in this analysis. Anything like a complete 
listing would be out of the question but the following are notable: 
Myles Brand ed. , The Nature of Human Action 
(Glenview, Illinois: Scott, 
Foresman & Co., 1970), (An interesting collection of articles and book 
selections which includes contributions from A. I . Meldon 
(see also his 
Human Action (New York: Humanities Press, 1961), Gilbert Ryle, Donald 
Davidson, and Arthur Danto) .In The Concept of Motivation 
(London: 
Rout ledge & Kegan Paul, 1958), R .S. Peters has some interesting things 
to say about the connections between human actions, rules and motives 
(see especially Chapters one and two) . 
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relationship between activities and the sub activities which comprise 
it will be discussed fully a bit later, but for now I wanted simply to 
identify the sort of entity we will be talking about as an 'activity'. 
Second, any activity is comprised of actions. And they, in turn, 
are intentional units of behaviour. (I am inclined to call them funda- 
mental units of behaviour so as to make them clearly distinguishable 
from actions; but we must be careful with 'fundamental' because of its 
vagueness. Any fundamental unit could be construed as having even 
more fundamental units, and they even more . Nevertheless, it is a 
rough distinction which ought to serve us without difficulty. ) 
An activity, like putting, say, would involve various actions 
such as lining up the ball (with the hole) and stroking it. These I 
will call fundamental units of behaviour with the understanding that, 
strictly speaking, they may be further subdivided. But it is important 
to make the further note that these actions are not just fundamental 
behaviours, they are intentional. The activity of putting is not com- 
posed of random or coincidental actions (i. e. behaviours) : they are 
done by an agent who intends them to be executed in suchandsuch a 
way. - 
Point three arises from this question: If an agent intends to 
act in such-and-such a way, what is it that inclines him to act in 
that way rather than some other? The answer is. that the agent acts in 
the way he does because he is following a rule. In activities, that 
is to say, there are proper ways of doing things, which are specified 
by rules or procedural directives of some sort. 
2 
How one goes about 
21n 
the considerable body of philosophical debate on the status of 
rules, there has been a distinction made by John Searle (Speech Acts, 
London: Cambridge University Press, 1969) between regulative and con- 
stitutive rules. In any activity, the former guide and direct behaviour. 
The latter not only regulate but actually define, or constitute, the 
activity. Regulative rules guide but do not define the activity; con- 
stitutive rules do both. 
Geoffrey Warnock (The Object of Morality, London: Methuen, 1971) 
down-plays the importance of this 'distinction. He says, first, that all 
rules regulate. (It is unclear whether he is criticising Searle for 
saying they do not; which, of course, would be a mistake on Warnock's 
part, since Searle explicitly states that both regulative and consti- 
tutive rules regulate. ) Second, he claims that this distinction between 
types of rules seems really to be a groping after a different sort of 
point about rules, namely how they function. 
I would support Warnock's second point; though of particular impor- 
tance for me is that the regulative-constitutive distinction is thought 
to be artificial. This I agree with because, as I will argue in other 
terms later, all rules that normally occur in (regulate) a given activity, 
in a sense, constitute that activity. Granted they may not 'officially' 
define the activity; but they are certainly integral to the characteri- 
zation of the activity - i. e. to our conception of what components make 
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putting, or playing the game of golf, is, from the procedural point of 
view, according to various rules - rules governing the proper way to putt, 
or in the larger case, to play golf. That is, one could not putt ýy 
bashing the golf ball into the ground with a tree branch! That might be 
an action - an intentional behaviour - but it is not part of the acti- 
vity of putting or the larger activity of golf. 
The directives of an activity - the rules - are what I will call 
procedures. Taken together, procedures give unity to an activity. They 
draw together a variety of actions into something we recognize as a 
coherent whole - such as golf or a dance. It goes without saying, there- 
fore, that the procedures of an activity must be consistent with one 
another. For instance, in golf it would not be consistent with one 
which prohibits stroking the ball out of bounds and another rule which 
specifies that precisely this should be done. 
If one were asked to characterize a particular activity part of the 
job could be done by relating the procedures. One could give a render- 
-ing of golf by stating the rules of play, strategies and so forth. But 
there is something more. To make golf or any other activity intellig- 
ible something more general must be said to draw a picture of the sort 
of game that golf is. A general description would be necessary; and one 
would want to say something about the purpose of the game and the point 
to doing this part of the game and that part. To that could be added 
some sort of explanation of the items described; and there could be a 
listing of general principles that oversee the more specific procedures. 
up the activity. In opposition one might claim that rules of procedure- 
for example, the proper way of holding a golf club', - are not essential to 
the existence of the game; hence they cannot constitute, or even charac- 
terize the activity. This is unconvincing, I find, because one could say 
precisely the same about a great many of the allegedly constitutive, i. e. 
formal, rules. For example, in golf, if we did not take penalties for 
going out of bounds, allowed all. putts within five inches of the hole to 
count as in and removed by hand any shots landing in a sandtrap, would we 
no longer be playing golf? And on the other side of the argument, is it 
not the case that particular rules of strategy and etiquette become so 
commonly applied that they develop into essential aspects of one's concep- 
tion of the activity? To put it bluntly, the notion of constitutive 
rules seems rather tenuous; held up only by the fact that in games and so 
forth there are official rules and that it seems convenient sometimes to 
speak of them as defining the activity. 
For an extended discussion of rule-fol lowing and the rule-governed- 
ness of activities see Peter Winch, The Idea of a Social Science (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958) especially p. 24-39. 
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These elements combine to form what I will call the programme of the 
activity. Now it is important to note here that some authors speak of 
activities as having a 'point' or 'overall purpose'. 
3 I think, though, 
this is to make the story much too short. For apart from how one actu- 
ally engages in an activity - by following the procedures -a much richer 
conception of what lies behind the activity such as I have given in the 
account of 'programme' seems to do more justice to how we actually under- 
stand an activity. 
As with procedures, the elements of the programme must be internally 
consistent. Obviously golf cannot properly be described as a game 
played with clubs and a game played with racquets. Also, the programme 
must be consistent with the procedures. If rugby is described as a 
body contact sport then the rules cannot expressedly forbid body contact. 
There are two subsidiary points here. First, to follow procedural 
directives is to make a decision. It is to choose a particular way of 
acting from among the alternatives. And, it is the rule or procedure 
that functions as the 'justifying principle'. We choose to act in the 
way we do because the rule indicates that it is (more) proper, advanta- 
geous, etc. than other alternatives. 
4 
Second, it is possible for an 
activity to have more than one programme and set of procedures. Riding 
a bicycle, for instance,, could be described and explained and undertaken 
according to different rules by two different people. For them to be 
engaging in an identical activity, as opposed to different versions of 
the same (general) activity, the programmes and procedures of the one 
person's actions must be logically equivalent to those of the other. 
5 
3Glenn Langford and R. S. Peters in 'Values and Education (1) and 
(2)' in Glenn Langford and D. J. O'Connor eds., New Essays in the Philos- 
ophy of Education (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973) speak of 
activities as having a 'point' (Peters) and 'overall purpose' (Langford).. 
4This 
is quite in disagreement with Wittgenstein who, in Philosophical 
Investigations (first edition 1953) (Oxford: Basil Blackwell , 197 
sections 219,232, maintains that, as a procedural matter, rules are 
followed blindly. This may be so whence rules become habituated (though 
even so, a subconscious decision is no less a decision), but some rules 
are not. I may learn the rules of the road in a foreign country and 
think carefully each time an occasion to use one arises when I am driving 
there. 
5Searle, in Speech Acts op. cit., p. 39 gives an interesting example 
of two sets of chess rules which follow different conventions with re- 
gard to the way pieces are to be moved but both reduce to applications 
of the same general rule. Languages, he claims, are like this. 
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Returning to the main points: I want to say, fourth, that proce- 
dural rules may be formal or informal. Formal rules would be those that 
have some 'official' claim to be necessary elements in the definition of 
the activity, e. g. to be found in the book of rules, or always espoused 
(and followed) by known authorities. Informal rules would be those which 
are not, strictly speaking, official but which are, nevertheless, fol- 
lowed by participants, including authorities and experts, whether they 
are articulated or not; and can be, as I will endeavour to show later, 
part of the constitution of the activity. 
6A 
soccer player, for example, 
would observe the official rules of play, but would, as well, regulate 
his actions by numerous strategies, rules-of-thumb, matters of etiquette, 
and so on, which are informal rules, and very much part of the activity 
known as soccer. 
Fifth is a point on which great importance is to be placed, now 
and in future chapters. It is that the programme and procedures of an 
activity are not simply propositions that are understood, and, in the 
case of procedures, obeyed. They can both be understood at more and 
less sophisticated levels; and the number of propositions forming the 
corpus of the programme and of the rules can be more than standard. 
Rules, first, may themselves be understood at different levels. 
The works of Piaget and Kohlberg are well known for providing similar 
explanations of the different levels on which rules per se can be under- 
stood. Rules can range from being seen as directives with no meaning 
or significance other than resulting in some pleasantness if obeyed or, 
perhaps more likely, unpleasantness if disobeyed, to human constructs 
which may be evaluated as either morally or practically good on the 
basis of further principles (or perhaps be seen as good principles in 
themselves). So there is, as a first point, the fact that rules them- 
selves admit of a more or less sophisticated level of understanding. 
Strictly speaking, then, an activity could be engaged in by someone 
even at the lowest of these levels , so 
long as he could construe the 
rules as part of a larger whole - i. e. as part of an activity. Such a 
participant, however, would only be marginally competent when compared 
with someone whose understanding of rules, per se, was more sophisticated. 
But more important still is surely the fact that the content of 
some rules can be understood in greater depth than others, and in many 
6This formal-informal distinction would probably be taken by Searle 
to correspond to his constitutive - regulative distinction. My point, 
of course, is that activities come to be characterized (constituted by) 
all of the rules that normally govern them - both formal and informal. 
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cases a greater number of rules than just the standard ones can be known. 
Talk of in-depth understanding of some rules is inappropriate, of 
course. One's tennis serve, for example, must land within a certain 
marked-off portion of the court. One either understands this or one 
does not. However, in some sports or games the application of a rule 
in some situations affords one player an option to do .x or y 
(perhaps 
more). In American and Canadian football, for instance, there are ci r- 
cumstan ces under which one team, against whom there has been an infrac- 
tion of the rules, is given two options by a further rule. In order to 
understand the rule one must understand what consequences normally 
follow from selecting each option. But there are different levels of 
understanding them; for one may understand that options x and y are 
both available without seeing the significance (with regard to winning 
and losing - game plan or strategy) of either. This, of course, applies 
to many rules whether they are of the sort that provide options or not. 
One still must see the consequences, and perhaps as well, see the impor- 
tance- of the rule in question to the activity as a whole. All of this 
can be understood more or less. 
And, one must not forget that not all rules are formal rules. If, 
in the category of informal rules, we include strategies (which act as 
justifying principles for some of the decisions within the activity), 
then most assuredly in-depth understanding is possible. Ingenuity com- 
bines with foresight, skill of execution, and overall understanding of 
the activity in this. Strategy, tactics and techniques are not just 
knowing what to do, but when'. 
To be sure, one can participate in activities in which one does not 
know all of the formal rules. Many unsophisticated chess players do not 
know the rule of en passant which under certain circumstances, allows a 
pawn to take an opponent. 's piece in an unorthodox manner. And it is 
quite obvious that some tennis players do not know that when stroking 
the ball it is not permissible for the ball to hit the frame of the 
racquet - it must touch the strings only. Like most sports and games, 
chess and tennis could be played without knowing a great many of the 
rules. A competent player (or an optimally competent player), however, 
would know all of the rules, or a very large portion of them. 
Equally, when thinking of informal rules, numerous rules of eti- 
quette or strategies could be unknown to a participant. Indeed, since 
strategies can be invented', there is always a petential for more regula- 
tive rules to come into existence and hence be known by a sophisticated 
player. 
Turning our attention to the programme of an activity, much the 
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same applies. with regard to depth and breadth of understanding. For 
within the 'programme' are the descriptions, explanations, aims, princi- 
ples, purposes, etc., which, quite obviously, can be understood in 
greater or lesser depth and breadth. For example, golf, to some, is 'a 
good walk spoiled' -a rule-governed activity which consists largely in 
banging around a small white ball in pretty surroundings'. Others might 
describe and explain it differently - with more subtlety, sensitivity 
and understanding - as a game of strategy, style, skill, subtlety, 
patience and emotional control; and a game whose aims include providing 
fresh air and physical exercise, good sportsmanship, compet i veness and 
improved body coordination. Much more could be said. of course, but the 
point is that someone who takes the latter view is not simply making a 
psychological or preferential judgment, he actually has a different -a 
more penetrating and ci rcumspect i ve - conception of the game than does 
the person in the former instance. Again, this would be true of chess. 
One can play the game describing it only in terms of manoeuvres directed 
toward capturing the opposition's king; or one could see it as a game 
of pattern, strategy and psychological play. This is not just to give 
a more long-winded, but equivalent, description; it is to give a differ- 
ent, more in-depth account. And as one elaborated further, the account 
would become increasingly broad. 
My point in sum, therefore, is that activities are objective enti- 
ties insofar as they have public and standard rules and descriptions. 
But there is a subjective dimension as well. That is, to a large degree, 
an activity is what it is conceived to be by its participants (and 
others, e. g. officials and spectators). Now there must be some degree 
of common conception in order for all participants to conceive them- 
selves as engaged in the same activity as the others., and that concep- 
tions must align with the standard conception of activity A, if activity 
A is to be the activity they are engaged in. But it does not seem at 
all odd to suppose that some participants understand much more about the 
activity than others; and understand in greater depth and detail those por- 
tions which they know in common with other participants. 
Sixth is a purely expository point. In future I will refer to the 
programme and procedures (both formal and informal rules) as the activity 
structure. For it seems quite legitimate to say that what describes 
and explains an activity, and what regulates its' procedures is, in aggre- 
gate, that which gives the activity its structure. 
(ii) Micro activities and macro activities 
Not only can actions combine into activities, but in like fashion, 
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activities can, on simi lar principles, combine to make other activities. 
A macro activity can be composed of micro activities so long as some 
central programme - i. e. description, explanation, aims, principles and 
purposes - unifies the latter by making them consistent and compatible; 
that is, into a coherent whole. Setting up a defensive posture in 
chess, acquiring all of the railroads and ul ti li ties in Monopoly, put- 
ting in golf, airplanes arranging themselves in a particular formation 
for part of a flying display, preparing and serving drinks at a party, 
and putting together the table of contents for a thesis, are all activi- 
ties within activities. They are micro activities within particular 
macro activities. And, in each case above, the micro activity indicated 
combines with other micro activities to make up the macro activity. 
Putting, for example, is one of the many activities that, when taken to- 
gether, comprise the game of golf. 
(M) i) Closed activities and open activities 
A further point about activities, and one which will be very important 
for our ensuing discussion about formal schooling and curriculum: is this. 
Some macro activities are what I will call closed activities. They have 
fixedly official descriptions, principles and purposes which identify 
and limit the range of micro activities that can exist within the macro 
activity. The supra or macro activity is closed to the admission of 
new (micro) activities or deletion of present (micro) activities. In 
other words, there is a set and unalterable programme of micro activities 
which comprise the macro activity. (This is unchanged by the fact that 
constituting rules of either macro or micro activities are capable of 
being understood at various levels (depths) and that from the programme 
can be generated numerous informal rules, (including strategies, under- 
standings, intimations, and the like). For such additions do not create 
new activities; only add to the complexity of our understanding of those 
already in existence. ) Chess is a good example of a closed activity. No 
matter how one describes or re-describes (fn logically equivalent terms 
at a minimum level) the game and its objectives the range of activities 
(those of defense and offense) remain constant'; otherwise one is simply 
not playing the game known as chess. 
Open activities, by contrast, are macro activities, but with a 
composition not completely restricted to standard micro units. Rather, 
7Conceivably, an activity which is a micro activity within a macro 
activity could, itself, possibly be construed as a macro activity for 
other sub or micro activities. 
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some degree of admission and deletion of micro activities is permissible. 
In some cases this is accounted for by the existence of looseness in the 
programme, particularly the description of the activity such that it is 
amenable to differing interpretations, each of which may have unique con- 
stituting structures. A parallel is well known in the analysis of some 
concepts such as 'democracy' or 'justice'. 
8 
This would be exemplified 
by, say, the activity of partying. Though A and B may share a basic 
understanding of the nature of a party and what procedures are character- 
istic - i. e. that it is an occasion for collective relaxation, enter- 
tainment and so on - each may plan for his party a collection of micro 
activities that differs from the other (e. g. drinks, dinner and dancing 
at A's party; coffee, cakes and conversation at B's party). 
It warrants note here that looseness is not boundlessness. Parties 
may be as different from one another as one system of democracy or 
justice is from others; but parties are not football games or tennis 
matches, democracy is not absolutism, and justice is not tyranny. We 
all have, in common, a concept of party, democracy and justice. And 
because of this we can roughly agree on what counts as an instance of 
each of the above. Nevertheless, the concepts are vague, something which 
allows for considerable differences in interpretation. 
Openness has another source. It could be expected to stem as well 
from activity programmes which stress aims and objectives without attend- 
ing too closely to the means, or procedural rules, of accomplishing 
them. Hunting and fishing, for instance, are necessarily concerned with 
the attempted capture of prey; and to be sure, present technology, 
traditions, and resources suggest a range of means. But the specific 
activities can differ quite considerably. The macro activity of fishing 
can be comprised of micro activities such as those relevant to catching 
fish with nets, spears or rods. 
Ironically, however, even open activities must be closed, if only 
provisionally. For a significant duration of time any activities must 
be considered to have a fixed programme of constituting activities, other- 
wise participants could never actually engage in a particular activity. 
If the procedural rules of fishing were not consistent for someone while 
he engaged in it on some occasion - if they were continually in flux - it 
would be hard to understand how the-fisherman could be said to be engaged 
in the same activity from one moment to the next. That a collection of 
8See 
F. Waissman, 'Verifiability' (see 'open' texture) in The 
Theory of Meaning, G. H. R. Parkinson ed., (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1966F. - 
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activities must be provisionally fixed, however, does not mean that 
after suitable duration it cannot be altered. The fact that in certain 
kinds of activities there can be alterations whereas in others there 
cannot, is the distinguishing feature of open activities from closed. 
This distinction of closed and open activities will be of consider- 
able importance when discussing formal education. The latter is a 
macro activity, I will attempt to show; and open in virtue of both the 
looseness of its central description and the multiplicity of possible 
micro activities (hence multiplicity of constituting procedural rules). 
If this is true, the school decision-maker's problem is, of course, 
determining (a) what the programme, i. e. description, etc., of the macro 
activity is to be (given the ambiguities), (b) what micro activities 
will constitute the macro activity, (c) what actions will take place 
within the various micro activities. (Since activities and actions are 
rule governed, to establish the former is to establish the latter as 
well. ) 
(i v) Summa ry 
To conclude the general analysis of activities, it might be helpful to 
reiterate some previous remarks about the part it plays in decision- 
making. Think of decision-making within the game of chess. 
Legitimate chess moves must be sifted from random options, then a 
preferred alternative move extracted from the legitimate moves. Both 
normative operations require a knowledge of the constituting rules, for 
it is being optimally consistent with them that justifies the selections 
in each case. But it is not just the formal rules which justify deci- 
sions in chess: the informal rules such as strategies, understandings, 
sensitivities and intimations do as well; all of which can be generated 
from the game's programme, i. e. general descriptions, principles, and 
objectives. Hence, to the extent that one does not have a rule to justi- 
fy each and every decision one must appeal to more abstract directives 
within the activity's structure; these being principles, objectives, and 
aims, which form part of the game's programme. But, as I mentioned at 
the end of the last section, the object-of-decision is not always about 
what to do within an activity. It could also be about what the activity 
should be as is the case, for example, when one decides what micro acti- 
vities shall constitute an openly described macro activity. Here one 
is virtually making up the provisional rules of the macro activity - 
decisions which rely on an understanding of the general macro description 
and' its aims, objectives, and principles. Clearly, competent decision- 
making both within and about activities depends upon one's understanding 
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of the details of, and within, an activity's structural categories. 
(b) Contexts 
More than simply knowledge of activity structure is important to 
decision-making. I want to show that it must be supplemented by an 
understanding of 'context' ; and not always as just a pragmatic matter 
either. What is 'context' and how does it relate to activities and 
decision-making? 
Roughly speaking, 'context' refers to the circumstances or frame- 
work within which something takes place. An argument in favour of the 
right to freedom of the press, for example, might take place in the 
context of a general discussion of civil and political liberties - the 
latter being the set of ci rcumstances or general framework for the 
former. It is a rather vague notion; but I want to be more specific 
about it and treat it under two headings: conceptual and material 
contexts. 
(i) Conceptual context 
There may be a sense in which an activity may be said to have its own 
objective existence - perhaps because it has been officially recorded 
in some way. But, unquestionably, a human activity must exist in a 
rather more subjective way, in the minds of participants and other con- 
cerned parties. Chess and tennis, for example, can only be activities 
in which we do participate if they are understood; and understood in 
much the same way9 by all. The possibility of such understanding is 
dependent upon participants and others having (a) a sufficient level of 
conceptual development (b) certain types of concept, and (c) certain 
specific concepts within these types. Any activity, say chess, could 
not be understood by an infant; nor could it be understood by someone 
who had no concept of a game; nor by someone who had no. concept of the 
particular sort of game that chess is. On the latter, to know chess is 
to know (most of) its structure; and this in turn is dependent upon pos- 
session of certain concepts .It 
is this shared network of concepts 
(which presumes sufficient conceptual development) that I will call the 
conceptual context. 
9As I argued earlier, it is possible for some participants to under- 
stand the programme and procedures of an activity in greater depth and 
breadth than others. There is, however, some minimum level of under- 
standing that must be shared. 
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To consider this more fully, take soccer as an example. Players 
(and others) would need to have a concept of a game - that it has a 
point, duration, rules; and is a team, or collective endeavour, invol- 
ving good sportsmanship, strategy, skills, balls, passing, shooting, 
scoring, and so on. This would not necessarily be comprehended by 
people from a culture which played no games as we know them. 
Equally, these concepts, themselves, presuppose further and more 
basic concepts. Team play, to take one of these, is built on the notion 
that an individual is able to see himself as part of a collective effort, 
not simply as a unit. This is an elementary social concept; and good 
sportsmanship would be another. 
In addition, scientific concepts, or beliefs about the natural 
world, underlie human activities. One would suppose that modern day 
olympic competitors understand their events rather differently than the 
ancient Greeks who felt that much of their fortunes depended upon help 
from the Gods. And much of Alice's frustration with the game of cro- 
quette in Lewis Carroll's Through the Looking Glass stemmed from an 
understanding, or rather misunderstanding, of the absurd natural world 
in which she found herself. 
My claim, therefore, is that an activity exists for its partici- 
pants and other concerned parties relative to how they understand it. 
So when their subjective comprehension is shared and is the same as, or 
logically equivalent to, the objective or standard conception of the 
activity in question, then at least one condition has been fulfilled for 
the activity taking place. Furthermore, this shared understanding is a 
common knowledge of the activity's structure. And what makes this 
possible or, correspondingly, impossible, is the conceptual context of 
the activity, i. e. the conceptual network concerned with activities 
in 
general, the one in question, the social world and the natural world. 
In short, a compatible conceptual context is an a priori condition 
for 
an activity to be understood and to take place. 
(i i) Material context 
One could not create a characteristic 
(practical) human activity which 
would not take place in space, time, utilize resources and 
involve human 
personality, events, needs, motivation, etc. 
Even if -this activity 
never actually took place, one could not conceive of 
it without having 
in mind (standard) conditions of space, time, resource and psychology. 
These are the material conditions for given facts about an activity. 
For 
instance, chess games are located in some physical surroundings, 
have 
duration (though often unspecified), require physical resources such as 
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the playing equipment (e. g. a board, pieces, and perhaps tables, chairs, 
1i ght i ng, a building, heat, etc. ) and human resources such as energy to 
think and act and time which could have been used to do something else, 
and the inclination to participate and desire to win. Could a soccer 
game be conceivable without a field, a time span, equipment and the motj- 
vation or inclination to play? 
The categories (i. e. space, time, resources, and human psychology) 
are a priori conditions. And to some extent this is true of particular 
times, resources, etc. which are relevant to specified activities. For 
example, chess conceptually requires a board and pieces. Many other 
specifications, however, which fall into these categories may not be 
a priori conditions, but given some collection of facts about such things 
as the quantity and quality of the resources and the psychological state 
of other participants, other specification of space, time, resources 
etc. may become pragmatic necessities if the participation is to be com- 
petent, or even if the activity is to take place at all. For example, 
decisions about tactics and technique in a soccer game may be affected 
by the condition of the field (e. g. a slippery turf would preclude one 
from making very sharp turns). Indeed, given certain facts about the 
field condition on some occasion, the activity may not be possible - 
logically possible, but not practically. Equally, a hostess, in order 
to have a successful party, may have to be tolerant and polite to an 
obnoxious or boring guest - practical necessities to do with psychological 
facts in the activity's context. Decision-making, it follows, is very 
much dependent upon material circumstances for given instances of an 
activity. How we participate, and even whether we participate, is either 
logically or practically linked to material context. 
(c) Contexts and Activities 
This concludes the analysis of context. It remains for us to ex- 
plore its relationship with activities. This will be done under two 
headings. 
(i) Consistency and compatibility 
First, elements of the context must be consistent, -and as well 
be of 
constant duration not just while the activity 
is in progress -on a par- 
ticular occasion but as long as the activity exists under 
its standard 
programme. In other words, the way in which, 
for example, a soccer game 
is understood (conceptual context) and the social, psychological and 
economic facts about participants and their environment such as 
the 
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condition of the field, ball, uniforms and weather (material context) 
must not be internally contradictory (e. g. a ball and goal posts but no 
field) and they must not change significantly while the proceedings 
are going on. 
Second, the relationship between the activity and elements of 
context must be one of compatibility. Clearly, the activity cannot 
proceed according to its standard description unless facts about material 
circumstances and participants are conducive to it. If the player's 
attitudes and weather are not compatible with normal game conditions and 
if their views about the world are too much at variance with those 
necessary to conceive of the game in some way that is logically equiva- 
lent to its initial conception, then incompatibility prevents the acti- 
vity from continuing. 
(ii) Contextual plurality and static and dynamic contexts 
This discussion of consistency of context and compatibility between con- 
text and activity leads us on to the final , yet very important, remarks 
I want to make about context. From the standpoint of context-activity 
compatibility, something which we have just claimed to be essential to 
the procedure of an activity on a given occasion and a priori necessary 
to the conception of the activity at all, a static, i. e. unchanging, 
context for all instances (i. e. times and places) of the activity being 
carried on, would. seem ideal - as long as maximum context-activity com- 
patibility existed at the outset, of course. Both conceptual and material 
contexts are susceptible to change over time, however. Facts change and 
so do general beliefs about the world and activity-specific theories: 
contexts are potentially dynamic (i. e. changeable) over time. Further- 
more, insofar as activities can be carried on in different locations and 
by individuals with different conceptual schemes and views about the 
world, at any given time there can be what I will call contextual plural- 
e. 
10 
Now, an i ndef in i'te variety of contextual facts and theories can 
10Cultural diversity usually accounts for this. For an informative 
discussion of the resurgence of cultural diversity in the United States 
see Richard Pratte, 'Cultural Diversity and Education' 
in K. A. Strike 
and K. Egan eds., Ethics and Educational Policy 
(London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1978). It is interesting to note that the American tradition 
with regard to cultural diversity has been to create a single and uni- 
quely American culture (largely through education). 
The famous metaphor 
has been the 'American melting pot'. Canada, on the other hand, has 
traditionally endeavoured to- retain and protect its cultural 
diversity 
and has thought of this in terms of the metaphor 
'Canadian mosaic'. 
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be compatible with the existence of an activity to be sure: soccer can 
be played in the rain and on artificial turf just as in the sun and on 
grass, and many different views about the world and the activity are 
conducive to play. But too much dynamic shift or eccentric contextual 
plurality and the vital compatibility is lost, with the result being 
disastrous- for the existence of the activity, either pragmatically or 
conceptually depending on whether the offending contextual element is 
material or conceptual. 
(d) Context and Decision-Making 
How does context, as we have characterized it here, affect decision- 
making? At risk of obviousness and slight repetition, I want to re- 
iterate that a necessary condition of one's understanding an activity is 
that the conceptual context be consistent with the standard description 
of the activity, and that a pragmatically necessary condition of an 
activity being gone ahead with on a given occasion is the compatibility 
of the material context with it. Decision-making, within an activity, 
therefore, is logically dependent upon conceptual context and is, or 
should be, influenced by matters of fact. On the latter: one's decision 
to kick the soccer ball in such a way that one is moving at right angles 
to the ball presumes the existence of a number of material conditions, 
among which, in this case, would be that the turf is not too slippery to 
permit such a manoeuvre. The decision-maker's ignorance of important 
elements of context in this case (i. e. degree of shift in dynamic context) 
could frustrate performance of the activity - he could fall without hav- 
ing even touched the ball. Clearly, the material context is important 
to decision-making in an activity with regard to making reasoned choices 
about how, and where to engage in the activity. It seems to me, as 
well, that it should have a strong bearing upon one's decision whether 
or not even to participate in the activity. Poor lighting and insuf- 
ficient heat in the room may be enough to warrant postponing the chess 
match. 
Remembering our earlier mention of contextual shift and differen- 
tiation, the former in terms of contextual dynamism and the latter of 
contextual plurality, decision-making within different instances of the 
same activity may well have different outcomes simply because of context 
variation. If, over time, material context alters drastically then 
engagement in an activity may become impossible, perhaps ever again. 
Similarly, if concepts vital to the activity were to change, the acti- 
vity could no longer be made sense of and decision-making about it 
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would end. Equally, contextual plurality presents similar sorts of 
problems, the difference being that instead of the context of different 
instances of an activity changing over time, it differs as between loca- 
tions. Think of the material and conceptual differences between pro- 
fessional soccer and that which is played by young boys in the school 
yard. 
Our concern with context in decision-making about open activities 
is greater in some respects than with closed activities because in the 
former we are not just occupied by matters of how to participate in 
the activity or whether to do it at all, but also with what micro activi- 
ties ought to be included in the macro activity, a factor which is absent 
in closed activities. In open activities, therefore, a decision-maker 
who is concerned about the composition of a macro activity, either in 
the general case or in specific instances, might think the material con- 
text incompatible with certain micro activities, as when a camper who 
is catching fish for food decides that his equipment and bait and the 
location are more conducive to fly fishing than travelling, or that the 
conceptual context is incompatible with a certain micro activity, as in 
the case of a meteorologist rejecting cosmological means of predicting 
weather as part of his general methodology (macro activity). Also, an 
open activity decision-maker who, intending that his macro activity 
contain all, and only, those micro activities which will maximize the 
likelihood of achieving certain ends which are derived from the aims 
of the macro activity, i. e. treating the function of micro activities 
as means to ends, might choose to include or exclude alternative micro 
activities in, or from, the composite whole on the grounds of their 
utility in terms of achieving the desired ends, something which would 
depend heavily on the material context. That is, facts about partici- 
pants and their material circumstances would be significant factors in 
determining whether or not an activity of a given description would be 
useful in bringing about an overall end. 
In the next chapter I want to carry this discussion into the realm 
of education. My intention will be to demonstrate that education can 
be seen as an open macro activity. And, in treating it this way we are 
able to see the form of the knowledge which decision-makers must have 
in order to make competent decisions about and within the activity and 
activities of education: this will prove to have been made possible by 
our having analysed the formal structure of activities generally and 
observed the importance of contextual elements to decisions about activi- 
ties. 
Chapter IV 
ACTIVITIES AND CONTEXTS (2): EDUCATION AS AN ACTIVITY 
1. Is Education an Activity? 
R. S. Peters claims in many places 
l 
that education is not an 
activity. It may involve activities, though none in particular, but it 
is not itself an activity. Rather, education is a concept from which 
can be generated two sets of criteria. One of these puts forth the 
conditions that would have to be met if some action or activity is to 
be judged to be educational, and the other functions similarly as a 
measuring stick for being educated. A note to make here is that he 
thinks it important when considering the concept of education to distin- 
guish between a pre-nineteenth century use that still lingers and the 
richer current understanding. 
2 
The former would hold 'education' to 
mean anything from the mundane training involved in child-rearing to 
instruction in school; and that latter would pertain to the twentieth 
century ideal of the all-round development of a person morally, intel- 
lectually and spiritually. It is the latter that will concern us. So, 
education generates two criteria in virtue of which one could answer 
the question 'Are these activities educational? ' and 'Is this person 
educated? '. Education is like reform in this regard. For according to 
Peters, the activities, participation in which would bring about re- 
formation, and the state of being a reformed person, would both be 
determined by appeal to the two sets of criteria stemming from the 
meaning of reform. Equally, reform is not itself an activity, 
though, to be sure, activities of some sort are involved in reforming. 
An interesting point about this measuring stick account of educa- 
tion is that the two sets of criteria for 'educational' and 'being 
educated' are themselves external3 to whatever processes or activities 
1See Ethics and Education (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1966), 
'Aims of Education -a conceptual inquiry' (with replies by J. Woods and 
W. H. Dray) in R. S. Peters ed., The Philosophy of Education (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1973), and 'Values in Education (2)' in Glenn 
Langford and D .J. O'Connor New Essays in the Philosophy of 
Education. 
2See 'Education and the Educated Man', Proceedings of the Philosophy 
of Education Society of Great Britain, Vol. IV, 1970. 
3Peters, in What is an Educational- Process? ' (in R. S. Peters ed., 
The Concept o. f Education (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967)) com- 
ments about 'education' that 'its-standards are intrinsic to i t' . 
(p. 
2, my emphasis). There is no inconsistency though. He is 
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are involved e. g. schooling and the activities within. That is, we 
could ask of any school activities or school graduate: 'Was that really 
an educational activity? ' and 'is he really educated? '. This is possible, 
once again, because the criteria are external to schooling. 
So it is Peters' contention that (a) education is a criterion 
(having two parts) and (b) education is not an activity. I disagree 
completely with (b) and have strong reservations about the 'utility of (a). 
Concerning (a), it seems to me quite true to say that the concept 
of education generates the two criteria outlined by Peters. After all, 
it is doubtless apparent to most of us that aji bbe ring idiot is not an 
educated person and a poker game is not, on the face of it, an education- 
al activity. We are able to tell these things because we do share, 
more or less, the same concept of education and corresponding criteria. 
If we did not, we could never agree on who was educated and what was 
educational. However, the concept of education that we all share is so 
vague that it helps us sort out only the most obvious cases. We can 
tell, for example, that someone who is broadly knowledgeable, numerate, 
literate, and inclines to rational assessment of important matters is, 
on the face of it, educated and that someone who is none of the above is, 
in all likelihood, uneducated. For our concept of education, as it is, 
would enable us to build up a set of criteria which, if satisfied by 
individuals measured against them, would enable us to pronounce him 
educated, perhaps even an exemplary case of the educated person. But 
the problem is, what items on the list are absolutely essential? And 
to what extent could we substitute other items? Since we normally 
attach the labels of educated and educational to such a wide range of 
instances it is very difficult to compose a list of criteria, from our 
vague concept of education, that has logically necessary (or even gen- 
erally characteristic) items; unless of course we want to stipulate. In 
other words, we do not all agree on what counts as an ideally educated 
person . 
For example, consider these criteria for being educated set out 
by Peters. 
4 
An educated person (1) pursues some worthwhile activities; 
here, saying that the criteria, or standards, are intrinsic to the con- 
cept of education. But Peters also thinks that the concept of education 
from which the criteria are generated is itself external to any parti- 
cular activity that-one might suggest as being an educational activity. 
That is, if one thought of an activity that might be educationally bene- 
ficial, one would verify this by-asking whether or not it satisfied the 
criteria. (The same goes, of course, for 'being educated'. 
) 
4Among 
the many places these are set out see-'Aims of Education -a 
conceptual inquiry' in R. S. Peters ed., 'The Philosophy of Education 
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and for their own sake (2) possesses some body of knowledge; not just 
facts but an understanding of the principles for the organization of 
those facts (3) must be broadly knowledgeable, not just narrowly special- 
ized (4) must be transformed, in outlook, by what he knows. Now, if 
one conjures up an image of someone who fulfills these conditions, un- 
questionably one would have in mind an educated person - given the way 
we usually employ the term. Still, it seems quite reasonable to ques- 
tion the necessity of some of these, and the completeness of the list. 
The problems that this analysis has had to face are well known. 
5 
But, even Peters' attempted solution, i. e. the construal of 'being educa- 
ted' as a post-nineteenth century ideal, does not help. For the simple 
fact still remains that not everyone agrees on what an ideally educated 
person would be. For instance, one could say that, as against (1), 
some people are purely instrumental in the use of knowledge. The prag- 
matist and behaviourist, both of whom take a problem-solving approach 
toward education, would surely think it ideal that a student became 
skilled at using knowledge. The writings of Dewey and Skinner do not 
seem to attend much to 'knowledge for its own sake' as in any way ideal. 
Also, some of us might find something unsatisfactory about an individual 
who learns a great deal about, for example, literature solely for the 
purpose of impressing others with his knowledge and the same applies to 
someone teaching subjects he hates. Nevertheless, it is not at all 
obvious that such individuals are not educated. It seems like the wrong 
grounds on which to criticize them. For such individuals we would be 
rather more inclined to say that their education had only instrumental 
value - not that they are uneducated. 
About (3) one could say quite rightly that there is no inconsistency 
in thinking of a specialist as educated (e. g. a mathematical genius whose 
interest in other fields is nugatory). Why is it more convincing to 
portray broad knowledge as an ideal? Would we say to the brilliant mathe- 
matician who loves his work and who is advancing his field greatly that 
he ought to broaden his knowledge even at the expense of happiness and 
time spent on and benefits to mathematics if he wants to be thought of 
as educated? 
There is, too, the sort of objection that John Woods raises 
6 
in a 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1973) with replies by J. Woods and W. 
H. Dray. Since I wrote this Peters has quite radically changed his view. 
See 'Democratic values and Educational Aims', Teachers College 
Record, 
February, 1979. 
5The 
responses of Woods and Dray to Peters are examples. 
6 
1bid. 
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reply to Peters that something would have to be added to the analysis 
to do with actually becoming competent in the disciplines studied. 
And then, of course, there is the problem that both Woods and William 
Dray? raise about the content of what is studied and whether or not 
it is worthwhile, given that views about this could differ. This is an 
important point because some people contend that being educated entails 
being literate, numerate and educated broadly among the disciplines 
(i e. generally educated) ; while others might quite happily count as 
educated someone who had virtually no formal introduction to the disci- 
plines but who was a good craftsman, or alternatively knew about sculp- 
ture, painting, film-making and art history. In the latter case, such 
an individual might be seen as not only educated but cultured and re- 
fined even though he knew next to nothing about literature, chemistry, 
biology and math. It is even possible, certainly on some versions of the 
free school conception of education, that an individual might be unable 
either to read, write or calculate with proficiency, but knows a great 
deal about art, crafts, folklore and perhaps even the disciplines them- 
selves. Moreover, it is even conceivable that an individual might be 
said to be educated, though illiterate and ignorant of the disciplines, 
if he were very wise and 'worldly' . 
The point of saying all of this is, of course, that the concept of 
an educated person can be stretched quite considerably, and trying to 
pull it into one shape or another by appealing to ordinary language use 
of the word is not very helpful. What counts as ideal in education is 
a matter of judgment in which there is not widespread agreement. 
P rofes - 
sor Peters tredes on a preferred conception. The problem with 'educa- 
ti on' as a criterion is that the concept is too vague to indicate with 
clarity and precision the items that ought to be on the 
list of criteria. 
There is, however, a way of improving the situation. It would be to 
start with a concept less vague, and from which criteria can 
be more 
easily derived. Schooling is that concept. By schooling 
here I mean the 
ways in which a society or part of it initiates 
its young into the main 
cognitive skills, modes of understanding, and so 
forth, which it takes 
to be of central importance. 
To say that X is educated is usually to claim that 
X has gone to 
school. This , rather than the vague concept 
of education, is the ortho- 
dox use of the word 'education' . 'To educate' , according 
to the Merriam- 
Webster Dictionary, is 'to provide with schooling' . And when we ask 
7fbid 
53 
'Are you educated? ' the expected reply is something like 'Of course. 
I was educated at Eton', 'Harrow', 'a comprehensive', or some other 
reference to a school, or schooling in general. Clearly, the word 
education can be used in a referring sense - to refer to formal education 
or schooling. And, since our concern is with curriculum decision- 
making, and decisions about curriculum have to do with schools, our 
concern is, surely, with schools. So, when we ask whether education 
is an activity, what we really want to know is whether schooling is 
an activity. 
To this point, however, we have not been discussing education in 
this referring sense. Instead we have been considering the possibility 
that education can be said to pick out two sets of criteria. There is 
certainly something to this view, but the inordinate vagueness of the 
concept seems to leave it without much substance. This seems to be so 
much the case that I am rather inclined to suggest we abandon the 
attempt to characterize education thus and stipulate a definition in 
terms of schooling -a concept whose boundaries are much easier to make 
clear. 
There are a number of other reasons why we might be, well advised 
to consider abandoning a characterization of education in favour of 
schooling. For one thing, when one thinks of how to characterize the 
concept of education it is almost as though one thinks about the 
different forms of schooling - grammar schooling, comprehensive 
schooling, free schooling, religious schooling, military schooling and 
so on - and asks what they all have in common with regard to aims and 
objectives. The concept of education is filled out by some compilation 
of these. Something that lends support to this is the fact that the 
various forms of schooling, that is to say their activity programmes - 
i. e. descriptions, aims, principles, etc. - seem to have a concept 
(not the universal concept) of education. In other words, embedded 
within the philosophies of the various forms or types of schooling are 
notions of what sorts of activities ought properly to be part of those 
types of schooling and what sorts of graduates those types of schooling 
ought to produce. It is these internal criteria - internal to the 
type of schooling in question - from which we draw in trying to character- 
ize education in general. In short, the concept of education is a 
generalization from the more particularized concepts of schooling, 
within the programmes of the various forms or types (theories or 
philosophies) of schooling. And what makes the items that are put 
together in the general concept of education at least to some extent 
compatible is the fact that we seem to have an overall concept of 
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'schooling' in sane degree of conformity with which we find the sub- 
concepts of free schooling, grammar schooling and so forth. The 
problem is that there simply is not enough unity to constitute a rich 
(external) notion of education. 
A point of clarification that we should make about the concept of 
schooling before we go any further is that what we are discussing is 
the very idea of types of schooling. We are not talking about the 
instances - the schools themselves. So, in the case of free schooling, 
we can say that this type of schooling has a programme from which can 
be derived two sets of criteria: one criterion is used to determine 
which activities ought properly to be found in such schools, and the 
other criterion is used to pick out the desired qualities of someone 
who has been schooled in this mode. These, of course, are the counter- 
parts to 'educational' and 'being educated'. Now, notice that the 
criteria are internal to the particular type of schooling in question, 
but external to the actual schools, activities and individuals to be 
evaluated. 
This, of course, leaves us with a problem. If we line up the 
various types of schooling beside one another, do we not require 
further criteria that are external to those types of schooling in order 
to choose among them as to which are the most educational? Answering 
this question returns us to the original problem. Where are these 
criteria to be found? We have already decided that an ordinary language 
analysis of the concept of education yields criteria too vague to be 
helpful - criteria that, for the most part, come from taking a synoptic 
view of the various types of schooling. So if there is to be an 
external criterion - external to schooling - and surely there must be 
8 
Note here that within a particular type of schooling, (i. e. within 
a particular macro activity) there is a programme in which is included 
various principles etc. which set forth 'the concept' of that type of 
schooling. It could be said, I suppose, that from this 'concept' 
there could be developed criteria of 'education' and 'being educated' 
(in the particular mode of schooling under consideration) in virtue of 
which the various procedures and micro activities could be judged. The 
criterion would thus be external to the micro activities etc. However, 
there is something odd about speaking of it this way because both the 
'criteria' and the micro activities would be internal to the macro activ- 
ity. It would be like a golfer who, after (engaging in the micro activ- 
ity of) putting, asks himself whether that was really an activity of 
golf by appealing to the criterion of golf generated by the programme 
of the game. True, the programme here gives legitimacy to the procedures. 
But when we speak of golf we are not simply thinking of the programme, 
or the concepts and criteria that can be generated from it; we are 
thinking of the whole activity of golf. The same is true with formal 
education. So, when Peters says that 'education' is rather like 
'reform', it picks out no particular activity or process. Rather it 
lays down criteria to which activities or processes must conform. 
(Ethics and Education, op. cit., p. 25). He is only identifying a part of it. 
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if we are ever to make choices among the types of schooling, then the 
criteria will have to be generated by an assortment of principles, 
such as social equality, freedom, individual and social needs, rationality 
and so forth. Of course, since these principles, and applications of 
them, are controversial, there seems to be little hope of a universally 
acceptable criterion here either. 
Returning then to the concepts of education and schooling: What I 
am suggesting is that we simply put aside our attempt to characterize 
education, and work instead on schooling. It is less vague because it 
refers to visible social institutions; the various concepts of types of 
schooling seem to have in them conceptualizations of, as it were, 
'education'; and our attempts to characterize education in a general way 
seem to draw on the various notions of schooling. What I am asking for 
is a transfer of attention from education to schooling. I am not saying, 
however, and we must be clear on this point, that education and 
schooling are synonomous. After all, we do speak of people who are 
educated but not schooled, e. g., a parent who teaches a child at home 
rather than sending him to school. Also, we do say that individuals 
can be schooled but not educated, e. g., a child who attends school but 
does not learn. And, there is the Illi ch point that schools are anti- 
educational. What I would say about this, however, is that the two 
notions are not as far apart as they might seem. For, if I am right, 
the concept of education does not have much substance: it is parasitic 
on schooling. I see no reason why home-education could not be character- 
ized as a form of schooling. If all forms of schooling had to be 
identical with the familiar state or private schools in order to count 
as schooling, new forms such as free schooling could never count as 
schooling. As well, if we say that X has been to school but not educated, 
we could well say that he is not properly schooled - that he has not 
met the criteria of a successfully schooled person, criteria that are, 
as we saw, generated by the programme of the type of schooling in question. 
X has attended a school but not been schooled in the aforementioned 
sense. (This is similar to saying that X has been to an educational 
institution but has not been (properly) educated. ) And, finally, 
Illich's claim that schools are anti-educational can be handled by saying 
that the activities in such schools do not meet the conditions of proper 
schooling activities as specified by the programme of that type of 
schooling. In other words, individual schools can be evaluated by 
criteria external to them but internal to the, as it were, theory of 
schooling of which they are instances. (Again, this is like saying 
that such and such an activity takes place in educational institution A. 
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but it is not educational. ) 
In sum, my view is that (a) 'education' is too weak - too vague - 
a concept to generate useful criteria, (b) that 'schooling' and the 
various sub-concepts of types of schooling are stronger and more useful 
(c) that most of the substance of the concept of education comes from 
the concept of schooling and (d) that in view of these points we ought 
to transfer our attention to 'schooling' from 'education' and therefore 
we should stipulate that what we will mean by 'education' is formal 
education, i. e., schooling. So, in response to Peters' claim (a) 
that education is a criterion, it seems that he is partly right. 
Assertion (b) is that education is not an activity. This would 
be true if the only interpretation for the word 'education' were the 
criterion account that Peters outlines; but this is not the only (non 
trivial) meaning - indeed it is rather an eccentric one. Normally, as 
mentioned earlier, it refers to schooling. And, to ask what type of 
education someone has had is to query the type of school attended. So, 
is schooling an activity? 
An activity, it was argued, is composed of actions; and this com- 
posite entity has a structure. It has a programme, i. e. descriptions, 
explanations, aims, purposes and principles, which draws together and 
conceptualizes the activity, and it has procedures, i. e. formal and in- 
formal rules that guide, direct and regulate performance. A macro 
activity is composed of micro activities, the former and the latter 
having the same relationship between them as between a simple activity 
and its composite actions. Education, by which we mean schooling, has 
this structure. Though different types of school, e. g. comprehensives 
and free schools, have different programmes and procedures, they are macro 
activities with constituent micro activities. 
It would be pointless to work out the details, but one could imagine 
a standard sort of description and explanation of comprehensive schooling 
that would include general and uncontroversial statements about aims 
and principles, and from which could be generated sets of criteria about 
what would count as a legitimate educational activity and what sort of 
qualities an educated person should have - all from the point of view of 
comprehensive schooling. In sum, this would constitute the programme of 
comprehensive schooling and would be that which ties together and makes 
sense of the various activities that take place within the school over 
the duration of a student's tenure. And as for how the students and 
teachers are to conduct themselves with regard to both the overall macro 
activity and various micro activities, there are sundry rules. Rules 
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of the micro activities, say history projects, would flow from the pro- 
gramme if the study of history, a micro activity, and would be consis- 
tent with the programme and procedures (rules) of comprehensive school- 
ing - i. e. the macro activity. Consequently, I would agree with Glenn 
Langford9 who stipulated education to be schooling and feels that it is 
an activity for reasons that are very similar to mine. 
In a reply 
10 
to Langford's article 'Values in Education (1)', Peters 
voices objections to the claim that education is an activity. Given the 
similarity of Langford's view to mine, Peters' objections apply to my 
view as well. In responding to Peters, my strategy, for the most part, 
will be to show that if he is willing to view education as schooling, in 
light of the vagueness of 'education', then many of the objections to 
education as an activity fall away. 
Peters' first point is that activities may conjoin to promote an 
overall end without there being a supra (macro) activity. Reforming, 
corrupting, boring, or interesting someone are examples, he suggests. 
It seems to me quite correct to say that a number of random activities 
may, collectively, have a certain consequence; and that in such a case 
there is no macro activity. As well, I would agree that individuals 
could select a number of activities in which they or others might engage, 
mindful of the consequences, without there being, thereby, created a 
macro activity. After all, as an example of the former, one could im- 
agine the proverbial naif from the country who came to London unmindful 
of its corrupting influences, whereupon she fell in with bad company, 
partied late, drank heavily, gambled to excess, and was frequently se- 
duced. Obviously there is no macro activity called 'corruption' in this. 
Nor, with the latter case in mind, would we say that any such supra- 
(macro) activity existed or was being engaged in even if the young girl 
was coming to London to participate in the aforementioned activities in 
the hope of being corrupted! But formal schooling is not much like 
either of these cases. It is not a random collection of activities that 
just happen to have a particular consequence, nor is it a series of activ- 
ities engaged in because of an anticipated consequence. In accordance 
with the account of 'activities' given earlier, it is an elaborate and 
systematic programme of descriptions, aims, objectives, and purposes 
9See 'The Concept of Education' and 'Values in Education (1)' in 
Glenn Langford and D. J. O'Connor eds., New Essays in the Philosophy of 
Education, op. cit. 
10See 'Values in Education (2)' in Langford and O'Connor, op. cit. 
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which generate procedural rules and in vi rtue of which various (micro) 
activities are selected and timetable d;. all of which is carried out 
within an institutional framework. Not 
.a 
bit like corruption; but very 
much like the characteristics of an intentionally structured activity 
e. g. a sport or a board game. 
Second, a related point Peters makes is that, apart from intended 
or unintended consequences, having an intention ör aim that links cer- 
tain activities does not necessarily thereby create a new overall activ- 
ity; otherwise consciousness of conservation, for example, in a range 
of activities would create the new (macro) supra activity known as the con- 
servation activity. Once again, Peters is quite right to point this out, 
but mistaken in thinking that it would rule out of court the claim that 
'education, qua schooling, is an activity. The reason is similar to 
that given above. Schooling is not just disparate activities with a 
common theme. As I said before, it is a programme of activities, con- 
ceived as a unity, and into which micro activities must fit; not the 
other way around as would be the case with conservation. 
In a further aspect of the same point he maintains that one could 
identify activities in such things as the corruption of someone that are 
independent of any thoughts in the minds of the participants that they 
are engaged in 'corrupting. For instance, in the earlier example of 
the young girl coming to London, she may participate in an activity such 
as party-going without any awareness that it is part of her corruption. 
Similarly, a student could engage in classroom activities attending only 
to the immediate concerns and without being aware of being educated in 
the process. The point is, of course, that if one is engaged in a genuine 
activity then one would be continually aware of the fact that present 
activities are part of the whole. 
In reply one could, I suppose, say that it is not at all inconceiv- 
able that one might lose sight of the enterprise as a whole for the sake 
of immediate concerns in any activity - even soccer. But more to the 
point would be that Peters' criticism has force only if one adopts his 
interpretation of education. It is true, after all, that the state of 
being educated may be arrived at by engaging in activities which are not 
seen as directed to that end. On the other hand, if education 
is con- 
strued as a formal programme of activities - i. e. schooling, the objec- 
tion does not come to much. Students and teachers may forget that they 
are engaged in a macro activity with specifiable ends etc., 
but surely 
the awareness that it is all part of schooling 
is not too far off. A 
soccer player may, for a time, be totally preoccupied with 
the activity 
of dribbling around an opponent; 
but the idea of being in a soccer game 
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and trying to win soon comes back. 
A third point is that activities usually have a range of specific 
acts. In cooking, for instance, one works with utensils, mixes ingre- 
dients, and so on, with definite intentions to bring about a certain 
end. Educating, he claims, can be accomplished not only by a great 
variety of activities such as visits to the library or seeing films (which 
apparently do not comprise a 'standard corpus' of sub activities as in 
cooking), but it also can be done by individuals who have no intention 
of educating. To respond: first, if there are standard actions (and 
micro activities) in cooking then surely this is true of schooling. 
There are classrooms, time-tables, lessons, projects and field trips, 
staff meetings, etc. enough to match the corpus of standard actions in 
cooking. But if Peters means here that an exhaustive list of cooking 
actions (and activities) could be prepared, but not in education, then 
he must be mistaken. For surely one could think of as many bizarre ways 
of getting food prepared (from the use of microwave oven to the waving 
of a wand) as of educating. Second, to say that cooking is always inten- 
tional but educating is not, simply will not do. If the film-maker 
'educates' unintentionally then so does the 'arsonist cook' as he sets 
a house ablaze wherein the Sunday joint of beef sits raw on the kitchen 
table! There is something unsatisfactory, however, about placing great 
emphasis on cases of unintentional cooking or educating because it is 
quite clear that both cooks and teachers are central characters in 
their respective activities, not arsonists or film-makers, and that both 
do what they do intentionally, in general. 
His fourth major point is that education depends upon, among other 
things, the state of readiness of the learner. Education is a transaction 
which requires of the student adequate cognitive development and prior 
learning. Presumably, this makes education not an activity because 
characteristic activities either are not transactional or do not depend 
upon a state of readiness of participants. But surely board games such 
as Monopoly are transactional and dependent upon an adequate level of 
cognitive development and a knowledge of the rules. And surely soccar 
players must be in a state of readiness -ie. know the rules, be 
physically fit and have the right equipment. So, I see no reason why 
either the transactional nature of education or the fact that participants 
must be in a state of readiness rules out education as an activity. 
The fifth and final of his points is that activities characteristic- 
ally have definite durations: they begin and top by prior arrangement 
as do soccer games or when the participants decide to stop as with 
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parties or school field trips. It seems quaint, he thinks, to say 
'stop your educating at three o'clock', But, given that education is 
defined as participation in some form of institutional practice, it does 
not seem quaint in the least. When school lets out for the day, formal 
education stops. 
Peters concludes, against Langford, that construing education as 
an activity can have the positive result of focussing attention on 'aims' 
but, on the negative side, can veil the importance of (a) looking for 
unintended outcomes (b) standing back to assess the overall endeavour 
and (c) concern for the learner's part in the process. These points 
find unconvincing and want to show them to be unwarranted fears. Later, 
however, I will mention some of the benefits that accrue to regarding 
education as an activity. 
First, nothing prevents us from standing back from an activity so 
as to observe unintended outcomes and to assess the merits and di smeri is 
of the activity - perhaps in the light of such outcomes. Is not hooli- 
ganism an unintended outcome of public soccer matches which, in the 
extreme, might incline us, by way of assessing the overall desirability 
of (the activity of) public soccer matches, to have them stopped? And 
is not one of the arguments against (the macro activity of) the grammar 
school that it has the unintended outcome of promoting elitism and in- 
equality of education opportunity, and that on such grounds, among 
others, it ought not to continue? Hence, (a) and (b) are unconvincing. 
As for (c) : why should our attention be deflected from children where 
the whole point of the activity is to do with their cognitive and affect- 
ive well being? 
2. Is Education an Open Activity? 
We have, so far, been rather cavalier in treating various types of 
schooling as legitimately under the umbrella of the activity of school- 
ing. Justification comes in seeing that schooling is properly character- 
ized as an open activity. 
Activities can be open, we said, if their descriptions are loose 
enough to accommodate different interpretations, or 
if their descriptions 
prescribe the (other aspects of) programme of the activity 
but not the 
procedures. Schooling 
11 is open in virtue of both. It is open for the 
11I 
am not, of course, claiming that schooling 
is a word that we can 
make mean anything we want t to. 
To be loose, and hence open to-varying 
interpretations, is not to be boundless. Schooling may 
be grammar, com- 
prehensive or free, but it is not 
driving a car or playing golf. 
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first reason because insofar as 'schooling' is to some extent confined 
by an antecedent external concept of education, which, as we have seen, 
is very vague, there are many possible descriptions of schooling. Even 
the Peters criterion is compatible with grammar schools, freeschools 
and military academies. Alternatively, if we start by requesting a 
characterization of schooling (either with or without concern for the 
external concept of education) we are faced once again with ambiguity. 
Grammar schools, comprehensive schools, community schools, and so on 
are all legitimately called schools (problem cases excepted); but in 
programme, they are manifestly different. Schooling is an open activity 
for the second reason because even once a particular type of schooling 
has been settled upon and even if a particular programme has been estab- 
lished, there are an indefinite number of different activities (hence 
procedures) that could be generated. For instance, discovery learning 
and formal lecturing are both compatible with, say, the grammar school 
concept. 
Now, of course, it is within the realms of possibility that at some 
time in the future we might all agree that a particular type of school- 
ing with a specified range of micro activities is right and proper, and 
that would make education a closed activity. But it would only be a 
provisional closing. For the possibility would always remain that at 
some time the unanimity of our agreement would cease, either about pro- 
gramme or procedures, in which case the openness would be transparent 
once again. 
3. Educational Contexts 
Since to this point, the discussion of context has been rather 
abstract and exemplified only by references other than to do with educa- 
tion, it might be useful to give a brief sketch of the conceptual and 
material contexts in education. 
(a) Conceptual Context 
Recall that the capability of understanding activity A is dependent 
upon participants (and others) 
(a) having attained a level of conceptual 
development such that they are capable of following rules and seeing 
them as part of a unified whole 
(b) possessing concepts that are specif- 
ic to A (c) possessing concepts that form the backdrop of understanding 
the nature of an activity per se. This 
framework within which A is 
understood, and which is necessary 
for A to be understood is the 
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conceptual context. It is an environment of ideas that must be shared, 
at least to some degree, by all competent participants. 
The very fact of schooling being a macro activity makes it fully 
comprehensible only to those who have an understanding of collections 
of activities coherently strung together by a programme and governed by 
rules. Think of the concepts needed to. filter the statement just made 
Then, of course, schooling is not just an activity, but an activity of 
a certain sort. It is a practical and social endeavour, with aims and 
objectives focused on learning and understanding. As well, activities 
of this sort can be of different types - e. g. free schools, comprehen- 
sives, and the like. And, within these macro activities are micro 
activities; activities which vary considerably. To understand, one must 
have the general concept of an activity, the specific concepts and the 
network of concepts that provide the foundation for specific and general 
activity concepts, namely social, scientific, ethical, etc. concepts. 
As an example think of history students from a comprehensive school 
taking a day-trip to some historical sight. One reason for the students 
being asked to undertake the study of history (a micro activity) at all 
is probably something that stems from or at least must be consistent and 
compatible with, the macro activity programme of comprehensive school- 
ing - more specifically, that part of the conception of schooling that 
explains what a proper schooling experience should entail (i. e. part 
of what comprehensive educators think is necessary for being an educat- 
ed person). Within the micro activity, the study of history, is this 
field trip which, in turn, must be seen as consistent and compatible 
with the programme of the study of history. Then, too, the trip has to 
be understood in its own right. The children must see the point to the 
trip, i. e. understand what they are seeing and be able to relate it to 
the rest of the course. Furthermore, students must conduct themselves 
in certain ways, according to certain rules. There may be regulations 
about how they are to move from place to place, when and in what manner 
to speak to one another and to the teacher, and so on. All of this, 
and there is much more of course, can only be understood within a com- 
patible conceptual framework. None of it, for instance, would make 
sense to a student who misconceived the idea of a 
field trip. One 
student might think of it as a holiday rather than part of a 
history 
course; and another, perhaps a very young one, might 
think of it as akin 
to abduction insofar as he or she 
is being taken away from the familiar 
surroundings of the school to an unknown place. 
As well, a student who 
thought of the venture as political propaganda 
(e. g. shining up the 
national image of a decadent and corrupt society) 
or one whose state of 
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alienation was such that he could not bring himself to see any compul- 
sory school activity as other than virtual imprisonment, could not be a 
genuine participant in the activity. 
It is important to mention here that the conceptual context can 
shift. That is, the web of concepts that enable us to think of school- 
ing activities as we do, can change. One example of this is that due 
to shifting notions of social decorum in Western societies the rules of 
some schooling activities have come to be seen in a new light. Social 
relations between adults and children, for instance, are now less formal 
than they were two decades ago. One consequence of this is that child- 
ren are not always seen as unmannerly if they address teachers by their 
first names rather than the former militaristic 'Sir' or 'Madam' - so 
relevant rules shift from being seen as quite fair and proper to being 
less so, and perhaps even intolerable. As well, children, particularly 
in North America and Scandanavia, are being seen more and more as having 
rights to freedom of choice. To a large degree, the free schooling move- 
ment has been fuelled by this. Furthermore, the rights accorded to 
children are coming to include legal right to such things as free speech. 
12 
As a result, certain forms of traditional schooling have become more 
difficult to operate, as a practical matter, because they are no longer 
seen in the same light as they once were. With significant amounts of 
shifts, as one could well imagine, certain forms of school could simply 
wither away. 
There is another way in which conceptual shift can occur, and it is 
due to the very nature of schooling. Children spend as much as twelve 
or thirteen years in school so it is not hard to see that their concep"- 
tual schemes develop and-mature. Consequently their understanding of 
the activity changes as they get older. This, however, does not alter 
the fact that they are engaged in the same activity for the duration. 
For their concepts do not change away from those that comprise the pro- 
gramme and rules, they deepen. As well, the activity, by its very pur- 
pose is designed to accommodate the change. 
Equally, considerable plurality of conceptual context is compatible 
with educational activities. Within a given comprehensive, say, there 
may be children of many nationalities whose world view 
(religions, moral, 
social, and scientific) differs from one another. 
The same applies to 
social class differences. However, if the plurality 
is too great, it 
12See K. A. Strike 'Philosophical Reflections on Tinker vs. Des Moines' 
in Philosophy of Education 1974: Proceedings of the Philosophy of 
Education 
Society Edwardsville, Ill.: Southern Illinois University, 
1974). 
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becomes impossible for the activity to continue. Discrepant viewpoints 
can only be compatible with a given activity to a certain level after 
which time it is impossible to say that participants are all engaging 
in more or less the same activity. 
(b) Material Context 
Of logical necessity, conceiving of a particular activity requires 
provision for space, time, resources, and other participants. Character- 
istic practical activities are not conceivable and cannot take place 
without these. However, not only are these a priori conditions of an 
activity, but they are practical necessities as well. For if an activity 
is actually to take place the particular facts of space, time, etc. 
must be compatible. In other words, within categories these are the 
material circumstances that actually exist on particular occasions; and 
if for some reason any combinations of them are significantly different 
than is standard, then the decisions about participation are affected, 
ie. decisions about how to participate or whether or not to participate 
at all. 
Since the educational macro activity usually extends over twelve 
years, involves a tremendous quantity of books, teaching implements and 
materials, and classrooms and buildings, and includes a very large 
number of people - students and teachers (and perhaps parents, the com- 
munity, and the state as well), there are a myriad of configurations 
that could significantly affect decision-making within or about the 
activity. The consequences of plurality and dynamic shift in space, 
time, resources and facts about participants must surely be of greater 
moment in education than in, say chess. Whereas in the latter, a chess 
board and playing space of any managable size would do, in education 
much depends upon having books, teachers and facilities of a very particu- 
lar sort - those compatible with, and useful to, the aims of purposes 
of the school. More about the importance of material context in deci- 
sion-making will be said later. 
Chapter V 
ACTIVITIES AND CONTEXTS (3): COMPETENT DECISION-MAKING AND SCHOOLING 
I. Introduction 
What is important in the analysis of activities and contexts are 
the internal relationships between the structural components of activi- 
ties - programme and procedures - and the external relationship between 
activities and contexts. Activities must be internally consistent - 
i. e. consisten-t- within the categories of programme and procedure and 
consistent " between the two. And elements of conceptual and material 
contexts must be internally consistent in each category and, more impor- 
tantly, compatible with the activity. In consequence, whatever decisions 
are made about activities must ensure that consistency is maintained and 
that suggested changes will be compatible with the context. The fact 
that activities and contexts are changeable and varied makes an intimate 
knowledge of both, vital. 
To ensure consistency and compatibility, in what areas of knowledge 
should the decision-maker be competent? In this chapter we will consider 
the sort of issues that the curriculum decision-maker must contend with 
(objects-of-decision) - that is the sort of decisions to be made about 
schooling activities and within activities; and these will be linked 
with the areas of knowledge - areas of knowledge on which the competent 
decision-maker will have to draw. 
2. Decisions About Macro Activities 
On the account given, a macro activity is an activity that pro- 
vides a programme for a number of micro activities. This is certainly 
true of education when conceived of as a period of schooling, usually 
about twelve years in duration to which children in Western countries 
are subjected. It should be noted, as well, that if macro activities 
are conceived in this way, it could be possible to see macro activities 
within the macro activity of schooling. For instance, one might suggest 
that in a large secondary school which is divided into academic 
depart- 
ments, the 'programme of study' that an individual 
department works out 
-a coherent progression of courses and 
their prerequisites designed to 
provide students with a balanced understanding of 
the discipline - will, 
when put into practice engender a macro activity which 
is composed of 
various teaching and learning activities 
in that discipline. It would 
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seem to me, however, that this activity wQuld be very much subordinate 
to the larger programme - at least in a secondary school. For, unlike 
the situation in a (European) university in which that department's 
programme may be the bulk if not the whole 'schooling' programme for 
the student (i .e. his entire university programme is determined by the 
department in whose discipline he is specializing), in a secondary 
school the prime concern is generally with the overall education of the 
student, only part of which is constituted by the activities in a par- 
ticular discipline. So, in speaking of the macro activity of education 
(i. e. schooling) I will stipulatively refer to the programme of the school. 
Subordinate programmes such as that just mentioned will be micro activi- 
ties unless otherwise stated. 
What are macro activity decisions about? And what would have to 
be known by a competent decision-maker? 
To answer the first question, they are concerned with determina- 
tion or assessment of the activity structure -i .e. the programme and 
procedures. Procedures are the rules and so forth that are followed in 
carrying out the programme. At the macro level these rules direct par- 
ticipants to engage in this micro activity and that. Consequently, a 
large part of deciding about procedures is deciding which micro activi- 
ties will constitute the macro activity. 
Programme decisions are about the sort of school that is preferable. 
I 
A military academy? Seminary? Grammar school? Comprehensive? Free 
school? Community school?, etc. What is the purpose of such a school? 
What should be its aims? And so on. Should the school endeavour to make 
students critical? Creative? Scholarly? Intellectually and culturally 
sophisticated - readers of the Times rather than Daily Mirror and patrons 
of the theatre and ballet rather than solely the cinema or the pub? 
Should it endeavour to foster liberal attitudes in the search for truth 
in politics, religion and social relations? Or, is it to seek foster 
in students the spirit of a particular intellectual or religious tradi- 
tion, school of thought or paradigm? 
2 
1Types 
of schools often have different versions, and within any type 
or version there is the possibility of individual schools being quite 
unique. Whether or not we think of each and every school , given that 
it 
will have some degree of uniqueness, an independent macro activity about 
which to decide, rather than simply an instance of a type of macro acti- 
vity would depend upon the degree of uniqueness. 
An institution which 
is called a comprehensive but whose aims, etc. are vastly 
different than 
the norm would best be treated as a type unto 
itself. 
2The 
enormous range of intellectual, religious and political tradi- 
tions, which have a profound influence on the aims, etc. of 
types of 
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Procedure decision, or decisions about which micro activities wi 11 
combine to form the macro activity would be the like of the following. 
What areas are to be taught (e. g. humanities, social sciences, sciences, 
vocational subjects, etc. )? Are students to study within each? Are 
they to concentrate on one, and if so, on which disciplines within the 
area? Within each discipline how are the courses to be arranged - is 
there to be a special order where some are prerequisites for others? 
There are, of course, many more questions, but these are among the most 
central. 
So, what knowledge is essential to competent decision-making in 
these spheres? The question is important because its' answer might 
suggest who is best fitted to make decisions. 
First is the problem of determining the activity's programme. 
What type of schooling is it to be? This problem has two parts: (a) 
what alternatives are there? and (b) which is most desirable? 
Part (a) is complex because one not only has the option of choosing 
among different types of presently or previously existing schools, but 
a programme might comprise parts of different types or be newly con- 
ceived. But however concocted, the programme must be seen as a genuine 
instance of education. In other words, legitimate alternatives must be 
sorted out from (sometimes. bizarre) options. Presumably the only guide 
we have to this is some combination of the vague external concept of 
education we possess and the standards and preferences of those to be 
served by the school (students, parents, teachers and community). As 
for the number of alternatives, they are logically indefinite. At this 
stage of decision-making, therefore, he who knows the greatest number 
of alternatives (other things being equal) is best fitted to decide. 
(b) is a vastly more difficult question. For to see one alterna- 
tive as preferable, i e. as an optimally rational choice, one would 
schools or schools in certain locations (e. g. on Indian. reservations, 
within tightly knit religious communities such as the Hutterites, and 
Eastern European and other communist countries) is a factor which accounts 
for the disparateness of types of education that many philosophers fail 
to recognize. There is a tendency among many in the Anglo-American 
tradition to suppose that notions of education generated from quite 
different traditions are somehow reconcilable - perhaps by appeal to 
common use of language or commitment' to similar basic principles. 
This 
I believe to be a fundamental mistake. Those who steadfastly believe 
that, for example, a particular religious or political interpretation 
of the world is essential to education are at odds with, say, those 
in 
the liberal democratic intellectual tradition 
(for lack of a better 
phrase) on a matter of faith in basic 
(and conflicting) principles. On 
what grounds would one ever show one's tradition to 
be superior, except 
by appeal to the very underlying principles that are at 
issue? 
6,0 
requi re a sophisticated knowledge of principles in light of which to 
make the choice and one would think as well that it would be necessary 
to have a far more penetrating knowledge of the alternatives, namely the 
activity structure (or the possible structures if one is also trying 
to decide what the composition of the macro activity will be), i. e. the 
programme, with special concern for the connections between the descrip- 
tion, internal aims and concept of education components in the form of 
schooling being considered. For example, one does not always simply 
choose between a comprehensive and a grammar school, or between either 
of these and a free school. One sometimes chooses, as well, among ver- 
sions of each, and among individual, and in many respects, unique examples 
of each version. Earlier I laid great stress not only on the subtlety, 
richness and sophistication of possible understandings of an activity 
description but, equally, on the subtlety of informal rules - the in- 
timations, understandings, and so forth - which are part of the activity 
structure. Much of this underlying detail varies appreciably among 
different instances of the same activity and hence can be significant 
to decision-making. 
Why be so concerned with contextual details about the alternatives? 
The answer is that a competent decision-maker will be concerned not only 
with the theoretical description of his choice but also the prI agma-t, ic out- 
comes. As argued previously, attention to the latter is essential to 
full consideration of an alternative. 
Justifying principles are of equal concern. We do not have a suf- 
ficiently distinct and powerful external criterion for what counts as 
educational so we must fall back on preferential principles. In other 
words, those serviced by the school (i .e. the parents and community) 
surely have certain wants and needs with regard to the type of school 
their children will attend. And this, measured against the interests 
of the children and society as a whole.,. is that which would normally 
figure prominently in the justification of one form of schooling rather 
than another. it is not our present concern to argue in favour of one 
or the other of these as the ideal principle of justification, 
but only to 
suggest the range of principles which might reasonably be considered. 
If these are the considerations involved in determining what pro- 
gramme the macro activity is to have, what then can we say about the 
prerequisite knowledge of a competent 
decision-maker? 
The considerations, restated, would number among them, these. 
1, What sort of school is to be chosen bearing in 
mind the scope of the choice -i . e.. the choice 
is 
being made for (a) individual students, or small 
groups, e. g. one's own child or children of a 
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religious or economic community, gifted 
children or deprived children? 
2. What detailed description is to be given, 
bearing in mind that types of schools 
admit of many versions, and these in turn 
can be styled to fit local needs or pre- 
ferences? 
3. What internal aims, objectives and purposes 
are schooling, or the school (depending 
upon what answer is given to the matter of 
s cope in 1. ), to have? 
In the jargon of our decision-making analysis, these would be the 
objects-of-decision. The question is now, what knowledge would be re- 
quired to formulate and assess the theoretical and pragmatic outcomes 
of alternatives and for justifying principles? 
Starting with theoretical descriptions: these will draw mostly on 
certain areas of theoretical knowledge and have to be compatible with 
the conceptual context, something which is important because others., 
participants for the most part, will need to understand the programme 
in all of its subtlety. (Remember as well that the conceptual context 
can be pluralistic, i. e. vary between locations in the same school 
system or shift in any one location. ) The spheres of knowledge are: 
1. Knowledge of types of schools 
(a) existing within the population for 
which the decision is being made 
(b) previously having existed within 
this scope 
(c) existing elsewhere 
(d) 
-that are possible - 
new conceptions, 
2. Understanding of theoretical frameworks of 
each, e. g. aims, purposes, etc. of compre- 
hensives, f rees choo ls, community schools, 
grammar schools, military academies, semin- 
aries, etc. 
Relevant to both 1. and 2. would be in-depth knowledge from phil o, s- 
ophy, history and comparative education. 
Consideration of pragmatic outcomes is characterized by the question 
'What is likely to happen if this theoretically possible alternative 
or that one is chosen? ' . Not too supri si ngly 
it is both the conceptual 
and material contexts, i. e. circumstances surrounding specific 
instances 
of the activity, that generate knowledge queries. 
But in which disci- 
plines? 
1. Personal knowledge of the individuals in- 
volved: students, teachers, and to some 
extent, parents, in order to judge their 
reactions to the school programme that has 
been selected. The following are important: 
(a) conceptual background of students 
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(e. g. level of cognitive develop- 
ment and social values) 
(b) capabilities of. the learners and 
teachers 
(c) psychological -impact on, individuals 
2. Knowledge of social and economic dynamics, 
especially 
(a) economic consequences, e. g. effect 
on the economy of schools which em- 
phasise vocational subjects rather 
than the pure disciplines, as for 
example in a grammar school. (b) social consequences, particularly 
with regard, ' to their influence 
on the 'good society'. 
Psychology, sociology, and economics would be germane. 
And justifying principles, which enable the decision-maker to select 
among alternatives-, would be developed by his theoretical knowledge of: 
1. social psychology 
2. social interaction theory 
3. economics 
4. ethical principles such as equality, con- 
cern for individualism, etc. 
5. understanding of social needs and pre- 
ferences 
Psychology, sociology, economics and philosophy would be the rele- 
vant fields. 
Looking back, it is important that we note two things. First, some 
of the knowledge required for choosing alternatives is simply an under- 
standing of what a school is, and being aware of some of the obvious 
alternatives, e. g. grammar schools, comprehensives, free schools and 
community schools. But much else besides is esoteric. This is true, 
for instance, of understanding school systems in other countries (the 
point of doing which is to consider them as viable alternatives) 
because they are usually very much a part of those cultures which, as 
well, must be understood if the school system is to be evaluated pro- 
perly . And, to understand clearly the programmes of any school system 
or school, given all that has been said about the subtlety of descriptions, 
takes considerable knowledge and perceptiveness. Surely this has im- 
plications for the choice of a competent decision-maker, since the know- 
ledge prerequisites are not entirely pedestrian. 
Second, even a decision about so abstract a matter as the programme 
of a school or school system is heavily dependent upon an understanding of 
local contingencies, i. e. the conceptual and material contexts. A 
school system which is quite satisfactory in France may be unacceptable 
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in Britain given different intellectual traditions - i. e. because the 
conceptual context is incompatible. And school systems in different 
parts of Canada or the United States may be vastly different because of 
significant differences in the school clientele and the disparate loca- 
tions such that the material contexts would not be compatible with other 
school systems. This discrepant situation is often found between pri- 
vate schools for children of the rich and professional classes, inner- 
city schools and rural schools. 
Part two of the macro activity decision which was mentioned earlier, 
deals with the micro activities that are to be collected together to 
form the macro activity. These, of course, must be compatible with the 
programme. Generally speaking, these are decisions about curriculum 
arrangements and deal with what and when children should be taught. 
Included would be the following: 
(a) What children should be taught. 
1. What subjects are worth teaching? 
2. Which are most important bearing 
in mind 
(a) what children find interesting 
(b) what their practical needs are 
(c) the limitations of space, time, 
material resources, and teach- 
ing staff. 
(d) the capability of students as 
learners and teachers as con- 
veyors of knowledge and learn- 
ing skills? 
3. What balance should exist among the 
various subject areas and disciplines, 
e. g. humanities, sciences, technology, 
vocational subjects? 
4. What depth and breadth should be 
aimed at? 
(b) When should children be taught? 
1. What age is appropriate for introducing 
children to specific subjects? 
2. How quickly should they be allowed to 
advance" bearing in mind 
(a) uneven intellectual development 
among children, and within the 
same child. 
(b) social and psychological pro- 
blems of rapid advancement in 
relation both to his peers and 
to parental expectations? 
3. Should certain courses be considered pre- 
requisites for others? 
From which areas should the decision-maker's knowledge come? 
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Theoretical descriptions first. 
1. Knowledge of subject alternatives, i. e. 
subjects which could possibly be taught. 
(what, when) 
2. Knowledge of subject content so as to be 
in a position to assess individual worth, 
e. g. bingo vs. history, (what, when) 
3. Knowledge of methods, techniques, and 
materials : (what) 
Knowledge of children's learning develop- 
ment, social development, and motivation. 
(what, when) 
Essential would be knowledge of the principles of and content within 
the various disciplines, curriculum theory and cognitive and motivation- 
al psychology. 
Pragmatic outcomes, i. e. consequences of an hypothesised choice, 
would draw on: 
1. Personal knowledge of the individuals in- 
volved: students, teachers, and to some 
extent parents, in order to judge their 
reaction to the subjects being taught, 
and the methods being employed , especially 
(a) the capabilities of individual 
learners and teachers (what, where) 
(b) psychological effects on these indivi- 
duals (what, when) 
(c) economic consequences for students 
as future wage earners (what) 
2. Understanding of collective behaviours. That 
is, 
(-a) social impact (what, when) 
(b) economic consequences for society (what) 
Psychology, sociology and economics would be the relevant fields. 
And justifying principles: 
1. Cognitive psychology (what, when) 
2. Social psychology (what, when) 
3. Social interaction theory (what, when) 
4. Economic (what) 
5. Subject knowledge (what, when) 
6. Knowledge of methods (what, when) 
7. Ethical principles about equality, concern 
for desires of others (what) 
Psychology, sociology, economics, subject knowledge, curriculum 
theory and philosophy would be important. 
The same two notes as were placed at the end of the 
discussion of 
knowledge requirements for programme decisions could 
be made here; though 
with one slight adjustment. First, 
it cannot be stressed too much that 
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knowledge of local contexts, both conceptual and material, are essential 
to competent decisions about the arrangement of curriculum subjects 
(and related alternatives). For deciding what to teach, insofar as the 
choice would be justified by a concern for the preferences of those 
affected, could only be accomplished if the decision-maker were a party 
to the preferences and overall value structure of those for whom the 
decision was being made (i. e. conceptual context). And, to the extent 
that decisions are about such things as the balance of humanities, 
sciences, and vocational subjects, the disciplines that will comprise 
each of these categories, and the depth and breadth of study within each 
discipline, the decision-maker must have consideration for pragmatic 
outcomes such as the social and economic consequences for society of 
the various alternatives, and the consequences for individual students 
(e. g. future plans, vis a vis, university entrance or careers); and the 
material context should be given careful consideration since these prag- 
matic outcomes are so heavily influenced by details of context. 
Second, the theoretical knowledge required is equally as esoteric as 
that needed for judgments about the programme, but it differs slightly 
in one important respect - something which has implications for a pro- 
posed decision-maker. It is that decisions about curriculum arrangements 
seem to be rather less far reaching in terms of importance to the indi- 
vidual learner's development of point-of-view (e. g. conception of the 
good life, value structure, etc. ), not because the consequences of them 
are not significant but because they are generally more technical deci- 
sions - ways and means of implementing the programme already decided 
upon or assumed correct. In other words, concerns about the arrange- 
ments of curriculum logically presuppose a programme, and are purposive 
decisions of implementation. Therefore, the ethical dimension to do 
with the appropriateness of one type of schooling rather than another 
gives way to the specialized understandings of the disciplines and cur- 
riculum construction. 
3. Decisions About Micro Activities 
It is a macro level decision to ask whether 
should be required as part of schooling. But it 
si on to specify the particulars of such a study. 
macro and micro here is that consistency must be 
sions about micro activities presuppose a prior 
macro activity - or its programme at any rate. 
the study of history 
is a micro level deci - 
The connection between 
maintained. So, deci- 
understanding of the 
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Among the most important micro decisions would be decisions about 
course content (syllabus detai ls) , methods, strategies and techniques. 
The objects-of-decision in these spheres - i. e. questions about what 
and how to teach (syllabus details and methods), do not range quite so 
widely and hence need not be set out in so much detai 1 as were the 
issues concerning macro activities. A more expeditious treatment would 
be to make a few comments about them and the relevant knowledge required 
for decision-making. 
First, syllabus details and methods are closely linked because the 
latter are very often determined by the former. (Sometimes it is the 
other way around. ) That is, decisions made about the former place cer- 
tain restrictions on the latter. Mathematics, for instance, is not as 
(practically) compatible with discovery learning (Meno notwithstanding) 
as would be certain aspects of biology or physics. Equally, if one 
wanted to promote self-reliance in students, and discovery learning was 
thought to be favourable to this, it might be decided that physics or 
biology should be learned rather than math. The implication for our 
selection of a decision-maker would be that a knowledge of both is im- 
portant for decisions about either one. 
Second, theoretical outcomes and justifying principles would be 
derived from (a) an in-depth knowledge of the discipline in which the 
decision is being made (b) an understanding of and ability to execute 
a wide range of teaching methods, strategies, etc. (c) a knowledge of 
theories of learning and motivation (d) knowledge of the particular in- 
dividuals being taught (conceptual and material context). (It goes 
without saying that ethical matters are to be considered - but ethical 
problems are not particularly outstanding here. ) Pragmatic outcomes 
would be determined largely in virtue of one's understanding of material 
context - the individual learners, capabilities of the teacher, re- 
sources for learning and the time available. The importance of these 
contingencies (of contextual plurality and dynamic shift) cannot be 
stressed too much. And particular note should be made of the last men- 
tioned of these - time. For, many educators would claim that syllabus 
decisions should be justified (solely) by reference to what is worth- 
wh i le learning or to what an 'educated person' should know. But this 
completely overlooks the fact that the macro activity of schooling 
has 
time limitations placed on it by the competence of learners and the 
dur- 
ation of school days, years and number of grades. 
Third, in deciding how to teach more is needed than an understand- 
ing of what is to be taught and knowledge of general teaching methods, 
strategies, etc. For, as was discussed earlier, activities of particular 
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sorts and locations come to have a certain character which is a function 
of the traditions within and surrounding the activity, the conceptual 
context and the personalities of participants. Schooling, because sus- 
tained personal relations are so central to it, is prone to having a 
'character' which plays a large part in determining how to act in a way 
that, say, a single game of chess is not. In consequence, the fabric 
of a school or type of school generates informal rules which govern 
teaching method and strategy. 
One commonplace example, I think, has to do with the way a teacher 
might present himself and his lessons to a class. If, for example, a 
school-were academically and socially very formal; that is, if students 
addressed teachers as Sir or Madam and teachers called students by their 
last names, and if teaching t rad iti ona. l ly took the form of lectures 
(where other methods might be reasonable options) and formal presenta- 
tion and manner of speech was seen as proper; then if a new teacher con- 
travened these precedents and traditions his behaviour might be seen as 
untoward and resented by other staff members and students. Rules, 
though informal rules, would have been breached. By contrast, in a 
free school such formalistic behaviour would probably be out of its 
character and in breach of its informal rules. A teacher could be 
thought odd or non conformist in such cases of breach; but as well he 
could be ostricised. In many respects, a breach of informal rules is 
as damaging as breach of formal rules. In any case, decision-making 
is to some extent regulated by these rules. 
An interesting point emerges. We are discussing decisions about 
micro activities - i. e. decisions which determine what the micro activi- 
ties will be. Since such decisions create the (micro) activity one 
would think that all components of knowledge necessary for this would 
be external to the activity. But the character of an activity, or its 
informal rules, comes to exist within the activity and after it has a 
history. For traditions, personal relations, norms, and so on, come 
into being at some time after the activity has been initiated. 
So, if 
decisions about how to teach are pragmatically dependent upon the 
infor- 
mal rules and they only come into existence after this activity 
is in 
progress, it follows that, since the how of teaching 
has to begin with 
the activity if not before, then it must be amended 
in light of the 
informal rules, later. 
This can be dramatized by the very familiar situation of the newly 
qualified teacher who learns how to teach 
in, say, comprehensive schools 
as a student teacher in the training college, then once 
actually 
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teaching, comes to see that considerable adjustment in style and method 
is necessary as the internal nuances etc. become known. 
The implication for decision-making, is, of course, that decisions 
about how to teach may not be easy to make from outside of the activity 
to which they are being applied. The suggestion is that competent 
decision-making would most likely come from those who, besides the essen- 
tial knowledge mentioned earlier, have intimate knowledge of the activ- 
ity. - that is, know it from the inside. This is a point that will be 
developed in much greater detail in a later chapter. 
4. Decisions Within Macro and Micro Activities 
The decisions we have been discussing are those about macro and 
micro activities - decisions which, once made, establish an activity 
and its structure. Types of schools (e. g. free school, grammar schools, 
and comprehensives) have quite different structures at both macro and 
micro levels; and within each type there are versions. 
It is within these structures that day to day schooling decisions 
are made. Individual schools of one type or another often aspire to 
programmes that are uniquely their own; and, of course, constantly there 
are decisions about what, when, and how to teach: grammar schools, 
free schools, and so on, each having notions of their own. Though, 
whatever is decided in the individual cases, it must be consistent with 
the general activity structure of the type of school that it is. (Other- 
wise it would be a different type of school, i. e. a macro activity with 
its own structure. ) 
As regards the knowledge required of decision-makers within, as 
opposed to about, activities, there are some important differences. 
There are surely some who would say that the differences are so impor- 
tant as to suggest that quite different groups of decision-makers ought 
to make them, e. g. educational experts in the former case and teachers 
in the latter; though I will argue against this in due course. 
The important difference in types of decision is manifest by the 
fact that objects-of-decision, alternatives and justifying principles 
within activities are largely (though perhaps not each and every case) 
suggested by the structure of the activity in which decision-making 
is 
taking place. In consequence, to know the activity structure would 
be 
to know most of what is necessary for internal decisions. In chess, 
for example, once one has grasped the programme - the game's 
description, 
aims, and so on - and understands the formal rules of pläy 
(e. g. how 
the pieces move) and the informal rules of strategy, psychological 
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manipulation of opponents, etc.; then given the usual cognitive and 
affective skills, internal decision-making may proceed. And in schools, 
to have understood that in a London comprehensive, and in an affluent 
area, the programme and rules are such-and-such, and that the description 
and purpose of one's history course is to teach central topics in Medt- 
eval European history, is thereby to put the decision-maker within a 
sphere of operations that makes one range of objects-of-decision, alter- 
natives, and justifying principles seem sensible, and others not. To 
consider an ecclesiastic, rather than political or economic approach, 
or consideration of the age from the peasants' point of view, would be 
the sort of question (and alternatives) that would make sense in the 
(micro) activity of teaching history in the conditions mentioned. To 
consider which of the Shakespearian tragedies to teach, or whether 
soccer rather than rugby should be played, are objects-of-decision and 
options which do not rate consideration in history because they deal 
with different activities. One could expand this example further to 
show that urban comprehensives are often different (in type) than those 
in rural areas; and affluent communities spawn schools of yet further 
distinction, and so on. As the example is refined one can see that the 
activity structure follows suit, and hence what the internal decision- 
maker must know to be competent is not just the structure of a compre- 
hensive, but of an affluent urban comprehensive. 
Decisions about activities contrast with these, not because of 
anything in the structure of decision-making or in the conditions of 
competence; but mainly insofar as what must be known in order to formu- 
late objects-of-decision, alternatives and justifications are not so 
readily avai lable. Where internal decisions in schooling require know- 
ledge of the programme and rules of the particular type of school that 
it is, external decisions (about schooling) require more esoteric 
knowledge of the alternatives and principles that justify the programme 
and, or, rules. As we have seen, this can involve, 'depending upon the 
specific decision. of course, knowledge of the history and philosophy of 
education and comparative education; and of educational sociology, 
psychology and economics; and of curriculum methodology and understand- 
ing of disciplines. In other words, decisions about activities 
have a 
dimension which is usually more abstract than is true of decisions within. 
Since the type of knowledge, at least in part, differs quite marked- 
ly as between the abstract and concrete, one might suppose that 
the 
implication for decision-makers is, perhaps, that more than one group of 
individuals ought to divide up the decision-making pie. For instance, 
one might suppose that decisions about schooling activities might 
be 
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handled by university based experts (e. g. philosophers and psychologists); 
or that macro activity decisions should be dealt with by the philosophers, 
historians and comparative education people, and that micro activity 
decisions should be the domain of the methods experts, or even groups 
like the Schools Council. Alternatively, macro decisions could be 
divided into those about the description of schooling and those about 
course arrangements and each allotted to different groups. And, conceiv- 
ably, decisions within micro activities might be given to teachers, 
students or their parents. These kinds of questions will be dealt 
with piecemeal over the next few chapters which will consider each of 
the main potential decision-makers (i. e. students, parents, experts and 
the teaching profession) in terms of competence to make the various 
levels of decision. 
Something which will play an important part in these considerations 
is the dimension of decision-making knowledge, a consideration of which 
we have strayed from, namely context. For in our discussion of decisions 
within activities we have attended mainly to knowledge required to 
assess theoretical descriptions of one alternative or another. We should 
now mention pragmatic outcomes; and of course with this comes contex- 
tual matters. 
We need only reiterate a point made earlier, which is that picking 
out alternatives from options and then evaluating them is, or ought to 
be, done by considering not only the standard, or usual consequences, 
but by thinking as well about the likely occurrences in this particular 
case. (This is what we mean by considering pragmatic outcomes in full. ) 
What affects the latter? Local contingencies: the conceptual and mat- 
erial context in which the activity occurs. That is, decisions about 
what, when and how to teach should take into account (i f they are to be 
competent) (a) conceptual context - the concepts and level of conceptual 
development of the students which are relevant to the activity in ques- 
tion (i. e. the level of the child's understanding of the activity's 
structure, and the concepts which are prerequisites) ý 
(b) material con- 
text - the time available to do what is 'theoretically' 
justifiable, the 
space, relevant teaching and other resources, and psychological, socio- 
logical and economic facts about the children 
(e. g. the number of school 
periods, days and weeks to undertake the activity, the classroom 
space 
(or whatever else is necessary), the textbooks, etc., and 
the attitude 
of the chi 1d ren to what is to be done - their receptiveness 
to the idea 
and motivation to participate, the social effects on 
others (the student 
body, parent student relations and the community) and 
the economic 
feas ibi1i ty) . One might consider all of 
these factors of conceptual 
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and material context in connection with a decision of whether or not to 
teach a Marxist interpretation of a partJcular sequence of historical 
events or visit an historical castle, as opposed to a museum, when study- 
ing fifteenth century home furnishings. In the later case one could 
ask: Is there time enough to spend a whole day on a field trip - will 
consideration of other important historical topics have to be left out 
as a consequence? Is there a museum or castle within traveling distance? 
Are there a sufficient number of teachers (or other adults) available to 
supervise adequately the children? How wi 11 the parents react - do 
they feel that school visitations are a waste of time? Will the students 
have to make a financial contribution to travel or food expenses? Can 
they or their parents afford it? Will the children enjoy the field 
trip? Will they take it seriously? In addition to these questions rel- 
evant to material context one could ask about conceptual, context. Are 
the children capable of understanding what they will be seeing and 
'studying'? ' Will they be able to relate the field trip experience., in 
whole and part to their current study topic? Will they be sophisticated 
enough, conceptually, to find the actual artifacts of greater signifi- 
cance than copies, drawings or explanations? To be sure, these sorts 
of questions about context, material and conceptual, can be raised in 
connection with any decision within an activity (especially schooling); 
and since they are important to assessment of pragmatic outcomes they 
are important to competent decision-making. 
It is, I think, important to note from this discussion that deci- 
sions both about and within activities have in common the requirement 
of contextual knowledge. Furthermore, this knowledge is not only a 
necessary condition of competent decision-making; as well it occupies a 
position of considerable significance relative to the knowledge pertinent 
to theoretical descriptions. I have tried to stress this through example 
to this point, and wi 11 have a great deal more to say about 1t as we 
proceed. For if one wanted to argue that, say, pragmatic outcomes were 
not nearly so important in decision-making as theoretical descriptions, 
especially with regard to macro activity decisions, then the case in 
favour of having those with appropriate theoretical knowledge make deci- 
sions would be all the stronger. 1, however, will want to argue quite 
the opposite. 
5. Conclusion 
I want to end by re-emphasising the thrust of the activity chapters 
and by explaining some of the advantages of seeing education as an activity. 
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The main points have been these. Education, interpreted as school- 
ing, is an open macro activity. It has a programme and procedures just 
as does any activity (e. g. a sport or board game); and it is similar to 
golf, tennis and chess in having numerous other (micro) activities 
internal and subordinate to it. But, like hunting or fishing, 'school- 
ing' is loosely described and can be structured in a myriad of different 
ways. So from the notion of schooling (as with hunting and fishing) 
there can be many different (yet in some important respects similar) macro 
activities. It was further contended that activities take place within 
both a conceptual and a material context: the former being the aggre- 
gate of conceptual schemes (or the portions relevant to school decision- 
making) of all participants and interested parties, and the latter being 
the aggregate of social, psychological and economic circumstances of 
participants and interested parties. 
Our ultimate objective is to determine who is most competent to 
make curriculum decisions and this furthered to some extent in seeing 
what it is that has to be known in order to make such decisions . The 
purpose of analysing education in terms of activities and contexts is 
that simply by noticing the characteristic structure of an activity and 
the circumstances (both conceptual and material) in which it exists we 
can tell a little bit about what must be known and, hopefully, who might 
know it. That is, since activities have programmes and procedures, both 
would have to be known by a decision-maker who is making decisions in- 
ternal to the activity. For example, one cannot make very many impor- 
tant decisions in chess without knowing what the game is about (its 
programme) and its rules (procedures). 
Putting it this way gives rise to the earlier made distinction be- 
tween decisions within an activity and those about an activity. The 
example just cited deals with the former and such decisions are, for 
the teacher at any rate, the most common. 'What to teach, when and how? ' 
are matters largely prescribed by the type of school, its programme and 
internal rules. To put it another way, a teacher's ultimate choice 
among alternatives is justified by appeal to formal or informal rules 
(or elements of procedure) or appeal to more abstract principles, aims, 
purposes, etc. within the programme. 
But there is another sphere of decision-making, as just indicated: 
it deals with decisions about the activity. What will be the programme? 
And what will be the procedures? Interestingly enough, 
it is in virtue 
of education being an open activity that such questions arise. 
For in 
closed activities such as chess very 
little of the structure is suscepti- 
ble to change, hence, decision-making. (Some of the informal rules, e. g. 
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strategies, would be an exception to this. ) 
If one were asked to make a decision about an activity, that is, 
to change the structure of the activity in some way (e. g. by changing 
a rule or a guiding principle), what would one have to know? Three 
things. First, the existing structure would have to be known. For 
if a change is to be made to a rule or principle, whatever the change 
is, it must be consistent with those parts of the structure that remain 
unchanged. One could hardly tell if a newly proposed rule would be 
consistent with other rules,. etc. without knowing those other rules. 
Second, the conceptual and material context must be known. A proposed 
alteration to the aims of schooling or an addition to the activities of 
schooling will depend for successful implementation upon how it is 
understood by participants (and interested parties) and the material 
conditions that will make it a practical possibility. That is, the 
contexts must be compatible with the structure of the activity. Third, 
certain fields of knowledge form the backdrop for curriculum matters 
and a familiarity with these is a requisite for the decision-maker. 
Even though the looseness of 'education' permits a variety of different 
forms of schooling, the concept is not so vague that no restrictions 
prevail. Since, activities have some limitation of range, particular 
areas of knowledge can be identified as more or less central. Without 
rehearsing previous arguments in detail, it can be said that decisions 
about activities - i. e. creating, ratifying or whatever - are more ab- 
stract than decisions within an existing activity, since. in the latter 
case many of one's alternatives and justifications stem from past 
practice and established rules. On the other hand, determining the aims 
and principles of a type of schooling or the content to be taught often 
entails quite erudite knowledge in the areas of history or philosophy of 
education and comparative education, on the former, and considerable 
understanding of the disciplines, on the latter. 
Decisions about the structure of an activity and those made within 
the structure do, however, have one very important ep is temi c item in 
common. It is the crucial relation between the sizing up of an alterna- 
tive and the contexts. For it was claimed that a ful 1 statement of an 
alternative entails (a) the description of the alternative 
itself (b) 
consideration of usual consequences if that alternative 
is chosen (c) 
prediction of consequences in the particular use at 
hand. Consideration 
of (b) and most especially 
(c) requires sensitivity to both conceptual 
and material contexts. This applies 
in equal measure to decisions about 
as well as within activities. For 
it would be absurd to devise aims of 
schooling which, given the circumstances 
in which the school had to 
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operate, had lithe chance of succeeding. And, quite obviously, the 
same applies to decisions about content and methods. 
in light of these observations about sphere of knowledge and 
decision-making, the question arises about whom is thus suggested as the 
most competent curriculum decision-maker. Seemingly the answer is clear. 
In the predominantly theoretical areas of decision-making about activ- 
ities, the educational'. theorist should have control. And within, the 
reins should be held by the practitioner. But, certainly in the first 
case, we slip all too quickly by any specification of the degree of 
theoretical knowledge that is important; and, more importantly, we ignore 
consideration of pragmatic outcomes and contextual information which 
is needed to predict them. Because of this a more pi ecer+Pa l approach 
to various potential decision-makers, with these considerations in 
mind, is called for. So the matter will be left to ensuing chapters. 
Why construe education as an activity? One reason is that it quite 
simply is an activity. It is that institutionalized ritual in which 
children are put for twelve or thirteen years. Those, like Peters, who 
think of it as an external criterion are, to my mind, in error. There 
may be an external conceptualization possible, but it is so vague that 
no criterion can be generated. Granted, a criterion is necessary for 
making judgments about 'being educated' and what counts as 'educational'. 
But this criterion, I submit, is internal to particular types of educa- 
tion (or schooling). The criterion is part of the programme. For 
example, part of the activity of giving a military education is that 
students should become soldiers. This aim would not be external to a 
military education; it is a part of it. A second reason: by showing that 
education is an activity its' structural. unity is highlighted. Programme 
and procedures are shown to be consistent within themselves and consistent 
with one another. A change to any structural component requires, there- 
fore, attention to the other components. Because elements of structure 
can be very subtle, an intimate knowledge of the activity is necessary 
to decision-making about any aspect of structure. This has profound 
implications for our choice of decision-maker. 
Certain benefits derive from the particular account of activity given. 
First, as mentioned above, the broad conceptualization of 'programme', 
rather than the more familiar 'point' or 'overall purpose', enables con- 
sideration of aims and principles that justify the full range of educa- 
tional (micro) activities to be regarded as internal to types of school- 
ing. This overcomes a relativistic difficulty that often confounds 
dis- 
cussions about the justification of this activity or that 
in schools. 
In other words, in an attempt to formulate a detailed criterign 
for what 
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counts as educational that is external to all schooling activities in- 
cluding types of schooling, so much disagreement arises about what 
should figure among the criteria that one is inclined to feel that such 
disputed items seem arbitrary. But, by considering types of schooling 
as we have done, these fugitive items can be housed alongs i de other. 
principles with which they seem more congenial. Take for example, the 
aim that 'students should come to think like soldiers'. It would surely 
be rejected from the external criterion of 'education'; but it seems 
quite consistent with other aims, etc. in the form of schooling we call 
'military schooling' . Second, this account links context with activity 
in such a way as to demonstrate that without compatibility between the 
two,, either (a) the activity itself is inconceivable, or (b) it is, from 
the practical point of view, an impossibility. Could one even conceive 
of soccer as a game without reference to a field (or any grounds) on 
which to play? Could soccer actually be played on grounds that did not 
meet certain practical requirements - say if the field was only five feet 
long or made of quicksand? Third, by dividing decisions into those about 
structure and those within structure it is more clearly seen that dif- 
ferent types of decisions are to be made - 'rule making' and 'rule fol- 
lowi ng' . This of course, emphasises the di ffereht sorts of 
knowledge re- 
quired in each, and it thereby has implications for our choice of 
decision-maker. Fourth, by scrupulously avoiding, in our rendering of 
activity structure, talk of elements which 'constitute' the activity, 
and instead speaking of 'characterization', we were able to give a rather 
broader account of what actually governs action within activities than 
would have been the case were we limited to 'formal rules'. In many 
activities much of the action is governed by informal controls - etiquette, 
nuance, intimations, common strategies and so forth. The complexion of 
many activities, e. g. tennis or golf, derives a great deal from these. 
For example, in golf one simply does not talk when an opponent is hitting 
the ball. This is not a formal rule; it is informal. Nevertheless, 
if one does not scrupulously observe it, finding opponents 
for future 
games may become very difficult'. Informal rules, thus, seem 
important 
to a characterization of the game. By including them as a structural 
element we lay them open to the decision-maker either 
for change or as 
elements with which other changes must be consistent and 
the context 
compatible. Fifth, and finally, by including an explanation of 
levels 
of understanding - of more and less sophistication - we 
have seen that 
even between genuine participants 
in an activity there can be a difference 
of understanding. Clearly, this- potential 
for levels of understanding, 
will have, as well, implications 
for our choice of decision-maker. 
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In coming chapters, we will employ this analysis in an attempt to 
determine who is most competent to control curriculum; or who -i s compe- 
tent to control which parts. 
Chapter VI 
STUDENTS AND SELF CHOICE IN CURRICULUM 
1. Introduction 
In preceeding chapters we determined the conditions that would 
have to be fulfilled by someone claiming to be a competent curriculum 
decision-maker. And, we analysed the structure of the activity of 
schooling thereby enabling us to see the domains of knowledge in 
which understanding is necessary for purposes of curriculum decision- 
making. We may now proceed to the main substantive business of this 
thesis which is to determine who among the reasonable alternatives (i. e. 
students, parents, experts or teachers) ought to have control of cur- 
riculum on grounds of competence. 
My intention will be to examine each of the prospective decision- 
makers as though each were claiming exclusive control. The 'control'; 
here, will be taken in the cases of students and parents to some extent 
as control by a student over his own curriculum or control by a parent 
(or parent couple) of his (their) own child's curriculum. In the case 
of experts and teachers, control will refer to either control within a 
particular school, district, province or nation, as specified. In ad- 
dition, consideration wi 11 be given to various sorts of participatory 
arrangements involving some or all of the aforementioned. The position 
I will defend is that teachers are most likely to best fulfill the con- 
ditions of competence. Now precisely which decisions they should make, 
and what 'teaching profession' means, (e. g. individual teachers making 
their own decisions, teachers in a given school, community or country 
making collective decisions) and who is to be counted as a teacher 
(e. g. practicing teachers, those with teacher training, sometime teachers 
who are now employed by teachers' colleges 
_government 
or private research 
institutions, all, some or only one of these), are matters of obvious 
importance which we will ignore for the moment but have on our agenda 
for later. 
The case is to be made over five chapters: individual chapters 
will consider students, parents, institutional experts, various forms 
of participatory decision-making and teachers. In the present chapter 
cases for and against the competence of students will be examined. Two 
notes before starting. First, the proposition to be considered 
i s, once 
again, that students are more competent than others to 
determine their 
own curricula - that is, each student ought to determine 
his or her own 
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curriculum. This of course does not preclude voluntary consultation 
with others; it simply puts the final say in the lap of the student. 
Second, the decisions of concern to us are limited to those we have 
characterized as dealing with curriculum. We have been using this term 
in a wide sense such that programme decisions (e. g. aims) are included as 
are procedural matters (e. g. teaching methods). However, this excludes 
such things as the appointment of staff and purchases of plant and 
equipment. 
2. What Decisions should Students be Entitled to Make? 
(a) 'Freedom' and Curriculum Decision 
Not only are we interested in what students are capable of deciding, 
but what they ought to be 'free' to decide. If we make this rough 
translation of terms and use Joel Feinberg's analysisI of the latter, 
we are provided with a useful piece of conceptual apparatus. 
To be free, on the 'free to free from' model ,is to be free to make 
curriculum decisions, and free from any cont rai nts . Moreover, the 
freedom we are speaking of is such that if X is free to a and from b, 
then X is in fact not constrained by-b; not simply that X feels happy or 
is unconstrained by b, which may in fact constrain him. The reason for 
ruling out feelings is not only that it stands against ordinary usaae 
of the term freedom, but that for us to hand curriculum control to those 
who simply feel free regardless of the actual constraints would be 
foolish. A further note about freedom and constraint is that, as in 
ordinary usage,. only possible freedoms and removable constraints will 
be considered. So if a child wants to eat his curriculum or turn into 
a butterfly we will not bother trying to think which constraints need 
removing'. 
Pace Feinberg, constraints can be positive or negative and internal 
or external. Expulsion from school would be a positive and external 
constraint to attendance, as compared with not having enough money to 
pay fees to a private school which should be a negative external con- 
straint. The key to the positive-negative dichotomy 
is that in cases of 
the latter one lacks something which would enable freedom rather than 
being as in the former. The external-internal 
distinction is somewhat 
arbitrarily set as outside one's mind and 
body as opposed to inside. 
ISocial Philosophy (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973) 
Chapter 3. 
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Expulsion and not having fees were positive and negative respectively, 
but both external to one's physical body or mind. To be constrained 
from attending school because of the measles would be positive and in- 
ternal because, on the first account, it is not an absence, and on the 
second it is to do with one's body. To have a low I. Q., on the other 
hand, would be an abseflce of intelligence, hence negative, and to do 
with the mind, hence internal. 
Now among child-centred educators, those who profess to place the 
needs and interests of the individual child before concerns about the 
organization of knowledge, freedom of curriculum choice is a fundamen- 
tal, if not all embracing, principle. What distinguishes them are 
subtle shades of disagreement about precisely what the child is to be 
free to do, and from what. Before looking at some of these positions 
it seems opportune to point out that a very common justification for 
freedom to decide is that it promotes the eradication of certain nega- 
tive internal constraints (e. g. absence of decision-making ability). 
Paradoxically such educators fail to see that their justification high- 
lights the weakness of their position, namely that a necessary condi- 
tion for freedom of choice is actual negative internal constraint - so 
we shall see. 
In -th is next section I want to give some credence to the notion 
that students ought to have control of their own curricula, or some 
portion of it, by considering some of the positions taken by liberal 
traditionalists and, more especially, by child-centred educators past 
and present. Along with a description of areas of curriculum in which 
they felt children should be self-determinate will be noted the justifi- 
cations offered. Then, in a following section, a critique of the jus- 
tifications will show that most justifications are either inadequate or 
dependent upon an assumption of competence. This assumption will then 
be shown to be flimsy. 
(b) Freedoms that Traditional and Chi Id-Centred Educators have 
Allowed Children in Curriculum Decision-Making 
What ought children to be free to decide and why? 
The most dismal 
conceptions of 'traditional schooling' against which 
the progressives 
fought held the student to be properly unfree as a decision-maker 
be- 
cause naturally constrained, internally and negatively, 
by an absence 
of knowledge and cognitive development. 
In consequence, decisions about 
the macro activity and within the micro activities were 
all to be'deci ded 
by someone other than the student. 
In the extreme, decisions about what 
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size of penci is to use, what drawings to do in art, what colours to 
make countries when colouring in maps, when to sharpen a pencil, etc. 
were all made for the student. This view is not widely accepted any- 
more. Even 'traditional' schools commonly ease the positive constraints 
by teachers to enable considerable decision-making within micro activi- 
ties (e. g. choice of projects in art and social studies, selection of 
topics in the latter and in science, and things of this sort). Older 
children are frequently given the opportunity of deciding about micro 
activities, such as whether to take this or that math course or whether 
to take a literature course instead. To the conservative eyes of some 
traditionalists a wildly extravagant extention of such lenience is the 
cafeteria curriculum which enables the student to make a significant 
contribution toward structuring his own macro activity. But this is 
hardly very radical and must be kept in perspective. For the cafeteria 
usually has limited offerings and once an item, a course, is selected 
it is the teacher or school who determines content and methods within. 
In consequence, positive external constraints often prevent very much 
student freedom - in either macro or micro decisions. 
To contrast with this picture, enter the early twentieth century 
progressives, who believed that education should be based upon the needs and 
felt-interests of children; and children more than anyone else were seen as 
being competent to discern them. Helen Parkhurst, for example, developed a 
programme in the United States in 1913 which became known as the Dalton 
y (and was later brought to England as the Dalton Plan). Laboratory Plan 
2 
The idea was to preserve from traditional schooling the notion of cul- 
tural transmission but to accomplish this without encrusting the minds 
of children, fettering them for life with inert knowledge 
(to use 
Wh i tehead's phrase), a slavish disregard for evidence, idleness care- 
lessness and failure. The Plan was that children should contract, month- 
by-month, to study certain major subjects such as history, mathematics, 
science, English, etc. and minor subjects such as music, art, handiwork, 
domestic science and so forth. The content and method of study was 
each student's choice, on grounds that it is not for the teacher to 
choose what the child must know. Says Parkhurst 
... the curriculum of any school should 
vary 
according to the needs of the pupils, and 
even in schools where it is designed to serve 
a definite academic purpose, this aspect should 
not be lost sight of as it often is. .3 
2Education on the Dalton Plan (London: John Bel 1,1922). 
31bid., 
p. 23. 
P9 
School, she felt, could be made as attractive as play and this done 
through 'experience' enabled by freedom and responsibility. 
Freedom. is therefore the first principle of 
the Dalton Laboratory Plan. From the 
academic, or cultural, point of view, the 
pupil must be made free to continue without 
interruptions his work upon any subject in 
which he is absorbed because when interested 
he is mentally keener, more alert, and more 
capable of mastering any difficulty that may 
arise in the course of his study. Under the 
new plan there are no bells to tear him away at 
an appointed hour and claim him pedagogically 
to another subject and another teacher. Thus 
treated, the energy of the pupil automatically 
runs to waste ..., Unless a pupil is permitted 
to absorb knowledge at his own rate of speed he 
will never learn anything thoroughly. Freedom 
is taking one's own4time. To take someone 
else's is slavery: 
And later she says : 
'Under the Dalton Laboratory Plan we place the 
work problem squarely before him, indicating 
the standard that has to be attained. After 
that he is allowed to tackle it as he thinks 
fit in his own way and at his own speed. 
Responsibility for the result. will develop 
not only his latent intellectual ýowers, but 
also his judgment and character. ' 
Intellectually, she claimed, freedom shapes and tempers thought and 
sharpens and enlarges judgment. Socially it promotes self-disc. ipl ine 
and regard for others which is essential in 1 ife outside the school. 
None of this is far from the real world preparation and experience 
concept of education espoused by Dewey. -For 'li ke Parkhurst, Dewey 
believed that a child's education had to begin with concern about his 
future and needs and with his felt interests. For only with this begin- 
Hing would education as experience and growth commence -ie. the process 
of learning and understanding through (worthwhile) experiences which 
lead to others, and they to others. 
6 
Apart from some of the particulars, Parkhurst's Dalton Plan is 
similar in important respects to other child-centred programmes of the 
day, both in Britain and the U. S. A. In Winnetka, Illinois, for instance, 
School Superintendent Carleton Washburne was responsible for implementa- 
4Ibid., 
p. 16. 
51bid., 
p. 18. 
6See John Dewey Experience and Education (193-) (New York: 
Collier Books, 1963) especially Chapter 3. 
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tion in 1919 of a bipartite programme which featured individualized 
programmes in the three R's, sciences and social studies and, in the 
second part, endeavoured to promote self-expression and creativity 
through art and group activities. 
7 
This programme was thought to be 
very influential in the spread of streaming in the U. S. because less 
radical school districts throughout the American mid-West were willing 
to acknowledge in principle the claim of individual differences in 
learning but unwilling to go so far as to provide individual learning 
packages - hence the development of group programmes (i .e. streams). 
8 
Homer Lane, an American influenced by Dewey, in Britain, founded the 
Little Commonwealth, a school which, in practice, was more social than 
academic in focus, but which espoused strongly the principles of free- 
dom and love. 
9 
All social and academic constraints here were self- 
imposed by students. In part, the justification for freedom was, as 
at Wi nnetka, pedagogic success. Added to this was the Freudian notion 
that freedom could be emotionally therapeutic. T. Percy Nunn, writing 
in 1930, adds a moral line of justification to freedom which is the 
claim that the development of individuality is the first duty of educa- 
tion and this rests upon a belief in the infinite value of the indivit9'- 
üal person and his responsibility for his own destiny. 
10 
In some respects, freedom of choice is more apparent than real. 
Attendance was compulsory in all of the above. And, as Parkhurst, 
Dewey and Nunn all took pains to explain, their views öf educating were 
compatible with the presence of teachers and classrooms and all were 
what might be called 'soft paternalists' insofar as the teacher was to 
be seen as a leader, guide or planner, one who, rather than dictating 
programme and procedure, would suggest to students means of attaining 
ends and would manipulate the environment so as to place alternatives 
before the student which would enhance his exposure to a greater range 
of educative experience than would otherwise be the case. Freedom, then, 
would be exercised within a material context arranged by the teacher. 
The conceptual context would be a given as well, since the adult world 
7L. A. Cremin, The Transformation of the School (New York: Random 
House, 1961), pp. 295-9. 
8Ibid. 
9Indeed, 
a1i the too much ' love' allegedly, because the school was 
forced to close in 1918 for rumoured (though unproven) sexual impro- 
prieties between Lane and some of the : older girls . 
See Talks to Parents 
and Teachers (New York: Shocken Books, 1928). 
10Education, Its Data and First Principles (London: Edward Arnold 
& Co., 193b " 
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represented by the teacher, parents and community would be that into 
which the student would be initiated. Beyond this, the extent to which 
actual freedom could exist would depend, in part, on the extent to which 
the negative and internal constraints of lack of intelligence, cogni- 
tive growth and cognitive experience inhibited competent decision-making. 
Further, actual freedom to make macro and micro decisions would depend 
upon the positive external constraints of teachers whose interpretations 
of 'leading, guiding and planning' varied away from and toward 'deter- 
mination' of curriculum. 
Since the 1960's, child-centred education, under the names free 
schooling, open schooling and deschooling, has equatled and in some 
cases outdone the radical promotion of child freedom of their progressive 
forebea re rs . Beginning with the romantic belief in the innate goodness 
and curiosity of the child stemming from Rousseau and Pestalozzi, which 
even Dewey shared, such people as A. S. Nei 11,11 Ivan Illi ch, 
12 
and 
Paul Goodman 
13 
denounced even the very liberalized versions of tradi- 
tional schooling. Neill, greatly influenced by Homer Lane, 
14 
established 
Summerhill School in Britain which provided children with considerable 
social freedom and with the right to determine not only what, when and 
how they would learn but whether they would learn anything at all (in 
contrast with most progressives, save perhaps Lane). In other words, 
seemingly the entire programme and procedure of the macro activity (and 
hence micro activities) was at their choosing. 'Seemingly' because the 
material context limited children to the resources of rural and residen- 
tial school, and in which surely conflicts over the available resources 
(e. g. teachers or laboratory equipment) would necessitate the curbing 
of someone's freedom, and, of course, the conceptual context would be 
outside the domain of choice. Illi ch and Goodman, both saddened by the 
intellectually debilitating mentality of modern (largely American) 
schooling, argued that learning could be best promoted by allowing 
I 1Summerh i11 (Harmondsworthi Penguin, 1968) . 
12Deschool ing Society (New York: Harper and Row, 1970) . For an 
example of the political and economic aspects see S. Bowles and H. 
Gintus, Schooling in Capitalist America (London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1976 , pp. 256-62. 
13Compulsory Miseducation (New York: Vintage, 1964). 
14See the Nei 11's forward to Lane's, Talks to Parents and Teachers, 
op. Cit. 
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children to pursue felt-interests outside the restrictive school envi- 
ronment - indeed schools as such should be abolished. From the stand- 
point of child freedom, this proposal would maximise freedom of choice 
in curriculum and would do likewise with matter of context. For a 
child with the resources of a society would presumably have a greater 
range of material circumstances; and the same would be true of the con- 
ceptual context within which his decisions would be made. 
There are many people in the modern day version of progressivism 
who do not support deschooling and who see that residential schools 
such as Summerhill are not possible everywhere, yet who favour a child- 
centred approach to schooling, as opposed to subject-centred. 
15 John 
Holt, 16 Jonathan Kozol, 17 Herbert Kohl, 18 Charles Silberman19 and many 
others could be included in this group whom we will label proponents of 
open schooling supporters. Barbara Blitz, generalizing about them says, 
Many of these attempts to finds new forms of 
educational methods share similar interpreta- 
tions of ways in which some basic needs of 
children can best be met. Most would agree 
that 1. children should have the right to 
pursue individual interests and activities; 
2. that they need to be actively engaged 
with their environment and other people in 
order for meaningful learning to occur; 3. 
that the environment is of major importance 
in structuring the learning of the child; 
4. that children learn at their own pace 
and with their own particular learning 
styles; 5. that learning should be exciting 
and enjoyable; and 6. that the teacher's 
role should be that of diagnostician, guide 
and stimulator. With these basic building 
blocks, other ingredients may be quite vari- 
able, depending upon the philosophy and 
personality of the tea18er and upon the 
available facilities. 
15For 
subject ' centred approaches based on the nature of 
knowledge 
see P. H. Hirst 'Liberal Education and the Nature of 
Knowledge' in R. F. 
Dearden, P. H. Hirst & R. S. Peters eds., Education and the Development of 
972 , and Jerome 
Bruner, Pro- Reason (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972T, 
- 
cess of Education (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 196, 
pp. 123-4,210. 
16How Children Fail (New York: Pitman, 1964), Freedom and Beyond 
(London: Penguin, 1973 and many others. 
17Death 
at an Early Age (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 
1967) and Free 
Schools Boston : Houghton Mifflin, 1972). 
18The Open C1 ass room (New York Review of Books, 1969). 
19C 
ri sis in the Classroom (New York: Random 
House, 1970). 
20The Open Classroom (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1973), pp. 3-4. 
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The force of 'right' in point 1. is unclear, but even if it means 
only commitment to an ideal rather than a moral entitlement, taken with 
point 6. one would expect that the teacher's guidance and stimulation 
would be unobtrusive so as to maximize student freedom. Certainly this 
is the use with writers such as Holt; 
21 but Blitz goes on to explain 
that free choice is subject to the constraints of the environment and 
of the teacher's influence, something which is particularly important 
in providing a broad range of subject matter for students. She remarks: 
""" the total organization of the class and 
the materials available within it gives control 
over how children spend their time and what 
they learn. Therefore, even giving great free- 
dom to students to choose what they will learn 
and when, we still maintain controls inherent 
in the school situation. When we add the inter- 
personal relationship between teacher and stu- 
dent, even more subtle controls begin to enter 
the picture so that the student is never really 22 left entirely free to pursue his own interests . 
Some radical educators might shy away from talk of 'control' in 
favour of, say, Dewian 'leadership' . 
23 
The two are, however, difficult 
to disentangle. For leadership exists in activities which have material 
and conceptual contexts, both of which 'control'; and activities by 
their very nature are rule-governed - control again. As Dewey says 'No 
rules, then no game; different rules then a different game' . 
24 And, on 
the other side, if teachers influence students positively, then how 
does this differ from leadership? 
What sorts of justifications do modern child-centred educators put 
forward for giving freedom of choice, if a limited freedom, to the 
child? One line of argument is the claim that teaching is an anathema. 
Harold Entwistle25 has catalogued Carl Rogers' complaint that outcomes 
of teaching are either unimportant or hurtful to students; 
26 F. Froebel's 
belief that teaching is a threat to the students; 
27 
and Jean Pi aget's 
21See Freedom and Beyond, especially Chapter 3. 
22 Open Classroom, p. 60. 
23Experience 
and Education, p. 59. 
24 Ibid., p. 52. 
25Chi ld-'Centred Education (London: Methuen, 1970), pp. 142-5. 
26On Becoming a Person (London: 
cited in Entwistle. 
27The Education of Man (London: 
cited in Entwistle. 
Constable, 1961), p. 216; 
Edward Arnold, 1887) , p. 7; 
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claim that direct teaching is not as effective as spontaneous concept 
formation by the chi ld. 
28 
A second way of arguing is that there is 
greater heuristic value in discovery learning than traditional lecturing 
and that the open school more easily accommodates the former than can 
traditional schools. This is sustained by an array of arguments claim- 
ing that learning of greater depth and breadth can be wrought by start- 
ing from the felt-interests of the child. Alfred North Whitehead 
stamped as 'inert knowledge', and thereby undesirable, propositions 
without present relevance for children. 
29 
And, although Whitehead be- 
lieved that ultimately teachers ought to decide curriculum content (to 
suit the children), others such as Dewey and even Piaget have maintained 
that a problem-solving encounter for the student is the only effective 
way for real learning to continue. Where Dewey and Piaget differ is 
that the latter favours 'contrived' problems and the former does not. 
30 
A third line of argument, closely linked with the second, is that 
the very meaning of education can be tied to the pursuit of one's epis- 
temic interests. In this vein P. S. Wilson intends that a necessary 
(and evidently sufficient) condition for something being educational is 
that it be knowledge of intrinsic value. The later is to be determined 
by its interest for the individual, who encounters it, a limiting proviso 
being that pursuing it not be harmful to others or immoral. Curriculum 
content, therefore, is whatever interest the child. 
31 
(c) Criticisms of Proposed Justifications of Child Freedom 
A preliminary point is that if a child is to have decision-making 
freedom, he may choose no curriculum at all. Open classroom supporters 
when confronted with this usually offer soothing remarks about the innate 
curiosity of the child and it being only a matter of time before taking 
up some (roughly) academic interest. 
32 Whether they are right about 
innate curiosity is neither here nor there, but if a child were to opt 
28Language 
and Thought of the Child, p. 11; cited in Entwistle. 
29 The Aims of Education New York: Macmillan Company, 1929), 
Chapter One. 
30For this point see Entwistle, op. cit., pp. 154-5. 
31 Interest and Discipline in Education (London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1971 -, pp-. 66-9. 
32See, for example, John Holt, Freedom and Beyond, Chapter Six. 
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for no curriculum at all for an indefinite period of time, then this 
is one exercise of freedom from which he should be constrainted. For 
in the general case, we are assuming education to be essential (regard- 
less of whether this is justified as a Kantian duty, a prerequisite of 
personhood, instrumentally from the point of view of the child or 
society, or whatever) . 
A second point is that the 'freedom as therapy' justification used 
by Neill and others cannot of itself, be an adequate justification for 
freedom to make curriculum decisions because by nature it presumes men- 
tal illness in all students, and this is simply not (obviously) the 
case. In other words, if we assume most children are mentally healthy, 
they would not be in need of the therapy that would be the reason for 
allowing them freedom. 
Third, if as Wilson argues, the sole criterion for determining 
curriculum content should be the felt-interest of the child; and this 
because being interested in something gives educative value to it; then 
we are commited to the view that a worthwhile activity, micro and pre- 
sumably even macro since a child might be interested in a particular 
type of schooling (e. g. military), is something which only the child 
can determine. This is difficult to see. There is something intuitive- 
ly plausible about the claim that educative worthwhileness exists only 
insofar as people find things interesting (either for its own sake or 
because they anticipate it being useful) - i. e. that knowledge, like 
gold, has value only insofar as it is recognized as having it. But 
to think that an individual child is to be the arbiter of such value 
in specific cases, rather than say, agreement in judgment by members 
of a society, seems mistaken. Is a child's all-consuming interest in 
carpentry projects to the exclusion of learning the three R's, social 
studies and science, that which determines the former as being educa- 
tionally worthwhile and the latter not? Do the consequences for the 
child such as a consequent lack of cognitive perspective not have a 
bearing on what is deemed educationally worthwhile? Is it 
impossible 
to learn something in which one is not interested? And, cannot interests 
be created and kindled? Enough troublesome questions can 
be raised to 
make the thesis dubious. 
Another version of the interests thesis, however, is that children 
will be interested in what is in fact worthwhile. 
This argument is 
not that what they want is worthwhile, 
but that they will want what is 
worthwhile. 
33 From Rousseau, Pestalozzi and others, this romantic notion 
33For 
an interesting discussion of this see Robin Barrow, 
Common 
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supposes that children will, unfolding from within, do what is right if 
not corrupted. Neill was one of its more illustrious contemporary 
exponents, and. Barbara Blitz contends that as a matter of fact, children 
will be interested in the disciplines, which we have come to think of 
as worthwhile. She says: 
Many critics of the open classroom do not feel 
that a young child can be trusted to select 
learning areas which will be profitable. [However] 
most curriculum guides have been compiled by 
assessing the natural interests of the children 
of particular ages and pairing these with the 
expected dexlopmental skills and abilities for 
that group. .s 
(However, Blitz, and those open classroom supporters whom her views are 
supposed to represent, allow that teachers can and should influence a 
student's curriculum choices where it appears that a child might not 
be successful) . But a very real difficulty arises here. Apart from 
the problem of establishing what activities are worthwhile, there is 
the question of how the student is to know what is worthwhile. How, 
for example, is the student supposed to assess the worth of Euclidian 
geometry without first having had considerable familiarity with the 
field? And if we follow Dewey and Whitehead in thinking that the value 
of knowledge is dependent upon the use to which it can be put, we must 
assume that students can recognize the uses. But this supposes that 
the student has a reasonable understanding of the problems that arise 
in his life, which supposes, in turn, that he is able to assess his 
life in a very sophisticated way. How is this sophistication to be 
acquired if not from prior initiation into the various forms of know- 
ledge which the student has not had but is now deciding about? 
35 The 
issue here is competence. How is the child competent to do what the 
romantics say he can? We will consider this in detail shortly. For the 
matter of competence underlies the other justifications. For instance, 
Parkhurst and others maintained that educational benefits of freedom were 
such things as the shaping of thought and sharpening of judgment. Free- 
dom is therefore an aid to developing decision-making competence. But 
are not some decisions so important as to require developed competence 
to justify the freedom to make them (e. g. macro activity decisions)? 
Sense and the Curriculum (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1976), pp. 52- 
3" 
34op. cit., p. 59. 
35For 
a discussion of this sort of problem see Harold Entwistle, 
op. cit., pp. 148-9. 
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Would children be competent? Competent for what? And, the alleged 
right to freedom of choice is similarly dependent upon competence; 
rights ascriptions make no sense otherwise. Can you have a right to 
become a tree or turn yourself inside-out? Of course not! And it 
would make no more sense to suppose that someone has a right to decide 
about their own curriculum when they are patently incapable. Again 
the question, are children competent, and for what? 
Finally, the supposition (by -Rogers and Froebel) that teaching 
might be harmful seems rather dubious in light of the fact that a great 
many people have been taught and are, in consequence, emotionally well 
balanced, apparently happy and educated. Nevertheless, even if there 
is some truth to the suggestion, we are faced with the alternative of 
allowing children to make choices, and once again this raises the 
matter of competence. For if children are not capable of making the 
choices, or making them well, we are then in a position of having to 
choose between two evils. Prima facie, the harms of teaching would 
seem the lesser. 
3. Are Students Competent? 
To assess the competence of students as decision-makers our appeal 
will be to the conditions of competence worked out in a proceeding 
chapter, namely the abilities condition, knowledge condition and access 
to relevant data. It will not, however, be necessary to discuss the 
third of these because it depends upon, at a minimum, fulfillment of 
the abilities condition; the latter I will argue is not satisfied by 
students in the general case. 
(a) The First Condition: Cognitive and Emotional Abilities 
Cognitive abilities such as foresight, orginal ity, a sense of rele- 
vance, and so forth develop over time in some complex intertwining of 
biological maturation and experience (acquisition of propositional and 
procedural knowledge) . The ep istemi c rather than 
biological component 
is, perhaps, most easily made clear. Abilities such as 'relevance' and 
'foresight', to take examples, surely could not be solely biological 
developments. For to claim that A has a refined sense of relevance 
would surely be an observation about A consequent of 
A's having demon- 
st-rated this in judgments x and y with the prediction 
that it would be 
similarly manifest in z. Now, how would 
A demonstrate this ability in 
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x or y. Surely it would be his having judged that a was germane to b 
in, say x; this presumably would only be possible if A had considerable 
knowledge of x. Equally, 'foresight' in x would entail a prediction 
by A that c will be essential, important, useful, etc. to a and b; 
a judgment which, again, would necessitate considerable knowledge of 
X. And, a final illustration, 'orginality' is an attribute of A based 
on past performance in x and Y. But contrary to the popular conception, 
it cannot be simply a casting of imagination to come up with something 
new. More is involved. For if c is to be taken by A as orginal in x 
then A must have general knowledge a and b; since it is only in virtue 
of his knowing a and b that he can have a criterion for determining 
that c is new knowledge in x- that it is compatible with a and b, con- 
sistent with the rules of x, and not identical to a or b. 
To put these ideas more concretely, think of a teacher planning the 
social studies curriculum for ten year olds before the term begins. In 
a unit on the community a question arises about the inclusion of a field- 
trip to the fire station. How would the teacher, who is thought to have 
a strong 'sense of relevance', determine the relevance of such a visit 
to the unit? Obviously this could not be solely an appeal to some 
mysterious personal capacity; rather an understanding of the services 
of the community, and perhaps also knowledge of the students' level of 
preparation would be involved. 'Foresight' , say in planning procedural 
difficulties with taking young children away from the school, would re- 
quire an understanding of the usual problems to be encountered with ten 
year olds, etc. 'Originality', if it were to be manifest in this cur- 
riculum unit, would require of the teacher imagination (perhaps a 'mys- 
terious' power) and, of course, a knowledge of social studies curriculum 
sufficient to warn of what is not original. 
Now the point of discussing abilities in this way is to show that 
not only are they (i. e. relevance, foresight and originality) disposi- 
tions which people have, but they are linked, of logical necessity, 
with knowledge (though, admittedly, not wholly constituted by i t) .If 
children are to have these abilities then they must have the 
knowledge 
as well. It is not, I think, difficult to see that children will not 
have very refined senses of relevance etc. at an early age -ie. 
before 
they have had much experience in the areas in which their judgments 
are being made. Being prerequisites to competent 
decision-making, the 
argument for child freedom in curriculum matters 
becomes shaky. 
As mentioned, child-centred educators have not only 
been aware of 
this but have argued that these abilities must 
be developed. Of course, 
they have maintained that freedom is a precondition of 
their being 
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developed and should not therefore be regarded as properly an entitle- 
ment consequent of having acquired them. 
This is persuasive, but only to a point. Granted it is difficult 
to imagine how, for example, 'relevance' would develop independent of 
experience of spheres in which one is a potential decision-maker and 
being acquainted with relevance relations between as and bs in that 
area. But it does not follow of necessity that one must actually make 
decisions about or within A in order to acquire this knowledge and 
develop these capacities. 
In fairness to open school proponents though, the claim is usually 
that freedom would augment development, not that it is a necessary con- 
dition for it. Suppose this is correct. What implication does it hold 
for curriculum decision-making? Quite plainly, micro activity deci- 
sions abound in which the consequences of being wrong are not momentous, 
and in which students could safely exercise their nascent intellectual 
capacities. There is no obvious reason why primary school children 
cannot decide which plants to grow, what to name the pet turtle and 
which community service (e. g. police department, fire station, etc. ) to 
visit on a field trip. The bounds can be stretched considerably for 
older children to include occasional topics of study, novels to be read 
and so forth. But micro activity decisions about course offerings, 
methods of investigation, etc. require more refinement in cognitive 
abilities. Under supervision of the teacher it seems reasonable that 
students, particularly older ones, could be given some, even consider- 
able, loose line; but not so much that they strangle in it. Macro 
activity decisions are another matter. Such decisions are about the 
programme and procedures of an activity. They are, therefore, decisions 
of principle. Now according to Kohlberg, a child, before the age of 
puberty, rarely conceives of the rules of an activity as potentially 
alterable because he does not see them as human constructs .If this is 
true, the pre-adolescent decision-maker would have difficulty making 
such decisions. 
36 And the 'practice makes perfect' justification of 
freedom in this case would be rather scary, when, the consequences of 
mistaken choices are taken into account. Imagine, for example, a child 
devoting himself entirely to handicrafts. 
Now, obviously individual cases differ, and later in adolescence 
the situation improves. But, again, according to Kolhberg, as regards 
36L. Kohlberg, 'Stage and Sequence: The Cognitive Developmental 
Approach to Socialization, in D. A. Goslen, ed., Handbook of 
Socializa- 
tion Theory and Research (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969), PP. 
347-480. 
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social and moral behaviour, it is only when someone has reached the 
sixth stage (and final stage in his model of moral development) that he 
perceives and acts in accordance with principles that underlie behav- 
ioural rules. This stage is often not reached until one's early twen- 
ties if it is reached at all. 
37 (Environmental stimulation and to some 
extent intelligence, influence this). Granted, the level of formal 
operations is usually reached long before this, but to the extent that 
the child's making of decisions about curriculum involves evaluative 
reflection about principles (of activities), our concern about cogni- 
tive immaturity is very real. 
However, there is a problem with taking this line of argument too 
far. Clearly, the latter stages of Kohlberg's stage sequence develop- 
ment are important in consideration of excellence but not necessarily 
competence. It is difficult to know where to draw the line, but if we 
insist on too high standards, we could end up by specifying conditions 
of competence which a great many adults even in western democratic 
societies, not to mention more primitive ones, cannot meet. It seems, 
therefore, that the argument against adolescent competence, though force- 
ful in particular circumstances, begins to weaken increasingly as 
children mature. 
Still there are further considerations. When we discussed compe- 
tence in an earlier chapter we claimed that past the simple fact of 
cognitive ability - one's capacity for principled thinking - there is 
the affective dimension, i. e., one's emotional maturity, which, I 
suppose, partly accounts for one's actually resolving to act on principle 
and then going ahead with it. (Perhaps this factor helps to explain 
why children who reach the level of formal operations in their mid teens 
do not exhibit a significant amount of mature (i. e. stage six) moral 
and social behaviour, i. e. action on principle, until their twenties). 
These affective traits, or personal qualities, are such things as 
the inclination to make decisions and do so rationally and to be confi- 
dent. Self-esteem, firmness, un i nh ibi tednes s, integrity, courage, and 
determination are central in these. Yet the typical teenager lacks pre- 
cisely these qualities. Lack of self-esteem and i nh i bi tedness about 
his developing physique, breaking peer-group norms, and much else 
be- 
sides, is characteristic of adolescents and hence a good reason not 
to 
remove the paternal hand entirely. 
37Ibid., pp. 38-9. 
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Over and above competence we adumbrated further characteristics 
which, like Aristotelian virtues or excellences, are important to ena- 
bl i ng one to make good quality deci is ions; a corollary being of course that 
it is likewise important to curriculum decision-making. We mentioned 
consistency, precision, clarity, accuracy, objectivity, rigour, impar- 
tiality, and respect for facts and arguments. 
These are dispositions which, like relevance, are a desired con- 
sequence of certain educational experiences. Those in which students 
see them exhibited by their teachers and, more to the point, are them- 
selves encouraged to acquire them - and which are not as likely to 
arise in absence of such educational experiences. Yet, they are the 
very dispositions which are needed in decision-making. Clearly, the 
excellences are important to someone designing educational experiences 
which will promote the development of the same in others. Students just 
do not qualify. 
(b) Could Students Fulfill the Second Condition of Competence 
- Knowledge? 
The most serious objection, by far, to be raised against the idea 
of permitting students to make the important decisions is that they 
lack sufficient knowledge. Recall from our analysis of quality in 
decision-making that one must (a) sort random options into alternatives 
on the basis of their theoretical descriptions and pragmatic outcomes, 
and (b) employ the principles of depth, breadth, and centrality in 
proposing alternatives and justifying principles. Thinking just of 
theoretical outcomes for the moment, how are students supposed to be 
capable of deciding what aims, subject arrangements, and topic content 
ought to structure the macro activity of education for them when the 
knowledge required to make such decisions is, to a large extent, the 
very knowledge they are noW deciding whether or not they should acquire? 
In other words, deciding whether or not schooling should have programme 
X or Y presupposes that one knows enough about X and Y (theoretically) 
in order to make the choice. 
Micro activity decisions (e. g. subject content) face much the same 
sort of objections. On this issue John White38 argues that some subjects 
like mathematics, the pure sciences, art appreciation, and. philosophizing 
are only comprehensible in terms of the concepts which are 
intrinsic to 
38Towards a Compulsory Curriculum (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1973) , Chapter 
3. 
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the subjects themselves. Hence one needs to have studied the subject 
in order to understand what it is about. Since this knowledge must 
precede a rational decision whether or not to study the subject further, 
it follows that the uninitiated are in no position to choose one way 
or the other. By contrast, cookery, painting, organized games, speak- 
ing a foreign language and so on can be understood in terms of concepts 
outside themselves. So, in connection with activities in which subjects 
from the second category are prominent someone who is deciding how to 
construct or arrange rules so as to make up the activity or perhaps 
simply decide how to participate or whether to participate in one that 
is already constituted, might be able to imagine the relevant details 
(in desired depth, breadth, and centrality). Such a thing is logically 
possible for subjects in category two but not in category one. 
I would not disagree with White on any of this so far but I would 
point out that it is not at all clear that one needs, as a matter of 
logical necessity, a formal schooling introduction to such things as 
mathematics, philosophizing, etc. in order to know enough about them 
to make decisions. For according to influential developmentalists like 
Piaget, these concepts appear to develop as part of normal cognitive 
development, and one can be introduced to them informally. That is, it 
is logically possible for a child to develop these concepts, in mathe- 
matics, for example, by means other than formal study at school as would 
be the case with precocious children. Hence it is possible, logically, 
for them to formulate theoretical alternatives which could include an 
option to study mathematics. So, even if we agree with White that 
certain subjects, like those in his category one, have concepts internal 
to those subjects, and that introduction to those concepts must logical- 
ly precede decision-making about activities in which they are central, 
we can still see that such an introduction may temporally precede any 
formal study of them, and that, hence, decision-making about such activ- 
ities by unschooled children could be possible. Nevertheless, 
White 
definitely has a strong empirical claim, because in fact, children rarely 
have the knowledge. 
We can extend this to give a further reason why children are 
dubious 
decision-makers. Our concern is that understanding something admits of 
degrees. Simply having been introduced to central concepts does not 
ensure a die th of understanding. But this 
is vital to the quality of 
one's decision-making and in turn 
depends upon more than simply being 
made aware of the conceptual components of an alternative. 
I take it 
that Mary Warnock, who stresses the importance of 
detailed study of par- 
ticular subjects to one's ability to 
imagine changes within them, and 
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who argues that development of the imagination is a central aim of ed- 
ucation would agree that students are, as a factual matter, incapable 
of sufficiently in-depth understanding of theoretical alternatives 
prior to their education to make informed judgments about them. 
39 
Deweyans, Who sanction child freedom because of their-faith in the 
heuristic benefits of problem solving - problems that spontaneously arise 
in the mind of the child and which he feels inclined to solve - are on 
equally unstable ground. For the child's opportunity to handle this 
micro decision is whol ly dependent upon a problem actually occuri ng_ 
to him (assuming we are, here, concerned about spontaneous and non- 
contrived problem-solving as favoured by Dewey but not all open class- 
room supporters) . But as Bantock notes: 
All through his exposition Dewey seems too much 
to assume that the ability to recognize the pre- 
sence of problems is a matter of little or no 
difficulty.... What Dewey fails to make sufficient- 
ly clear is the enormous dependence of even the 
modern scientist on past knowledge before the pre- 
sence of a g6oblem can be recognized and a hypothesis 
formulated. 
This problem is understandably overlooked by Deweyans because, in science, 
for example, any simple child's question about the nature of things can 
be seen as the first opened door in an almost infinite series of in- 
creasingly sophisticated questions, one leading to another, each probing 
the subject in greater depth. But in history, for example, it is not 
quite so easy to see what would ever get a child wondering about the 
possibility of alternative interpretations of events? Or in literature, 
would it likely occur to a child to puzzle about allegories or irony? 
Perhaps, but the likelihood would be so much greater if the child were 
initiated by someone already knowledgeable. And even if children do 
stumble across knowledge that would be of help to them in solving pro- 
blems, it is not at all clear that they would recognize this fact. I 
quote Entwistle commenting on a study by Jersild. 
He concluded that children are often unable to 
identify the existence of problems which touch 
them closely. He noted that the deprived child 
tended not to ask for things which might : mitigate 
his deprivation, except that the chronically hungry 
child showed an interest in food. Children 
39'Towards 
a Definition of Quality in Education', in R. S. Peters 
ed. , The Philosophy of Education 
(London: Oxford University Presst 
1973). 
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.H. Bantock, 
Education in an Industrial Society (London: Faber 
and Faber, 1963), p. 33. Quoted in Entwistle, op. cit., p. 
148. 
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deprived in other senses (for. example, the child 
living in a. slum) were unaware of their deprivation. 
The deprived chi 1d"' is an adult concept and the 
child himself cannot always know that it is in his 
best interests that the circumstances of his depri- 
vation should be removed. And even when Jersi Id's 
children were aware of fear, they rarely expressed 
a wish for help or understanding in overcoming these, 
or showed any recognition that schooling might help 41 
them come to grips with themse 1 ves or their p rob 1 ems 
A further and final objection leading from the knowledge condition 
of competence back to the abilities condition rests on a distinction made 
in our analysis of competent decision-making. To give a full account 
of any alternative course of action, before judging it against others, 
we said that one had to describe the alternative - give its 'theoretical 
description' - then consider the 'pragmatic outcomes' - i. e. the con- 
sequences of selecting the alternative in the case at hand given the 
contingencies of context. Now if the student is making his curriculum 
choices on the basis of felt-interest, is he giving due consideration 
to pragmatic outcomes? Unless his interest is fuelled by some practical 
foresight (e. g. a student's interest in biology fanned by his desire to 
become a doctor) the answer is no, and his decisions are not competent- 
ly made. Doubts about students thinking ahead, etc. arise because the 
cognitive and affective abilities we discussed are often not fully de- 
veloped. Hence, an aspect of the knowledge condition may not be satis- 
fied because of an inability to satisfy an abilities condition. 
(c) The Verdict on Students as Decision-Makers 
Concerns about immaturity and inadequate knowledge speak against 
student freedom to decide about the macro activity because the conse- 
quences of error are severe. Practice may sharpen decision-making 
skills, but too much is at stake when choices are 
being made about the 
programme and procedures of schooling 
(i. e. choice of the micro activi- 
ties that combine to form the macro activity). This is not the case 
with all micro activities. A great range of 
decisions are possible with 
respect to content and methods of learning in which students may 
be 
competent. Given the span of student ages and 
levels of development it 
is impossible to specify particular decisions to be made by students; 
obviously the more mature the student, the greater 
his range of competence. 
41Child-Centred Education, op. cit., p. 149; commenting on Jersild 
and others, Children's' interests. 
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Two further notes. First, open classrooms or close approximations 
are particularly conducive to maximization of student freedom with a 
modicum of risk. For if the views expressed by Blitz are favoured, as 
opposed to those of Holt, or the even more radical views of those such 
as Neill, then considerable influence and supervision of student choices 
is compatible with student initiative. (I say 'initiative' here be- 
cause the so-called freedom is subject to veiled constraints if teachers 
not only manipulate the environment and influence ('guide', 'lead', 
etc. ) but retain veto powers .) Second, we brush by an ethical area 
here of which note should be taken. For to claim that students ought 
not to decide, i. e. be forbidden to decide, on the basis of incompe- 
tence can be defended on paternalistic grounds. That is, we can say that 
it behooves parents, and after them teachers, the community, and the 
state, to protect children from themselves until such time as they are 
competent. But paternalistic argument is considerably weakened by 
applying it past competence to excellence. That is, we can save child- 
ren from themselves if they are incompetent but not because they are 
not excellent. For the liberal principle of presumed individual liberty 
is normally denied only to those who are incompetent choosers, hence not 
moral agents (e. g. infants, animals and the insane). Insofar as students 
are predictably incompetent we can forbid them decision-making freedom 
as paternalists. But this changes as they mature. However, this would 
prejudice the type of normative claim on which our general thesis is 
based, namely, the general desirability of decision-making entitlement 
being extended to the most competent. Hence, if I may anticipate some 
conclusions of arguments to come, students will come last in the pecking 
order of competence, certainly behind teachers and educational experts. 
Now chi child-centred die-hards might oppose the pecking order with the 
claim that competence isachild's purchase voucher for freedom of choice, 
curriculum included. The mistake here is not seeing that school author- 
ities and tax payers are not obliged to commit their resources - the 
time and energies of teachers school facilities and educational materials 
- to children even if the latter are, basically, free to choose. 
Chapter Vlt 
PARENTS AS CURRICULUM DECISION-MAKERS 
I. Parents and the Scope of Parental Decision-Maki ný 
Prior to asking whether parents are competent curriculum decision- 
makers, there are some matters of clarification with which we must deal. 
Who are we including in the classification of 'parents'? What sort of 
decisions do they, typically, want to make? What are the ways in which 
they can be envisioned actually making these decisions if they are 
given title? 
To start with the first question, natural parents or legal guardians 
are obvious candidates. But, included as well could be any adults who 
have had or are capable of having children. Each of these, past, pre- 
sent and future parents, could be said to have a rather direct interest 
in schooling. However, the circle could reasonably be broadened. It is 
not just parents who have a vested interest in the schools. Virtually 
all adult members of the community have to pay taxes which go, in part, 
toward the funding of schools; and all members of the community are 
affected by nature and quality of school graduates since the schools will 
provide new citizens who are, or are not, literate, numerate, technically 
skilled, thoughtful, creative and so on. So, we could include, along 
with parents, any adult member of the community. Since most of the 
cases made for curriculum control by adult members of the community are 
made on behalf of parents who presently have school age children, I do 
not want to drop the reference to 'parents' in favour of 'adults'. Still, 
cases are sometimes made for all adult members of the community; so 
where we come across them I will make special mention. 
As for the scope of decision-making, 'parent-power' supporters run 
the gamut from wanting individual parents (or parent couples) to deter- 
mine what school their child should attend from among the available 
alternatives (or by insistance that the state ought to provide a greater 
range of alternatives) to nominating parents for control over the pro- 
gramme of their neighbourhood school to suggesting that parents ought 
to directly participate in the classroom. The range includes all manner 
of decisions about macro and micro activities and those within 
both. 
Now some parents, or community members, only want a say in these matters. 
Our concern at the moment, however, is only with those who want control, 
not to share it with, say, teachers. We will consider sharing arrange- 
ments in a separate chapter on 'participation'. 
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And, how is it that parents could be seen making these decisions? 
They could have a choice of alternative neighbourhood schools as many 
boards in North America allow. Or, school vouchers redeemable anywhere 
within a country or province would vastly increase the number of options. 
l 
Such proposals enable parents to select a pre-packaged macro activity 
programme and procedures from alternatives at hand. Alternatively, 
political, ethnic or religious groups often want to determine (or some- 
times only influence) the programme of the macro activity by stipulating 
its aims and describing the atmosphere and attitudes of the school. 
Marxists, for example, might see the school as an instrument of class 
warfare and prescribe its aims accordingly. Feminists, Blacks 2 North 
American Indians, 3 religious groups such as the Mennonites, 
4 
etc. some- 
times have in common their desire to promote group interests and ideolo- 
gies through the aims etc. of schools. (These are often influenced in- 
directly by parents having control of hiring teachers or headmasters. ) 
Influence and control over micro activities is often of less concern to 
parents; nevertheless some radicals have become so discouraged with 
available schools they have started their own. 
5 Thus, decisions at all 
levels can be made by a parent committee-of-the-whole (provided, of 
course, that the school is small enough). Short of such drastic actions 
are situations where parents enter classrooms and offer elective (option- 
al) courses to students, 
6 
thus enabling control of some micro activities. 
IA 
classic presentation of this idea comes from Milton Friedman in 
Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969). 
It also appears in G. West, Education and the State (London: Institute 
of Economic Affairs, 1965), and J. Wiseman, 'Vouchers for Education', 
Economics of Education II, ed. M. Bla: ug (Hammondsworth Mi ddv'ý.: Penguin, 
970 . For rather more recent support see 
Rhodes Boyson, The Voucher in 1970T. - 
Schooling (National Education Association, 1972); and Noel Paully, Pay 
to Learn (London: Selsdon Group, 1977) 
2See J. M. Cronin, The Control of Urban Schools (New York: The Free 
Press, 1973), Chapter VIII, 'Returning Control to the Community'. 
3See 'Statement of the Indian Philosophy of Education';; a summary 
from Indian Control of Indian Education. Presented to the Minister of 
Indian Affairs (Canada) by the National Indian Brotherhood. 
4See 
M. I. Assheton-Smith and K. Toohey, 'School-Centered Community 
Conflict: The Ho l deman Mennonite Case in Alberta' forthcoming in the 
Alberta Journal of Educational Research, and various presentations made 
by the Mennonites to Canadian provincial Departments of Education. 
5See Jonathan Kozol, Free Schools (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972). 
6Kozol, 
op. cit., P. 65 and James Benet 'Parents and a Dream 
School' 
in Don Davies ed., Schools Where Parents Make a Difference 
(Boston: In- 
. stitute for Responsive Education, 
1976), pp. 36-7 
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As we 11 , 
(some) parents can take over some micro act i vi ty decision- 
making by acting as a teacher's aid. Proposals of this sort are very 
common among supporters of the community education movement, now quite 
strong in North America. Though it takes a great many forms, the central 
idea is that school and community should be brought closer together. One 
result is that parents often take over much of the decision-making at all 
levels 
. And, some parents do not demand a decision-making role as much 
as the right to object to certain types of content or pedagogical activ- 
ity and have appropriate action taken. 
7 
(a) Some Justifications 
Justifications are not often found in the popular literature, and 
even less frequently given much supportive argument; but certain lines 
of argument can be summarised. There is, for example, the claim in respect 
of parents making curriculum decisions (whichever they may be) whether 
through vouchers, controllers of alternative schools, etc., for their 
own children, that parents have a human right to determine the actions 
of their children - schooling included. During the industrial revolution 
parental rights to child control were seen as being inalienable. That 
is, under no circumstances whatsoever could there be legal interference 
in parent-child relations. In Britain this began to change only in the 
latter part of the nineteenth century with the Education Act (1880), 
Children's Charter (1889), formation of the National Society for the 
Prevention of Cruelty to Children (1904) and the Young Person's Act 
(1933), all of which were moves to recognize the rights of children not 
to be harmed. 
8 
This is of interest to us because it raises the issue 
of competing rights to freedom as between parents and children, something 
which the United Nations declaration of Human Rights recognized in 
article twenty-six when it claimed that every child has the right to an 
education. Now it may be unclear who the right to positive performance 
of providing that education is to be claimed against, or what the basis 
for the rights claim is; but if children have (or ought to have) such a 
right (morally) , however it 
is justified, and our argument has presumed 
this from the very beginning; it follows that parents cannot (morally) 
7Ph i1ip and Susan Jones, Parents Unite : (Wyden Books, 1976), p. 101. 
8For 
a very interesting discussion of parental power and its 
dimin- 
ution see F. Musgrove, The Family, Education and Society 
(London: Rout- 
ledge & Kegan Paul, 1966), Chapter One. 
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stand in the way of a child's education. Since we have further presumed 
that the child's right is to the best efforts by parents and society to 
provide the best possible education under the (local) circumstances, it 
follows as well that the education ought to be given by those who are 
most competent to do so (ceterus peribus) . In consequence, if our assump- 
tions are correct, the justification for parent rights hinges upon a 
limiting condition of superior competence. That is, the parental right 
to control of their children has, in respect to the education of child- 
ren, a condition of superior competence which, if not fulfilled, limits 
their freedom. The question about their ability to satisfy this condi- 
tion will be dealt with shortly. 
A second line of justification for direct parental control might 
take either of two forms. First, a parent couple might claim that they 
are more competent than others in determining the needs of their child- 
ren and how those needs may be best met. The explanation for this is 
usually on grounds of the intimacy of parent-child relations; and its 
justificatory power could legitimize decisions ranging from the selec- 
tion of schools through vouchers to decisions about both programme and 
procedures of schooling as would be possible if a parent were selecting 
a child's educational activities in a free school, to micro activity deci- 
sions as could be the case if a parent were to offer courses in a com- 
munity school, and so on. Presumably, however, this line of justifi- 
cation would weaken wherever a parent had to make judgments about child- 
ren other than his or her own, since the intimacy factor would lessen. 
Hence it would be difficult for a group of parents to make decisions 
(macro or micro) on this basis for a group of (their) children, unless 
parents all found that after assessing the needs of their own children 
there were common needs requiring fulfillment by similar means. For 
example, parents of a gifted child might believe in the child's need 
for intensive study in particular areas such as math and science, and 
band together with other like-minded parents with gifted children to 
form an alternative school. 
The second form of this line of justification almost begins at the 
point the first stops. For it could be argued that parent groups are 
especially competent to determine needs - not so much the children's 
needs, though, as the needs of the society, community or group 
to which 
the parents and children belong. Minorities and special 
interest groups 
such as vVlacks, North American Indians, 
feminists and Mennonites often 
claim that group identity and values are 
dependent upon certain courses 
being taught (e. g. the place of women in literature, history and science) 
and taught in particular way 
(e. g. in a native language) bfr particular 
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people (e. g. Blacks, women, religious sects, etc. being taught by 
members of the respective group). 
There are some problems to do with justification on the basis of 
needs, to which I would like to draw attention. Indeed I think the 
matter can, for the most part, be collapsed into the issue of parental 
competence. By way of a preliminary comment on 'needs', whether 
needs of the child, group or whatever, we might note that they are 
quite different in logical form from either 'wants' or 'interest' with 
which confusion, or conflation, is often found. To start with interests 
and wants: presumably one could want an X if one had no interest in it. 
Indeed, to want a new car, an ice-cream cone or a book is to be interested 
in having one. On the other hand, though, to be interested in X is 
not necessarily to want it. A bizarre sculpture may hold one's interest 
without developing in one the slightest desire, or want, to own or 
possess it. 
Both of these, " however, differ quite markedly from needs . First, 
one may need things that are neither wanted nor have interest. When one 
has the flu, for example, nutritious foods are needed but often, because 
of nausea and taste loss, are not interesting or wanted. Equally, one 
may be interested in, or want, a new car; yet it may not be needed. 
Second, to need X, rather than to be interested in it or to want it, is 
to require it for something else, Y. 
9 
While one may want, or be inter- 
ested in, sex or a piece of sculpture for nothing other than its own 
sake, one would only be said to need either if a requisite for something 
outside itself, e. g. needing a particular piece of sculpture to complete 
one's collection. 
Both Wilson and Woods and Barrow stress the implications of 'needs 
implies objectives or goals'; 
10 
and this is important for our concerns. 
For one thing, there is an evaluative component, often overlooked in 
needs-talk. If something is judged to be needed, and therefore needed 
for something else, a question can be asked about the worthiness of the 
objective. For example, if a student were to need courses in computer 
technology for perpetrating computer frauds later on in business, it 
would be reasonable to ask whether this need should be satisfied given 
9See P.. s. Wilson, Interest and Disci line in Education (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1971), Chapter One; R. G. Woods and R. St. C. 
Barrow, in Introduction to Philosophy of Education (London: Methuen, 
1975) , PP. 
117-22, to whom the o outing -i scuss i on owes much. 
10Ibid. 
the student's ends. As well, needs themselves are subject to evaluation 
in their own right. An innocuous objective such as gaining peer-group 
respect may, in order to bring it about, need of a young boy, that he 
pick fights with other boys. This may be a need, but should it be ful- 
filled? So, our first point with regard to parents as decision-makers 
is to indicate that if it is they who are left to ascertain the needs 
either of children or the community, then evaluation of alleged needs 
and objectives will be necessary. Furthermore, since evaluation of 
needs (and objectives) in curriculum requires of parents, the would-be 
decision-makers, certain epistemic credentials, the certification of 
parents becomes, at least in this regard, one of competence. 
Against the claim about the evaluation component being built into 
needs-talk and hence about the precarious epistemic position into 
which this puts the parent decision-maker, is this possible counter- 
argument. Some, and probably the most important, curriculum decisions 
are based on the cognitive development of children. If there is a 
psychological model of cognitive development, a counterpart, for example, 
to the biological model of plant growth, and certain essential conditions 
of development or growth, i. e. needs, can. be elucidated, then the evalu- 
ative element will be removed in light of thereby having a descriptive 
theory which need only be applied by parents in order to make decisions 
about needs. In other words, if a theory of cognitive development such 
as Pi aget's is a satisfactory descriptive account of 'child-growth' as 
would be a theory about plant growth; and if it mentioned the needs for 
growth, just as water and sunlight is needed by a plant; then parents 
would need only to observe the signs of a child going through the growth 
cycle and, as with giving water to plants, satisfy his or her needs. 
This counter-argument does not work, and in showing why , further 
credence is given to our statement about the importance of requisite 
epi stemi c credentials of decision-makers. First, the counter-argument 
fails because cognitive theories are necessarily prescriptive not des- 
criptive. Consequently, the evaluative component -ie. assessing the 
worthiness of the cognitive development theory would still remain. Why 
are cognitive theories prescriptive? A developmental theory about cogni- 
tion presumes an end - the fully developed human - just as plant develop- 
ment theories are based on notions of a fully developed plant of one 
type or another. However, what constitutes a fully developed plant is 
a matter of observation - its end-states can be determined by watching 
it grow under standard conditions. But, we cannot just watch 
humans 
grow in order to determine their end-state - their being human. 
For 
what they become depends upon the 
(standard) conditions which prevail 
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as they grow. Indeed, they can be made to grow one way or another 
(though, granted, they are not infinitely determinable) as the conditions 
are changed. What should the end-state be, though? The answer is that 
there is simply not a specifiable end-state that can be determined by 
observation as being 'human', to the exclusion of other possible 
descriptions. The matter of being a fully developed human (cognitively 
speaking) depends upon what you take 'human' to be; and this is inescap- 
ably a matter of evaluation. This being so, it would make the parent's 
decision-making that much more in need of ep is temi c backing. This is 
the second point. To determine the needs of a child (ignoring those of 
the community for the moment) would necessitate having a reasonably 
sophisticated understanding of what could be meant by being human, cogni- 
tive theories and the children about whom decisions are being made. It 
is one thing for a parent to have a solid understanding of his or her 
child's desires, but quite another to comprehend needs as thus described. 
Apart from the evaluative component of needs is a further point 
which is very much an extension of the ep is tem ic items just mentioned. 
It is that identification of genuine needs can be a very difficult 
matter. When something is alleged to be needed for self-realization, 
happiness, etc., a decision-maker must be capable of making these ends 
more explicit. Otherwise needs-talk becomes trivial: virtually any- 
thing can be construed as needed for self-realization unless the latter 
can be made less vague. What is more, even when goals or objectives 
are unequivocally stated it is not always clear that one needs what one 
thinks one does; and this applies not only to the needs of children but 
the needs of communities. Does a child really need to attend a military 
school to achieve self-discipline? Is an in-depth study of a discipline 
needed in order to be imaginative within the bounds of that discipline? 
Is vocational education in schools needed by a community to ensure that 
its essential services, etc. will be staffed in the future? 
In order 
to preserve its identity, does an ethnic community need to 
have its 
young instructed in its own customs and language? 
None of the answers 
to these needs-questions are obvious. They present problems, 
the solu- 
tion to which requires a considerable knowledge of 
individuals or com- 
munities in general, as well as specifics about those 
in question. 
There is,, finally, the matter of whether or not a curriculum and all 
therein ought to be based solely on needs. 
A somewhat refined taste for 
literature, drama, music and the visual arts, a sophisticated understand- 
ing of historical 2 political and economic 
trends, and much else besides, 
might well be regarded as spheres 
into which it would be desirable 
(from 
everyone's point of view) to 
introduce students. Yet, inclusion of 
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these in the curriculum may not satisfy any needs. I think it is clear 
that justifications in and about curriculum must involve more than needs. 
In consequence, I want to suggest that (a) the argument from needs 
will not, of itself, justify parental control of curriculum and (b) to 
the limited extent that it could, the entire matter can be collapsed 
into a general discussion of parental decision-making competence. For 
the knowledge requisites of determining needs of children and communities 
are very similar to those needed for curriculum decision-making in 
general. Therefore, I suggest that the answer to (b) can be provided 
by considering parental decision-making competence in light of the condi- 
tions of competence we have worked out in an earlier chapter. 
Before going on however, it should be mentioned that there are 
other arguments to justify parental involvement in curriculum. For 
example, it is frequently contended. that a closer connection must be 
drawn between home and school, and that this cannot exist if parents are 
given no responsibility for the school. Alternatively, it could be 
maintained that parental involvement would provide a check on the vested 
interests of the teaching profession and the local education authorities. 
One sort of reply to this would be that they still hinge on competence; 
and the other would be that such arguments are more commonly made to 
support the case for parents having some form of participation rather 
than control. To the extent the former is true, it can be dealt with 
by the discussion about competence to follow. Inasmuch as it is the 
latter, they will be considered more fully in the chapter devoted to 
participation. 
2. Are Parents Competent? 
Our judgments about parental competence wi i vary depending upon 
which individuals comprise the social category of 
'parent' in a particu- 
lar location and time. For geniuses and idiots can be parents; and even 
where generalizations can safely be made about competence among one 
group of parents., the generalization may not hold with other groups 
(c f. British and Brazilian parents) . And, over time, 
incompetent par- 
ents may improve significantly, and vice versa. 
Equally, competence 
applies to specific (types of) activities, each of which 
has its own 
list of epistemic prerequisites. To satisfy one 
list of conditions is 
not necessarily to satisfy others. 
To assess competence in curriculum, 
therefore, it becomes necessary to examine piece-meal 
the various types 
of decision which might be 
left to parents. 
Given these contingencies, it is of great importance 
that the 
114 
following two provisions be noted. First, the search for the most 
competent curriculum decision-maker is based on an assessment of who 
best fulfills the conditions of competence in educational activities. 
Where there is reasonable doubt about the soundness of generalizations 
made about any group of parents in any time or place, there must be an 
immediate retreat to the conditions of competence and a reassessment 
of the candidate. 
Second, the parents with whom we will be concerned are those in 
Western democratic nations. Within these, we will refer to 'parents in 
the general case', with all due recognition of the vagueness of the 
phrase and attention to difficulties to which it gives rise. 
(a) Decisions About the Macro Activity 
Decisions about the programme and procedures (i e. the aggregate of 
micro activities) can be divided into two questions: (a) Who is most 
competent to set out and explain the alternatives (and justifications)? 
(b) who is most competent to choose among the alternatives? Our pur- 
pose is to ask if we can say 'parents' to either of these. 
(i) The knowledge condition and selection of alternatives 
With regard to (a), it was claimed in an earlier chapter that school 
programmes (descriptions, aims, etc. ) could be decided about only if a 
listing of theoretical alternatives could be made: that is, a list of 
types of schools and corresponding aims and objectives of the schools 
so described. What knowledge would be required to prepare such a list? 
Prior direct or indirect knowledge of such schools would enable a rough 
characterization of items on the list; obviously the more sophisticated 
one's knowledge, the better the list. For example, if one had remotely 
heard of community schools but never visited one, one's characteriza- 
tion of them would probably be rather superficial, moreso than if one 
had studied them thoroughly. We must, however, stop short of saying 
that prior knowledge of all schools to be listed is logically necessary, 
because new conceptions of schools are only possible if we can go beyond 
present knowledge. Still, one does not conceive of schools without 
considerable knowledge of other types of school, for one must 
have some 
criterion to judge whether the new conception even counts as a school - 
and if so, whether or not a reasonably good school. 
So, the areas from 
which would come the knowledge essential to preparation of 
the list 
would be, as previously indicated, philosophy and 
history of education 
and comparative education. And, added to the 
'theoretical descriptions' 
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of alternatives would have to be the anticipated 'pragmatic outcomes' 
(which is necessary for a complete statement of an alternative). Re- 
quired would be, in general terms, personal knowledge of the individuals 
involved (i. e. students, teachers and parents) and knowledge of social 
and economic factors. Pertinent here would be the areas of psychology, 
sociology, and economics. 
One would have to be rather generous in the case of parents to 
suppose that they would have sufficient knowledge to prepare a sophisti- 
cated list. Even parents who keep themselves up to date on the develop- 
ments within, for example, comprehensive schooling, would not necessarily 
understand very much about open classrooms or French Lycees. To have 
heard of the latter is not necessarily to clearly understand the de- 
tai is of description or aspects of programme such as aims. Further- 
more, if a parent did have a good grasp of the theoretical description, 
it is hard to see how he or she could apply the knowledge of material 
and conceptual context of their circumstances (assuming they are at 
least in command of this) to predict pragmatic outcomes of implementing, 
for example, open classrooms . or Lycees. Even professional psycholo- 
gists, sociologists and economists have difficulty with accurrate pre- 
dictions of this sort. In consequence, macro activity decisions,. insofar 
as setting out alternatives for the programme of schooling is concerned, 
would best not be left in the hands of parents. So, if one were to 
ask 'What sort of schools should we have in Britain, Canada, Australia, 
etc.? or, What school should I send my child to in Britain, etc.? ', it 
would be far from ideal, in the general case, to ask parents for a list- 
ing. (Remember, we are only concerned with suggested alternatives here, 
not final decisions. ) 
A second type of macro acti vi ty decision, which arises after a 
programme has been adopted or is under consideration, concerns the 
selection of procedures that will govern action within the macro activi- 
ty. Not only are administrative and moral directives (e. g. rules 
against running in the halls and corporal punishment) to be included, 
but the structural features (rules and principles) of disciplines and 
teaching as well. Since the procedures of the macro activity will be 
the sum of the procedures (rules, etc. 
) of the micro activities, to 
select the former will, at the same time, be to decide which micro 
activities will combine to form the macro activity. 
So, for a govern- 
ment to decide what wi 11 be the structure of one type of school 
which 
it will consider funding (e. g. open classroom schools), 
there is the 
question 'Which micro activities 
(e. g. integrated study of science, math, 
etc. ) should be included?. 
' These, therefore, will be decisions about 
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what and when children will learn. What subjects? What balance of 
subjects? What depth? What breadth? What age is appropriate for 
introducing children to certain subjects or parts of them? And so on. 
We claimed in an earlier chapter that such decisions would involve, in 
the theoretical description of alternatives, knowledge of disciplines, 
content, methods of teaching each and knowledge of learning theory. 
In assessing pragmatic outcomes of implementing any of these, it would 
be necessary to predict the likely outcomes of implementing any one of 
the alternatives which would demand of us that we have knowledge of 
the individuals and groups who would encounter these alternatives. For 
the most part, psychology, sociology and economics would be the servi c- 
ing fields.. 
Would parents, in the general case, know what the alternatives are? 
In some instances parents are quite familiar with particular types of 
school. Romantically remembered experiences of one's own school days 
are often not very accurate, but parents who, for example, take a keen 
interest in the school attended by their children and who keep abreast 
of contemporary debates, often know a great deal. Moreover, some schools 
strongly encourage parental interest (especially in alternative and 
community schools) which increases yet again parental understanding of 
the present school structure, which in turn, provides the basis for 
thinking of alternatives. So, one could build the case for parents as 
decision-makers, albeit at its strongest, in the possibility of them 
being, or at least becoming, well informed about schools - perhaps even about 
a range of types of schools. And then to this, would have to be added 
consideration of pragmatic outcomes. One could argue here that parents 
would be quite capable of assessing the practical consequences of 
having history or sex-education on the curriculum, or integrated days, 
cafeteria curriculum or whatever, given the considerable extent to which 
such decisions are matters of common sense. At least so it would seem 
on first inspection. 
We are virtually forced to say that surely some parents will under- 
stand the subtleties of the programme and the range of reasonable 
alternative micro activities (e. g. the study of history, math, etc. ) 
well enough to propose, competently, alternatives. But the question is, 
would the knowledge of even a well informed and educated group of 
parents match that of either educational experts 
(e. g. government depart- 
ments of education) or teachers whose professional occupation it is to 
deal in this knowledge? I would think the answer to be, no. Not a 
resounding no; but a firm one. The weakness in the parents' case 
has to 
do with the inability to adequately assess pragmatic outcomes of 
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prospective alternatives. For a proposed educational activity is only 
a genuine alternative if it can reasonably be brought about. Surely 
parents can assess this insofar as larger implications for the family 
and, perhaps as well, the community are concerned. But can they tell 
what is teachable? No matter how much the parent likes the idea of 
his child learning Greek or medieval history, the successful teaching 
of it is dependent upon, among other things, the readiness and, equally 
as crucial, the child's willingness. Parents often fai 1 to see the 
complexities of execution of alternatives in this regard, and, in con- 
sequence, the activities they suggest to comprise the macro activity 
are not always possible. 
(i i) The knowledge condition and choosing among the alternatives: 
final choices 
Faced with a list of programme alternatives, or alternative micro activ- 
ities to be combined to make a macro activity, could parents choose 
competently? Would they have sufficient knowledge in the areas of 
psychology, sociology, economics and philosophy from which would come 
'justifying principles' on the basis of which choices could be made? 
On the first matter, parents might be faced either with choosing 
among pre-established school programmes, as, for example, would lie 
the case when a parent decides whether to send his or her child to a 
grammar, comprehensive or open classroom school , or with choosing which 
among competing programme descriptions ought to be adopted by a school 
(or, perhaps, school board, in North America), a situation which might 
occur, for instance, when a community school is being planned. Now, 
in the latter example, it would be a further consideration to determine 
p rocedu res . This is the second matter mentioned 
in the last paragraph. 
It should have a separate answer to the question about competence be- 
cause it has more of a technical element than the former; we will come 
to this in a moment. 
Concerning the programme, then, a decision about which school to 
send one's child to, after the alternatives have been 
fully set out, 
hinges on the justificatory principle to be employed in sorting out 
the preferred alternative. What would such principles 
be? In an earlier 
chapter we rejected the possibility of sorting out alternatives simply 
on the basis of a conceptual analysis of 
'education' or 'educational 
activities' . For, on the one 
hand, the concepts are so vague that we 
could never get much satisfaction from asking a question such 
as 'Is 
an open classroom school more educational than a comprehensive 
school 
or military academy? '. Not all of us mean the same 
thing by 'educational', 
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so it is no use appealing to usage for a specific meaning. We could 
get rid of the vagueness by stipulating a meaning, but then it would 
be necessary to justify acting (deciding) on the basis of the stipu-. 
lation. And such a justification would necessarily appeal to principles 
external to 'education', which is the position we find ourselves in 
now. Consequently, other principles have to be considered, such as 
the development of creativity, reasonableness, critical thought, voca- 
tional preparation, happiness of the child, benefits to the community 
and much else besides. Since many of the principles are the same as 
the principles being considered as constitutive of the macro activity 
programme, selection of programme principles sometimes becomes almost 
a matter of faith. That is, for example, a school is judged to be 
properly guided by a commitment to develop creativity, because crea- 
tivity is seen as self-justifying. 
Now what the educational experts have been,, to some extent, success- 
ful in doing, has been to clarify the meanings of such principles and 
to explain the logical, psychological, sociological and economic condi- 
tions under which these principles can be fulfilled. But, which prin- 
ciple or combination of them is correct, is a question not satisfactorily 
answered. That creativity is preferable to reasonableness or vocational 
preparation is something on which authoritativeness appears dubious. 
There is no consensus among, say, philosophers on which principles are 
central, nor is there agreement on higher order principles that would 
enable us to find out. It would be too strong to say that such a thing 
is logically impossible; but the very fact that it is so dubious is 
sufficient grounds, for our practical purpose, to claim that at the 
present, the argument from authority cannot stand against parental 
decision-making. And are parents competent? Prima facie, it would 
seem that they are. One would have to take a very dim view of thei r 
intellectual abilities to stand against this, and be willing to argue 
as well, that the common man in western society is equally incapable of 
having a sufficient knowledge, in depth, breadth and centrality, of 
justifying principles to choose a government. The political choice, J§ 
after all, much the same as choosing one's child's school - either, 
which school to send him to or what the 
(community) school should be 
like. 
The matter of procedures is slightly different. Deciding whether 
to include physical education, music, dance, moral education courses, 
political science and specialized courses 
in physics, etc. is partly 
dependent upon the same principles which are central to programme 
decisions, but, as well, partly dependent upon the extent to which such 
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activities are compatible with the elements of programme, and compatible 
among themselves. Hence a decision about whether to include music 
and dance in the macro activity could be justified by a parent's alleg- 
iances to the principle of creativity in education, and, perhaps, 
supported by the fact of creativity being one of the school's aims 
(programme principles). But an important consideration, as well, is 
the pedagogical justification. The particular courses may be too advanced 
for the students in question. The music class, for example, might 
presuppose a level of sophistication in music theory which the students 
do not have and the parents cannot judge. Or, the particular courses 
might be too esoteric. That is, it may not be pedagogically sound to 
introduce children to music through classical compositions or esoteric 
forms of jazz. For regardless of the wants of parents, the children 
may not be sufficiently motivated, or such courses may not provide a 
suitable background for other courses in music which the parents have 
also decided they want their children to have. 
It is the importance of these pedagogical principles to decisions 
about procedures, in macro spheres (this qualification is necessary 
since there are many procedural matters in the domain of micro activi- 
ties) that militates against parental competence. Therefore, I would 
draw the line for parental control between programme and procedure 
decisions. It is hardly inconceivable, though, to imagine a great 
many laymen who are sufficiently well versed in these pedagogical prin- 
ciples, or who could be tutored in them. It should, perhaps, be a line 
of chalk'. 
(iii) Parents, macro activities and knowledge: conclusion 
It is no act of intellectual charity to credit parents in Western nations 
with considerable knowledge and understanding of schools. Certainly 
a significant majority have completed secondary school themselves and a 
large minority have attended university. Consequently, it seems un- 
warranted to say that they lack depth, breadth or centrality of know- 
ledge of principles on the basis of which to make decisions about the 
programme of a school or to choose to which school to send their children. 
However, it would be no surprise to find a great many parents limited 
In their knowledge of educational principles necessary to making macro 
decisions about procedures. Equally, doubts could be raised about the 
depth and breadth of parental knowledge of alternative programmes. 
Hence, it would be dangerous for parents to determine the range of 
alternative schools that a society should accommodate or consider, 
though 
not so dangerous for them to choose among the alternative schools 
listed 
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by those with greater knowledge (i e. educational experts) . 
(iv) Macro activities, competence and the abilities condition and 
access to data 
In 1i ght of the two remaining conditions of competence have we any 
reason to alter our judgment about parents as macro activity decision- 
makers? The answer is,, I think, a safe, no. Although we have obvious 
worries about generalizing, it seems reasonable to suppose that, on the 
whole, parents will have,, - inadequate supply, the intellectual and affec- 
tive abilities requisite of decisions about such things as the sort of 
school their children should attend and the sort of school (i. e. the 
programme of) their community school should be. To reuse a point 
made earlier, if parents were not possessed of such abilities, the whole 
democratic practice of weighing political issues and electing govern- 
ments would be undercut. Since there is little evidence to suggest 
the incompetence of the body politic (which includes most parents) in 
these regards, it seems reasonable to assume that similar educational 
decisions are not beyond their grasp. 
The pragmatic condition of access to data is satisfactorily ful- 
filled in making most judgments about selection of a child's school and 
decisions about what a school programme should be like. Parents, 
after all, are usually a part of the material and conceptual contexts 
in which the school would exist. Resources of a community, school board, 
etc. available to alternative schools being considered are matters on 
which adequate information is not difficult for a parent to acquire. 
Equally, the values of a community (part of the conceptual context) are 
usually shared by the parent, or known to him or her; so in this regard, 
the parent's vantage point is satisfactory. 
(b) Decisions About and Within Micro Activities 
The range of decisions here is from concerns about the subject 
content of micro activities - i. e. what the activity will be about, to 
concerns about how and when that content is to be taught and 
learned - 
i. e. what goes on within the micro activity. The latter, of course, 
involves not only such important pedagogical matters as the teaching 
strategies, materials, class visits and group projects, 
but, as well, 
such trivial matters as, for example, the 
brand of art supplies to be 
used and the arrangements for transporting children 
to the museum. Con- 
sequently, failure to be optimally competent 
in one area is not neces- 
sarily failure in another. 
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(i) The knowledge condition 
The division in questions between (a) who ought to select alternatives? 
and (b) who ought to judge among pre-selected alternatives? could be 
made here, but is not so important as will become evident as we proceed. 
Our main concern, then, is in choosing groups of decisions along the 
micro activity range and testing for competence. 
As the object of a micro activity decision, consider, for example, 
the content of a history course. That a history course should be taught 
at all is a macro activity decision; but decisions about the specific 
subject matter, topics, themes and interpretations, are decisions 
about a micro activity. To formulate such alternatives requires more 
than simply an appreciation of history as a 'form of knowledge' - i. e. 
that, as a discipline, its central concepts are the like of social 
customs, artifacts, government, conflict, causal relations, means of 
production and so forth, all in relation to one another and in the past. 
Necessary as well is an understanding of specific historical periods - 
descriptions and explanations of them. Authoritative knowledge, or 
origional insight, would surely not be needed for curriculum matters, 
but it would be necessary to have considerable familiarity; that is, to 
be a bit of an historian. But having such a background would especially 
equip an individual to fulfill only part of the requirement for present- 
ing an alternative completely. For a theoretical understanding would 
only enable a theoretical description. Pragmatic outcomes, the other 
component, would be dependent upon acute perceptions of the practical 
likelihood of various options actually working in class. 
Now most parents in Western nations have studied history in school. 
So the claim to being an historian, if only of low standing, has some 
initial plausibility. But to what level did they study? And how does 
this level relate to the varying (grade or form) levels of study in 
schools? To have done A-levels in history better prepares an 
historian 
than 0-levels, and they better than none at all. 
(Assuming, of course, 
that a programme of independent study has not been undertaken. 
) But 
does having taken an A-level in history prepare one to plan the content 
of courses for future A-levels students; or 
does it qualify one, per- 
haps, to determine contents for lower level courses? One would think 
surely more the latter than the former. 
But as against potential deci- 
sion-makers with university degrees 
in history, one might suggest they 
pale even in the latter. However, 
I do not think this is always so. 
it is not obvious that it takes the level of sophistication of a 
univer- 
sity graduate to map out the contours of an elementary 
level history 
course. Nor does it seem obvious that 
having an appreciation for the 
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subtleties of historical explanation makes one better able to prepare the 
bluntly contoured elementary course. Surely the research chemist's 
tea is not better tasting then the housewife's. So, if in our illus- 
trating case of history, decisions about course content, the concern 
was only about preparation of theoretical descriptions of course content 
alternatives, I would be inclined to support parent control at elemen- 
tary levels where adequate prior training in history could be demon- 
strated. But it is not that simple. 
To start with, we have chosen to discuss content in a school 
subject, history, with which most parents would be familiar (since in 
many places it is compulsory). However, a great many parents would 
not have studied Latin, physics or integrated programmes (e. g. Russian 
studies, which could be composed of Russian geography, history, liter- 
ature and language); hence we could not say that all parents would be 
competent to make decisions about all subjects. Rather, as with the 
case of history, the population would have to be divided into those 
with prior training in certain subjects, and then further sorted into 
levels of competence in order to determine the (grade or form) level 
at which decisions could be made. Doing this would, of course, necessi- 
tate a change in the original question about parental competence, be- 
cause at the outset we asked whether parents as a group could decide 
about curriculum, without further qualification. However, it will not 
be necessary to make any amendment, for I want to suggest that theoret- 
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ical knowledge of subject content is not the main problem. 
What is problematic is the level of understanding parents have of 
the activity within which decisions are to be made, namely the teaching 
of history, or whatever. Recall that in the analysis given of activity 
structure it was claimed that activities are not simply understood or 
not. Rather, among those who can be said to understand (well enough to 
be genuine participants), different levels of sophistication are pos- 
sible. This has both a qualitative and quantitative side. The subtlety, 
nuance and intimations of programme and procedures joins with the exten- 
ded range of rules, especially informal rules such as strategy and 
technique, to make possible a gradation in levels of authoritative and 
profound understanding, in contrast with the pedestrian and mundane. 
The argument against parents in this regard is, in a way, a version of 
the 'secret garden' argument. Intelligent individuals, with appro- 
priate training and relevant knowledge are capable of coming 
to under- 
stand an activity at the higher levels 
largely by experience in the 
activity - by 'dwelling in the garden'. 
Parents do not dwell in the 
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garden and by and large they do not have the necessary background to 
understand what they can see over the garden wall. They do not recog- 
nize much of what passes before them nor do they always appreciate the 
significance of what they see. 
To put it in more concrete terms, what they lack is understanding 
of the way to go about teaching - those countless informal rules that 
inform the teacher of when to increase the pace, when to slow down or 
do revisions, when to add a bit of humour, when to stop the joke, when 
to confront a misbehaving student, when to let him alone and so on. In 
other words, what must be known is what will work in the classroom 
and what will not - what are the viable alternati-ves. A self-directed 
course in Medieval European history might sound to the layman like a 
good idea - good in theory - but experienced teachers who know the sub- 
ject and relevant teaching considerations might not agree. 
It is not just a matter of practical wisdom or having the ability 
to deal with people. It is, too, knowing how to organize. oneself for 
action and knowing the 'tricks of the trade. Now in the coming chapter 
which deals with teachers as curriculum decision-makers, I will work 
out in much greater detail the 'argument from experience'. For now, 
though, I think it is clear that parents would lack sufficiently in this 
regard to make them highly suspect in terms of competence. 
At the beginning of this section I said that not much needed to be 
made of the distinction between decisions which determine lists of 
alternatives and decisions which make the choice among them. With re- 
gard to macro activities it could be seen that parents were sometimes 
competent to do the latter though not the former. With decisions about 
micro activities, it is plain that parents are not competent to do 
either. For choices among, for example, pre-selected alternative his- 
tory course contents would be justified by, for the most part, princi- 
ples to do with pedagogy and the standards of the discipline in question. 
For example, selection among alternative topics to comprise a course in 
Medieval European history would be justified, at least in part, by 
appeal to such discipline standards as centrality of importance to an 
understanding of the period. These are not areas in which we could 
reasonably expect parental competence. 
A second area of questions to do with micro activities are those 
within the bounds of a micro activity. These would 
be use of teaching 
strategies, projects and so forth. Much the same 
line of argument 
against parts would be put here; there 
is no point to rehearsing it 
again. -Suffice it to say that without special training a 
layman's only 
vision of such matters is from outside 
'the garden wall' . 
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However, some micro activity decisions are far less technical than 
others; as well, some have less severe consequences if made incorrectly. 
In such cases as these the argument from competence against parental con- 
trol disappears. For example, students in a junior school social studies 
programme might be thought to benefit from a visit to either a news- 
paper or a police station or the fire station or some other community 
service centre. Where there is no pedagogical preference, there would 
be no reason why parents could not 
decide. Matters of this sort would 
be on a par with such non-curriculum concerns as school uniforms, 
length of boys' hair and so on. So, although these are not particularly 
important matters, it is worth pointing them out to show that not every- 
thing in the garden is secret. 
Before going on to consider parents in the light of the other two 
conditions of competence, there is a counter-argument that must be dealt 
with. It is, as the Taylor Committee suggested, that parents do not 
have the knowledge required to make many of these decisions because 
they have never been invited into the garden - hence never had the 
opportunity, or perhaps motive, to learn. Conceivably, therefore, if 
parents were given control of some aspects of curriculum they would 
learn what is needed - they may even be given various training courses. 
Assuming that our concern is with parents as a whole, rather than 
those few who would participate in decision-making as school governors, 
etc., for this situation will be considered in another chapter, this 
seems rather far-fetched. It is conceivable, if rather optimistic, 
that parents would attempt to learn about curriculum if given control. 
(This does not seem to be borne out in "forth America, however, where 
parents can have a large say in school board appointments and through 
contact in parent-teacher associations, yet where parental willingness 
to involve themselves has long been a problem. ) But to think that 
all, or even a majority of parents, would take, as it were, upgrading 
classes would surely over-extend even an optimist's imagination. But 
even if parents did become more interested and took classes as well, 
would the result be epistemic competence? I fail to see how this 
'low- 
brow' version of a teacher training course would raise parents' under- 
standings of the various disciplines, pedagogy and the subtleties of 
teaching to match that of the professional teacher whose working 
life 
is devoted to such matters. This is to have either a very high opinion 
of parental competence, or a very 
low opinion of teachers. 
While I think the bulk of the case against allowing parents to make 
important micro decisions stems from their lack of knowledge, one could 
also point to the other class of conditions which 
decision-makers must 
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fulfill apart from knowledge, namely, cognitive and affective abilities 
and access to data. 
(ii) The abilities condition and access to data 
It would be foolish, I am sure, to speculate about what portions of the 
adult population have developed the intellectual and personal excellences 
which we have claimed to be so important in making correct decisions; 
though it was not so difficult to do this with students since we could 
present a fairly strong psychological argument about intellectual imma- 
turity. However, in the realm of emotional, or affective, characteris- 
tics there is at least one point -a significant one - about parental 
deficiency vis a vis decision-making which should be mentioned. 
What I have in mind is not so much an emotional immaturity as 
simply a factor which interferes with a parent's ability to make rational 
choices. 
11 
It is this. While maturity can be safely assumed of parents, 
at least in the general case, we cannot always presume that parents wi ll 
have good judgment when making decisions about matters in which they 
have great emotional involvement. In short, parents, as most classroom 
teachers can attest, have a tendency to think well of their children, 
i. e. to assume them to be well behaved and highly intelligent. Parents 
are sometimes not very objective. One unfortunate consequence of this 
is that they sometimes overrate their own ch il d's_ ab'i li ty to perform. 
Hence, a parent in charge of arranging his child's curriculum, as is 
the case in many schools nowadays (given the widespread cafeteria cur- 
riculum) , may press him 
into areas for which he has no aptitude, blinded 
by false confidence. 
12 
This is not to be taken as a fatal objection to 
the case for parents; but it is a serious consideration. 
(c) The Verdict on Parents 
The same inexorable difficulty of making a simple statement about 
Il 
See R. S. Peters' article 'Freedom and the Development of the 
Free Man', in J. F. Doyle ed., Educational Judgments (London: Routledge 
& Kegan Paul, 1973), for a useful discussion of some psychological 
factors that interfere with or prevent rational choice, both in the 
development of one's capacity and the ways it can be stymied. 
12F. Musgrove, in Fami ly, Education and Society, op. cit., p. 135 
maintains that 'The ambitions of parents 
for their children bear a 
closer relationship to their social class position than 
to the demon- 
strated abilities of the child'. 
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decision-making competence exists-- in the case of parents as with students. 
For the competence criteria of knowledge cognitive and affective abili- 
ties and access to data are logically independent of parenthood. That 
is, if A is a parent, there is no necessary connection between his 
being a parent and being either a competent or non competent decision- 
maker. We are left, therefore, to evaluate competence on the basis of 
generalizations about parent populations and their ability to fulfill 
the conditions of competence. Given that competence in curriculum 
matters depends largely upon knowledge of various sorts; that the type 
of knowledge differs with the type of decision; that some parents may 
have none of the knowledge, some, some of the knowledge, i. e. some 
knowledge for the entire range of decisions or, enough knowledge tomake 
some decisions (e. g. macro activity decisions) but not others, and even 
a modicum of parents who have adequate knowledge to make a great many 
macro and micro decisions; it follows that determining competence is 
precarious at best. Still, it is important to make this judgment, even 
if it must be heavily qualified. For, just as we must, for the sake of 
democracy, consider Plato's problem of the competence of citizens to 
make political judgments (e. g. about leaders), we must, for the sake 
of educating the young, determine who is most capable of controlling 
the school curriculum. And, in view of the arguments in this chapter, 
it seems reasonable to suppose that only certain macro and micro issues 
should be within the control of parents. (Participation is another 
matter. ) These are such macro decisions as selection of the programme 
of a school from pre-presented options (as in the case of a community 
school) or choice of a school (existent macro activity) for one's own 
child. Equally, some micro activities which are non technical and of 
less than significant consequence if made in error ought to be within 
the domain of parents. For other curriculum matters, parents ought not 
to have control. 
Chapter VIII 
EXPERTS AND CURRICULUM DECISION-MAKING 
I. Introduction 
We have taken the view that the consequences of misjudgment in 
schooling can be severe. Some members of the educational community 
are little concerned by this, e. g. free-school supporters, while others 
regard it with alarm. Many in the latter category suppose that minimi- 
zation of risk (and sometimes maximization of benefits) can be best 
achieved if our closest approximations to philosopher-kings make the 
important decisions, namely educational experts. 
In law or medicine such a proposal would meet with little resis- 
tance, but in education this is not so. The problem is not an unavail- 
ability of those claiming to have expertise. Nor is it any of the 
stumbling blocks to which students, and parents succumbed, such as 
intellectual immaturity or inadequate understanding of educational 
issues. Oddly enough, in the first line of debate, the questionable 
factor is whether or not there is an adequate body of educational 
theory to make sensible any talk of educational experts. Some people 
argue that we do not have dependable theories in education like in 
engineering, hence we ought not to rely on the so-called experts. 
Others take the stronger opposition posture that theories in education 
are, in principle, not possible; if by 'theory' we mean a set of law- 
like statements as in natural sciences. And still others, in the 
second line of debate, take the interesting view that even if theories 
were possible and available, we would not require them in education 
anyway; hence we have no need of experts. 
My intention is to investigate the status of educational theory 
and the arguments against theorists - experts. First, however, some 
important clarifications need to be made. The conditions for being an 
expert must be outlined. We must mention who claims to be the educa- 
tional expert. And I want to make some observations about the charac- 
teristic functions of experts: these will be very important in assess- 
ing their claim to authority. Ultimately my objective will be to show 
that experts, or at least some of them, ought not to control curriculum, 
though not for the reasons currently being advanced. 
2. Educational Experts 
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(a) What is an Expert? 
We could hardly prescribe expert control without identifying those 
who claim to be experts. But in advance it might be worthwhile to 
mention the formal properties of 'expertise'. First, one must have 
superior competence in some sphere. This is a conceptual truth. In 
practice, however, those we label experts do not always have this. 
Sometimes a charlatan is misidentified; and sometimes individuals, 
highly knowledgeable within a particular school of thought, are called 
experts and later that school of thought falls into disrepute within 
its field, thus making continued title to expertise unwarranted. Second, 
superior competence is an assessment of one's propositional or proce- 
dural knowledge. In some spheres, one's expertise alignes more closely 
with one than the other. Compare the historian's propositional knowledge 
with the tennis player's procedural counterpart. In others, there is a 
relatively even balance as might be so in the case of an archeologist 
who knows what he is looking for among the ancient ruins and how to 
dig it up. Third, R. S. Peters1 distinguishes 'authorities' from 'experts' 
by saying that the former knows things for their own sake while the 
latter has instrumental knowledge. Presumably, historians and tennis 
players would represent these respectively. This dichotomy between in- 
trinsically worthwhile and instrumental knowledge would, perhaps, be 
more useful if taken as an indication of differing functions to which 
knowledge can be put than to pick out particular groups of individuals. 
The former would function, perhaps, to satisfy curiousity or to entertain, 
and the latter to have functional utility. Otherwise, the historian who 
is alleged to be an authority as opposed to an expert, and who uses h is 
knowledge to predict the future from the past meets the requirements of 
an expert. Regarding the dichotomy in terms of function seems to make 
more sense, and doubly so, given that ordinary language users are gener- 
ally indiscriminate in labelling individuals as one or the other. 
Con- 
sequently, I will use the terms interchangeably, or to 
denote function. 
(b) Who are the Educational Experts? 
In countries such as Finland, Sweden, Norway, 
France, Belgium, 
Austria, Spain, Italy, the United States, Canada and Australia curriculum 
decisions are centralized. In all but Canada, the 
United States and 
(Ethics 
and Education (London: George Allen & Unwin, 
1966), p. 240. 
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Australia the structures of the macro and micro activities of schooling 
(for state supported schools) are determined by the central government. 
In Canada et al local school boards have some say in determining parts 
of micro activities (e. g. syllabus details) but provincial governments 
have responsibility for macro decisions. Now the composition of deci- 
sion-making groups and the procedures they employ vary from country to 
country, but commonly governments set up or sponsor curriculum groups 
who draw up guidelines etc. Groups are often small and membership 
might include academics, teachers, civil servants and perhaps indivi- 
duals from the wider community. The individuals are presumed to be 
experts in some sphere relevant to curriculum. 
These groups of professional decision-makers are institutionalized. 
They are, to a considerable extent, intellectually and physically 
detached from that which they decide about, namely the schools. I 
will call them institutional experts. They are to be distinguished 
from other experts whose contact with the schools is more direct such 
as reading specialists, child psychologists and perhaps even a reformed 
Schools Council in Britain. 
At mention of Britain here, it seems opportune to note the current 
debates in Britain about state control of the curriculum, since I 
think that in some respects the issue is one of expert control and 
competence. It is not entirely this, of course. John White 
2 
and others 
have argued that decisions about the structure of curriculum (a macro 
activity decision) ought to be made at a political level, not so much 
on grounds of competence, but because democracy is involved. His claim 
is that the structure of the curriculum, i. e. what disciplines we teach 
and what we leave out, affects the conceptions children develop of the 
good life. As the children become adults and take their places in 
society as decision-makers - in industry and government - their notions 
of the good life will, through their decisions, influence the emergent 
good society. Since the shape of the good society is of concern to 
everyone in society, each should have a say in determining it. Since 
the state is the democratic representative of citizens the state ought 
to decide the shape of the good society, hence, the structure of 
curriculum. Now White's argument has serious flaws which I have tried 
2See White's paper 'Teacher Accountability and School Autonomy', 
Proceedings of the Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain, 
Vol X, 
July 1976, pp. 58-78; and my reply 'John White on State Control of the 
Curriculum', Journal of Philosophy of Education, Vol. 12,1978, pp. 
63-8. 
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to point out elsewhere. Still, the position could be revitalized by 
different arguments. However, for me to show that the position is 
completely misguided would involve a very long discussion of tradition, 
democracy and rights; hence in a thesis on competence we must simply 
leave it as it is. 
There are, however, other arguments that could be used to 
support state control. For instance, one could say that if the state 
were to make macro or micro decisions, or both, it could gather 
together the most expert decision-makers in philosophy, economics, 
sociology, psychology, curriculum and the disciplines. Experts 
would make the decisions. Centralization, thus, could lead to 
optimally competent decision-making. Equally, the level of efficiency 
in running the nation's schools could be bolstered by the coordination 
and standardization of plans. For instance, school programmes could 
be made uniform throughout the country so that, among other things, 
the children of mobile parents would not suffer as they moved to new 
schools. 
Now there are many similar 1 ines of argument that could be taken 
but they all seem to hinge on the expertise of state decision-makers. 
In consequence, apart from the political argument in support of state 
control, the matter could reasonably be treated as of a piece with the 
general case dealing with institutional experts. For state decision- 
makers are typical of institutional experts, and the arguments that I 
will put against the case for such experts will apply as well to those 
employed by the state as to those who are independent of it. 
(c) Institutional Experts 
We might think of institutional experts as a sub-set of the class 
of experts, insofar as they meet the formal conditions but have 
characteristics which distinguish them in an empirical way from others. 
There are, I believe, two features about their modus operandi which 
set them apart. Typically, institutional experts 
(a) centralize, 
and (b) standardize policy making. Since there are usually not enough 
of them to go around, centralization makes efficient use of a scarce 
resource (i. e. the experts). And standardization 
(e. g. prescription of 
compulsory texts, courses and content) 
is something which is done to 
achieve efficiency of policy implementation and 
it can be justified 
on the grounds that objectively true and universally 
applicable theories 
are available and known 
(exclusively) by them. Why? Well, because 
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they are experts, of course. And that is what is usually meant by 
being an expert. 
Why should we be so concerned with only a sub-set of the class? 
The answer is simply that proponents of the 'experts-should-decide' 
view use 'expert' not just in the conceptual sense of individuals having 
knowledge credentials, but in the referring sense, where those picked 
out by the term are specific social groups - academics, government 
policy makers, and so on. 
Given that our over-riding objective is to recommend one among 
the usual alternatives as worthy of entitlement to authority for 
curriculum, it would be pointless for us to deal solely with the con- 
ceptual issue. In consequence, by 'experts', I will mean institution- 
al experts as we have just described them. Teachers (as experts) will 
be dealt with in a separate chapter and non institutional experts such 
as remedial teachers or clinical workers of some description who are 
not usually centralized, will simply be treated as a special case, 
though not a particularly important one since they rarely aspire to 
more than consultation on curriculum, as opposed to authority for it. 
3. Educational Theory 
(a) The Problem 
If the expert's claim to superior decision-making competence rests 
on the assumption that he is a party to the theory of education just 
as an engineer's competence rests on his understanding of up to date 
engineering theory, we are entitled to ask, what is this educational 
theory? 
3 The likely response to such a query from most educational 
commentators would be a rather blushing remark about there not actually 
being a systematic theory at present. What bearing would this 
have on 
the position that experts ought to be educational decision-makers? 
From 
a practical point of view it would remove the thrust 
from their claim - 
the discussion about which we will return to later on - but 
from the 
logical standpoint one could still posit that, at 
least in principle, 
experts would be most competent. But even that 
has its problems because 
strong arguments have been raised 
by some philosophers against the 
possibility of there ever being an educational 
theory in principle. The 
cogency of this stricture depends, 
in turn, upon the interpretation 
3Clearly, this sort of competence would pertain to decisions about 
rather than within activities. 
For educational theories would be rele- 
vant to determination of the rules of schooling, 
not decision-making 
within the rules once known. 
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given to 'theory' ; for if, by theory, we only mean a set of explanatory 
generalizations it is not hard to produce several (e. g. common sense 
notions about human learning and teaching methodology) which might be 
construed as sufficient for this. But if we have in mind a more rigor- 
ous scientific interpretation of theory there may well be a serious 
p rob 1 em. 
Even if we defend the notion that educational theory is possible, 
there are further problems. Overlooking the obvious point that, logi- 
cally possible or not, there may not be any theories yet developed 
which experts can lay claim to, there is a further, and seemingly odd 
view, that elaborate education theory is not necessary - hence, neither 
are experts. Nevertheless, it has some powerful arguments to support 
it. 
My intention is to begin this enormously complex problem by look- 
ing at the debate between D. J. O'Connor and P. H. Hirst about the meaning 
and criteria of an educational theory. 
4 
The reason for taking this 
debate so seriously here is that each presents a plausible view of 
educational theory yet they are views which are in competion with one 
another. These notions are, I believe, quite representative of the 
major sphere of debate, at least among philosophers of education. My 
intention will be to explore some of the possibilities of reconcili- 
ation between them and to show some of the weaknesses of each. Then I 
want to consider some of the arguments that have been appearing in the 
current literature against (a) the logical possibility of an educational 
theory, and (b) the desirability of developing one. I will then argue 
that theoretical knowledge in itself is insufficient for decision-making 
competence. 
(b) The Structure of Educational Theories 
(i) The O'Connor-Hirst debate 
O'Connor takes the view that if there is to be such a thing as an educa- 
tional theory, whereby 'theory' one has in mind something which con- 
4'The 
Nature and Scope of Educational Theory (1) and 
(2)', an essay 
by O'Connor and reply by Hirst, in Glenn Langford and D. J. O'Connor 
eds., New Essays in the Philosophy of Education, 
(London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1973), pp. 47-75. This debate between them is long-standing. 
It began with O'Connor's book Introduction to the Philosophy of 
Educa- 
tion, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 19T7), and essays 
by Hirst: 
'Philosophy and Educational Theory', British Journal of 
Educational 
Studies, Vol. 12, No. 1,1963, and 'Educational Theory' in J. W. 
Ti bb le 
ed., The Study of Education, 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966). 
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forms to the normal and proper (scientific) usage of the term, it 
would be something like the following. First, the object or goal of 
the theory would be the explanation of, and prediction within, the 
social institution of education for the control and well being of those 
within it. Second, such a theory would be made up of appropriate 
sciences like psychology, sociology, economics, human biology, as well 
as of non scientific components like religion, political and social 
ideals, etc. Third, the theory, to qualify as a 'theory', should meet 
the following four conditions which are characteristic of any scientific 
theory. 
(i) It should be a logically interconnected' 
set of hypotheses. 
(ii) They should be confirmable by observation. 
(iii) They should be refutable. 
(iv) They should be explanatory, i . e. , they 
should be conclusions of valid inferences 
from premises which are believed to be true. 
5 
And under pressure from Hirst, O'Connor agrees that educational 
theories would have to be seen as functioning so as to 'guide' educa- 
tional activities. But 'guide' is ambiguous, O'Connor notes, as between 
indications of what can be done and what ought to be done. Hirst 
accepts the latter but O'Connor, the former. To the extent that what 
can be done determines what ought to be done, O'Connor is willing to 
say that a theory should determine (guide) ends as well as means. 
6 
(i i) Educational theory: the moral dimension and verification 
Now Hirst, on the face of it, agrees with the four conditions O'Connor 
lays out. But they disagree on two issues which are fundamental to 
the notion of there ever being a rigorous educational theory and 
seemingly vital, in turn, to the matter of the experts' claim to superi- 
or competence. 
The first contention is about the place of morals with regard to 
educational theory. Both agree that moral problems arise in education. 
But, Hirst, on the one hand, feels that moral guidance should be part 
of, i. e., included in, an adequate educational theory, 
7 
whereas, 
R 
O'Connor, on the other hand, thinks that morals ought to be excluded. 
50'Connor: 'The Nature and Scope of Educational Theory (1)', p. 50. 
6Ibid., 
pp. 54-55. 
7H i rst : 'The Nature and Scope of Educational Theory 
(2) ', pp. 68-71. 
80p. 
cit., p. 55. 
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Now if we look behind the scenes to see why each believes as he does, 
we will, at the same time, draw out their second major difference and, 
perhaps more valuably, some of the major philosophical difficulties 
with ' theory' . 
O'Connor, to start with, sees a practical theory, in this case an 
educational theory, as procedural, that is, means to ends. No values 
need be present in the theory, or if they are in the first instance, 
they can be reduced to statements of fact. The procedures, or means of 
bringing about educational ends, can be selected on the basis of 
efficiency, and as for educational ends, they have an evaluative com- 
ponent to be sure, but which can be reduced to matters of fact if we 
use as evaluative principles those which are accepted by the community. 
In other words, by observation we determine the evaluative principles 
relevant to educational ends, then judge on the basis of them. Conceived 
thus, educational theory would at least come close to its natural 
scientific counterparts (though O'Connor still thinks that attaching 
'theory' to education is very much a courtesy title) insofar as it is 
verified purely by observation. More troublesome moral problems, what- 
ever they might be, can be dealt with outside the theory. Incorpor- 
ating them would simply spoil the theory by' importing unmanageable 
logical problems. 
9 
Hirst, by contrast, is not compelled to exclude morals by the 
strict empiricism that binds O'Connor. That is, in O'Connor's theory 
there can only be propositions that are verifiable by observation; but 
Hirst is not ultimately committed to verification by observation, hence 
not to the exclusion of morals - for that reason anyway. Hirst, rather, 
is willing to accept confirmation rather more broadly. Truth may be 
assigned on the basis of strong inductive inference, for one thing, and 
propositions about human behaviour need not depend solely upon observa- 
tion but could include, as well, the agent's own account of reasons for 
acting. 
10 
Now this begs an enormous range of philosophical questions 
about the credibility of the agent's account, our ability to understand 
him and much else besides which we will have to by-pass; 
but it provides 
the opportunity for saying that Hirst is aware of these 
difficulties 
and that he is not, in view of all this, 
becoming slap-happy about truth 
criteria. That is, while standing against strict empiricism 
he is not, 
at once, supporting subjectivism of any sort. 
He simply wants to say 
that truth can be established in more ways than simply 
through observa- 
tion. 
91bid. 
10 
op. cit., p. 69. 
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This, then, brings us to the inclusion of morals in theory, 
because part of Hi rs t' s more generous truth criterion is provision for 
assignment of truth-values to moral propos it ions. Hirst's claim, 
though a bit unspecific and unclear, is that the logical connections 
between fact and values are existent, if not solid. Moral propositions 
cannot be prove by appeal to fact; nevertheless the logical link is 
there. Moreover, on his view, progress is being made in establishing 
fact-value mappings in some areas; and, in any case, the distinction 
is demonstrably tenuous in many educational matters. In consequence, 
values are not forced from theory; the question is, then, why should 
they be present? Hi rst's answer to this is really very simple. If 
theory is to guide practice, then since moral guidance is needed in 
educational matters, the theory should provide it. What distinguishes 
his position from O'Connor's is the interpretation given to 'guidance'. 
O'Connor looks to medicine and engineering where theories are practical, 
reasonably solid and restricted, insofar as guidance is concerned, to 
efficient means to ends, and supposes that education should be likewise. 
To Hirst, this is to make educational theory inadequate for its purposes. 
Having said all of this, we can see that what starts as a disagree- 
ment about the place of morals within or without of theory soon becomes 
an issue of verification. Not only is this their problem, but it is a 
major issue in philosophy of science and social science. So important 
is the issue that without taking note of it, further talk about educa- 
tional theory becomes somewhat suspect. Because of this, it behooves 
us to examine the issue briefly, if for no other reason than to show its 
complexity. Moreover, by making a few comments about verification we 
can, perhaps , take up a position 
in favour of one or the other, and in 
the process work our way back to the morals issue, since the two are 
wound up together. In other words, we arrived at the problem of verifi- 
cation from morals , so we will now start with verification and work 
back to morals. 
The first point is that the strict empiricist, as O'Connor seems 
to be, holds that confirmation of scientific statements has to be by 
observation, and the starting worry is that 'observation' is a vague 
term. When we test air temperature with a thermometer are we observing 
the heat when we see the mercury rise in the same sense that we observe 
a typewritter we are looking at directly? And when the path of a proton 
is noted by a trai 1 of vapour in a cloud chamber, 
is that observation in 
the same sense as either the testing of air temperature or seeing 
the 
typewritter? Strict empiricists differ on what counts as observation. 
Those who are willing to accept indirect observation can save 
O'Connor's 
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condition (ii) from falling to the air temperature counter-example; but 
does vapour in the cloud chamber count even as indirect observation? 
Is the vapour trail not simply an inductive inference based upon prior 
unconfirmed proton theory? In any case, even if we do call it observa- 
tion, and hence allow the empiricist to relax his standards, how would 
he account for black holes which emit no light and hence are unobserva- 
ble in principle? Theories about black holes posited by scientists 
would have to be regarded as unacceptable: in similar vein much of 
science - of what scientists do - would have to be ruled out of court. 
Given the two options, rejecting the empiricist criterion seems more 
realistic. It is the matter of observation and the empiricists insis- 
tence upon it that introduces the difficulty with values in his concep- 
tion of theory. For, to begin with, observation in the social sciences 
often presupposes particular explanatory theories about entities which, 
themselves, cannot be confirmed by observation, the fact of depending 
upon which, illustrates the theorist's evaluative bias in favour of those 
theories. For example, the development of a practical psychological 
theory about regulating particular behaviours, which is based on a theory 
of operant conditioning, may or may not itself be confirmable by obser- 
vation, but the theory on which it rests in this case cannot be verified 
as bullet-proof by observation simply because no amount of observed 
regularity of behaviour will force us to accept the causal connection 
between rewards and repeated action, to the exclusion of, say, Freudian 
theories to the contrary. The same goes for a wide range of psycholog- 
ical, economic and sociological theories. And then on top of this, 
the fact that the social scientist builds upon these prior theories 
shows that he prefers these theories to those in competition which in- 
di cates an evaluative bias which he, the empiricist, claims not to have. 
11 
A second point, closely related to this, is that any natural or 
social scientist, empiricist or other, pledges allegiance to values such 
as rigour, simplicity, elegance, and so forth; indeed they are part of 
the construction of theory. it seems plausible as well to suppose that 
I In a similar vein Brian Fay argues in Social Theory and Political 
Practice, (London: George Al len, and Unwin, 1975 Chapter 3 that strict 
empiricists (or positivists as he calls them) characteristically treat 
social rules and institutions, which in particular cases are not 
immut- 
able, as entities with a life of their own, upon which social theory is 
developed. In consequence, these rules and institutions are reified and 
reinforced. Because the empiricist needs these rules etc., as a 
basis 
for observation, he develops an ideology which 
is founded upon these 
rules. Thus he generates a conservative 
bias in his construction of 
social theory and subsequently recommended political practice. 
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commitment to certain personal or professional values such as integrity 
and abhorence of falsehood, confusion and muddle would apply to the 
strict empiricist as much as anyone. 
Third, Hirst makes fleeting note of O'Connor's suggestion that, on 
the means-ends model, ends can be those which are desired by the 
community, and means those which are most efficient. 
12 But is the 
educational theorist here not to morally assess those ends, even if 
only to rule out or refuse to participate in bringing about ends which 
are immoral in his mind (e. g., indoctrination or some state of anti- 
rationalism)? 
13 
And is 'efficiency' to be interpreted as minimizing 
time spent, resources used, cash cost, human suffering or what? Is 
not value placed on that which one chooses? 
Fourth, and another point also mentioned by Hirst, is that means 
are sometimes themselves ends of action which leaves them open to moral 
evaluation. 
14 
Is corporal punishment, for example, an acceptable way 
of bringing about behaviour reform in schools? The whole idea of educa- 
tion and educational institutions - what they are and how they are to 
carry out their function - whether we accept a means-ends model or not, 
reflects a range of values held by decision-makers about the world, 
institutions and the treatment of human beings (i . e. , respect 
for 
persons' rights, duties, freedoms and so forth). 
Looked at in this way, it becomes very difficult to separate the 
inherent value-ladeness of theoretical statements and moral directives 
made by the theory. Although the former is covert and the latter 
overt,, they come, in the end, to much the same thing. In consequence, 
it leaves us wondering about the coherence of O'Connor's position. 
Still, he could admit that even the empiricist's theory is value-laden 
without being committed to adding further value prescriptions in the 
abundance that Hirst would like to see. Hirst, remember, envisions an 
educational theory that guides practice in much more than technical 
matters - in morals as well. 
O'Connor wants morals outside of theory to protect the 
latter from 
grave logical difficulties. Hirst 
does not see the difficulties as 
grave, and believes that without morals the theory would 
be inadequate. 
Their positions would be potentially reconcilable 
if both were ethical 
def ini sts because such a view reduces 
judgments about moral right and 
120' Connor, op. cit., p. 55" 
13Hirst 
makes a reply along these lines, op. cit., p. 
71. 
141bid. 
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wrong to reportive definitions (e. g., 'right' means 'desired upon 
reflection' or 'desired when looked at from an impersonal point of 
view') which enables moral decisions to be judged in accordance with 
the definitions by empirical means. For example, the question 'Is it 
right to corporally punish this child? ' would be answered by determining 
empirically whether the person asking it, to use one definition, actually 
'desired to do it upon reflection'. 
Given O'Connor's emphasis of the logical difficulties of deriving 
values from facts, it seems unlikely that he would support this view, 
even though _a strict empiricist might 
be tempted to do so. And Hirst, 
in acknowledging the face-value difficulties, seems to be implicitly 
against this view. Doubtless for the best because definism is open to 
devastating criticisms. Its downfall is that it endeavours to reduce 
ethical matters to factual propositions, namely definitions and the 
compatibility of 'ethical' judgments with them. But factual propositions 
do not favour, recommend or prescribe actions as ethical propositions 
do. For example, if we query the moral goodness of corporally punishing 
achild on some occasion, and to do this we ask if, say,, this punishment 
was 'desired upon reflection', we have established a matter of fact, 
not a moral recommendation. Now the definist might reply that the de- 
finition of good, say, 'desired upon reflection', is implicitly an 
ethical principle recommending action on the basis of reflective desires. 
The problem is though, as Frankena clearly points out, the definition 
is needed to support the principle; and the principle is needed to 
support the definition. Since, obviously, they cannot support each 
other, the problem of justification of the definist's definition remains 
unsolved. 
l5 
Consequently, there does not seem to be any way of drawing values 
into an educational theory that would satisfy both O'Connor and Hirst. 
We are therefore returned to the starting point: a theory without 
messy moral directives or one that includes them. 
Choosing between them is made difficult because the principles used 
to justify the respective positions are not themselves easy to rank 
in 
importance. Hirst justifies the inclusion of morals on grounds of the 
adequacy of the theory to perform 
its function. O'Connor would counter 
this by saying, first, that a rigorous theory 
is important and the inclu- 
sion of morals militates against this. 
Second, to his way of thinking, 
a practical theory need not perform so great a 
function (namely guidance), 
15W. -K. Frankena, Ethics (2nd ed. ), (Englewood Cliffs, 
N. J.: 
Prentice-Hall, 1973), p. 100. 
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hence without morals it would be adequate. Resolution of the issue 
would then seem to focus on the function of an educational theory. This 
issue, however, is much too complex to deal with here; especially since 
our main concern has been to highlight two major contrasting views of 
educational theory so as to give a ci rcumspect analysis, all with an 
eye toward asking whether an educational theory is possible in principle. 
We are left, therefore, at the interim position of having to choose a 
side. 
However, as a parting note: to my way of thinking, Hi rs is position 
is preferable. For educational decision-making is shot through with 
moral issues which somehow must be dealt with by our moral principles, 
flimsy or not. In other words, we need guidance in the larger sense. 
To keep the moral component on the outside just to keep the theory, as 
it were, respectable,; seems pointless. Proclamations. of strict empiri- 
cists notwithstanding, social science theories, as we shall soon see, 
are not as rigorous as those in natural sciences, so not much contamina- 
tion is caused by the inclusion of morals. 
(c) Attacks Against the Logical Possibility of Educational Theory 
(i) Mounce's two objections 
Even if we take Hirst's side, as against the more rigorously 
scientific position of those like O'Connor, the way is not now clear of 
obstacles to claiming the possibility of an educational theory. One of 
the recent commentators on the O'Connor-Hi rst debate, Howard Mounce, 
poses a number of problems for theories of social science in general. 
16 
want to look at two of these. 
Mounce's attack on the notion of an educational theory centres on 
the impossibility of developing a systematic body of theory, something 
which would satisfy O'Connor's condition that a theory must 
be a logical- 
ly inter-connected set of hypotheses. His two principal misgivings are 
(a) theories about human beings are impossible 
(other than as vague gen- 
eralizations) because of the unpredictability of 
human actions, and (b) 
systematic theories are impossible because of the complexity and 
diver- 
sity of human motives and influences on them - an extension of 
his point 
about them being unpredictable. 
To develop his first point: he believes, as do many philosophers 
of social science, that human behaviour 
is unpredictable largely because 
16'Theory and Practice' in proceedings of the 
Philosophy of Educa- 
tion Society of Great Britain 
(Vol. X, 1976)v pp. 114-123. 
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we are out of the natural order of causation to which material things 
are subject, insofar as we are able to act as we choose rather than in 
ways which are determined causally by our 'nature'. Many 
social scientists have endeavoured to explain and predict human behaviour 
by trying to understand man's motives (both conscious and unconscious) 
for action hoping to generalize from them. Now, understanding another 
man's motives has always been contentious in philosophical debate 
because if one takes (one version of) the empiricist - scientific means 
of understanding, one must propound and confirm theory by observation 
only. But in fact, this is not how we understand human motives, accord- 
ing to Mounce. The social scientist's understanding of his subject is, 
at least in part, based on what he, the scientist, shares with the sub- 
ject, namely a conceptual understanding of the circumstances in which 
one is motivated to act, and of course the same sorts of inclinations 
and beliefs about what one ought (morally and otherwise) to do in such 
and such a situation, and so on. In other words, the social scientist 
makes predictions about what the subject will do - what his motives 
are - on the basis of shared beliefs and understandings. But, the prob- 
lem which Mounce says Peter Winch has rai sed, 
1 7 is that correctly asses- 
sing the subject's motives would depend upon having the same knowledge 
and understanding, i . e. , beliefs about the world and beliefs about the 
specific circumstances in which the motivation arises, as the subject 
did at that moment. Well, this certainly cannot be guaranteed between 
social scientists and their subjects. For surely the anthropologist, 
for example, cannot lay claim to the same conceptual scheme as his primi- 
tive subject any more than the historian can pare away his knowledge of 
some historical character's future so as to understand - to have identi- 
cal thoughts and feelings - as that historical character. If the social 
scientist cannot understand exactly what the motive is, or was, he can 
hardly generalize about i t. And it follows on the heels of this, of 
course, that hopes are dashed for a system of social theory. 
Mounce's second, and very powerful objection to social theory, is 
that motives are too complex to be stated precisely. There are an indef- 
inite number of contingent factors which may have a bearing on judgments. 
A misbehaving child, for example, could be acting from deep-seated frus- 
trations with his home life, the school or social life or acting on a 
dare from his friends in class or attempting to impress them with his 
courage or, indeed, any number of other things. 
If asked for his motives, 
17See his influential book The Idea of a Social Science (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958). 
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would the child understand them fully or be able to articulate them? 
Social behaviour, it is alleged, is simply too complex to be completely 
explained by a theory. 
What reply can be given to Mounce on these two points? On the 
issue of understanding someone else's motives, his first point, it is 
sometimes suggested that, at least in theory, we could use our imagina- 
tions. That is, we could put ourselves in the actor's position and 
think what motives and contingent circumstances would influence our 
behaviour. The problem with this of course is that we would have to 
know what the actor's motive actually was in order to assess whether or 
not we have imagined correctly. For example, suppose in constructing a 
theory of reading competence among beginners one task would be to deter- 
mine the linkage between the child's concept of reading - understanding 
of its nature, purpose, rules and use of the rules (strategies) - how 
he reads. We could gain much by asking the child, of course, but under- 
standing might depend upon our ability to put ourselves in his concep- 
tual shoes. So we would imagine ourselves as children deciding upon a 
strategy to employ, e. g., read letter-by-letter, clusters of letters, 
word-by-word, and so on, and endeavour to make the connection with our 
notion of what reading is. Now suppose, imagining ourselves as begin- 
ning readers, we were able to do this. How, it could legitimately be 
asked, do we know that we imagined correctly? Some sort of criterion 
for success would be necessary; but that is precisely what we do not 
have. Indeed one would have to imagine it; hence the same problem once 
again. In consequence, if we accept Mounce's (and Winch's) view that 
social science theory depends upon understanding human motives, and 
that to have such an understanding requires that we share the conceptual 
foundations with, and have the identical experiences to, our subjects, 
it follows that, since we cannot, we are thereby unable to construct with 
complete accuracy theories about human behaviour. 
The complexity issue raised by Mounce is, equally, troublesome. 
But a possible response could be worked up from a point made by A. J. 
Ayer. 18 To Mounce's assertion that reasons and other contingencies about 
human action are indefinitely numerous and complex, something which 
differentiates the social sciences from the natural sciences and which 
militates against the possibility of an accurate theory in the former, 
we might state Ayer's claim that there is no difference in principle 
between social and natural sciences in this regard. For it is possible, 
18, Man as a Subject for Science' in P. Laslett and W. G. Runciman, 
eds., Phi losoPh , Politics and Society, 
Third series (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1969), pp. 6-24. 
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again in principle, to allow for a list with an indefinite number of 
places on it to account for every possible variable. In other words, 
just as in the natural sciences, it is possible in principle in the 
social sciences, to account for the contingencies. The list may be 
much longer in the social sciences, but that alone does not make them 
different in principle than the natural sciences. For example, develop- 
ment of a reading theory would have to contend not only with specifics 
about the child's concept of reading but with motivation, state of 
readiness, prior learning, eyesight, and much else besides. Although 
these factors may be numerous and complicate theorizing, they can be 
dealt with in the same way that are contingencies in physics or biology. 
I think a reply to Mounce along these lines is adequate, and why 
this is so will be explained shortly. But for the moment I would like 
to take a liberty with Mounce, and those who would support him, and 
present what I think he (or they) would argue in rebuttal. They could 
say that at some stage in propounding a theory we must settle on a 
finite listing, otherwise we would not have a final version of the 
theory. But, once we have done this, the theory is open to a charge 
of incompleteness. This is because reality is so complex that there 
always remains the possibility of an unaccounted-for item coming to our 
attention, thus rendering our list, and hence the theory, incomplete. 
If we revised our theory in light of it, another could appear; our 
list would never be complete, hence neither would our theory. 
The reason why this counter-argument does not work is the reason 
why the whole complexity issue does not devastate the notion of a 
social science theory. First, complexity is not exclusive to social 
behaviour; it exists in nature as well. Granted, theories of social 
action must contend with significant differences among (human) subjects 
(e. g., mental and physical capacities and competences), their widely 
ranging motives and the very fact that motives sometimes change when 
subjects become aware of predictions about themselves 
(cf., a student 
who begins to work hard when failure is predicted by his teacher). 
But nature is not always or necessarily uniform. Higher primates, 
chimpanzees and dolphins, for example, may well be said to 
have motives, 
individuality and vary in competence. This, if only a plausible 
hypoth- 
esis amoung biologists and 'philosophers of science, seems intuitively 
obvious to many domestic pet owners'. What 
is more, the contingencies 
of time, place and experimental conditions when 
testing theories are 
matters which even the physicist or chemist must contend 
with. 
19 
Think 
19Karl Popper makes this point in The Poverty of Historicism 
(1957) 
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of a chemistry experiment: there is always some degree of impurity in 
the chemicals (perhaps from exposure to the air or residue from the 
container in which they are stored, measured or mixed) ; measurement can 
only be as accurate as the instruments used and the chemist who (using 
his 'fallible' senses) reads them; and the chemical reactions themselves 
are to some extent affected by such things as atmospheric conditions 
which can never be identical to similar experiments or completely 
eliminated (given the imperfections of containers or the instruments 
used to detect minute quantities of leakage). Put simply, experimental 
conditions are never identical or separate occasions, whether in natural 
or social sciences. In this respect at least, therefore, they do not 
differ, in principle. 
Second, complexity, or the problem of completeness that it leads 
to, fails as an argument against theory because it would be an unreason- 
able expectation of all theories, even in the natural sciences, to be 
complete. For, if by complete, we meant that a theory would have to 
explain absolutely everything about some phenomenon, we would run head- 
long into the logical impossibility of answering every why-question 
about the phenomenon because there would always be the logical possibility 
of why-questions as yet unasked or unthought of. For example, think of 
something in the realm of nature such as a flower. There could be an 
infinite number of descriptions of the flower. Science, which endeavours 
to describe and explain nature, could never achieve its purpose if com- 
pleteness were a necessary condition. To be systematic and adequate 
does not require an accounting of every complexity. In consequence, 
Mounce's complexity argument against social science must be rejected. 
To be considered next is the first point attributed to Mounce, 
namely the inability of the social scientist to predict human behaviour, 
in large measure because we cannot, logically, get inside the head of 
the subject at the time he acts to see what his motives are. There are, 
really, two questions here. Can human behaviour be predicted? Can we 
understand as the subject understood? 
The answer to the first question is yes. Insofar as social behav- 
iour is rule-governed or habitual, we need only learn the rules and 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961), pp. 93-97. This, however, is 
not true in all cases. In celestial mechanics mass, velocity and 
distance interact with one another and are the only variables. This 
applies as well with nonatomic thermodynamics 
in which only volume, 
temperature, pressure and a few other variables of this sort interact. 
On this see May Brodbeck: 'Logic and Scientific Method in Research on 
Teaching' in N. L. Gage ed., Handbook of Research on Teaching 
(Chicago: 
Rand McNally, 1963), pp. 44-93. 
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habits which govern behaviour and we can make predictions. Motorists 
will stop at red lights, cricketers will wear white on the pitch at 
Lords and a particular friend of mine, if invited for dinner at eight, 
will arrive not a second late. And, how do we learn these rules and 
habits? Observed regularities and questions asked of the agent about 
motives and hypotheses which seem to best explain the facts. Now, to 
be sure, generalizations about such behaviour are not certainties, nor 
could they be. But are we any more able to predict animal behaviour in 
zoology? Wi 11 every single rat in the universe push the lever for 
food when in the Skinner box after the same number of rewards? Will 
every wolf attack the lamb? Will your dog come when called each and 
every time? The likely answer to these questions is no because other 
factors sometimes intervene. Animals, for example may become distracted 
or lack physical or cognitive capacities to behave as predicted. The 
problem seemingly is ameliorated by postulating standard conditions 
under which behaviour will be uniform. But listing the items can be 
problematic as an indefinite number of unthought of or unprecedented 
possibilities may arise to force greater refinement of the theory. In- 
deed this would be true in other branches of natural science. In biology, 
for example, it is possible to theorize about plant growth 'under stand- 
ard conditions' but this phrase is a possible catch-all for anything 
that confounds the predicted behaviour. For much of natural science 
then, how is there a difference from social science with regard to 
certainty? The mistake is to suppose that science theory expects cer- 
tainly. For to have this certainty we would have to have solved the 
problem of complexity which, clearly, we cannot. 
The second question asks about a particular means of understanding 
and explaining human behaviour which is sometimes known as empathy 
That is, in virtue of having the same conceptual scheme and common exper- 
iences as the subject, we put ourselves in his shoes - we try to under- 
stand what he must have been thinking and feeling at the time. 
Mounce 
claims this is impossible in all cases because the social scientist 
might not have the same conceptual scheme or 
have shared the same ex- 
periences. And, to be added, is the point we made about not 
having a 
criterion to be used in telling whether or not we were understanding 
exactly as our subject did 
(i. e. actually empathizing). 
There are two points to be made. 
First, as we have seen, this is 
simply not the only way of understanding 
and explaining human action. 
Hence, to argue successfully against 
it (as Mounce does) is not to argue 
that social understanding is impossible. 
Second, to suppose that it is 
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essential to understand as the subject understood in order to produce 
an adequate scientific explanation is to make a fundamental mistake 
about the purpose of science. That is, to put oneself in the subject's 
shoes may be an effective technique for acquiring understanding, but it is 
wrong to think that the outcome of a scientific theory must be postu- 
lates that actually make those who understand them experience what the 
subject did. It is not the business of scientific theory to recreate 
reality. To have successfully described and explained the alienation 
of Indian children in white urban classrooms is not to have produced 
statements that invoke in the reader or hearer the feelings or thoughts 
of those children. Empathy might help as describe and explain, but the 
end product is not to be empathy. If Mounce's position implies this, 
he is mistaken. For this would be to make unrealistic demands on 
science. And it would confuse a description and explanation with what 
is being described and explained. To quote Richard Rudner on this: 
The alleged failure of social science to 
'capture' (i. e. to reproduce or to be the 
psychological equivalent of) the delightful 
chortle of a baby in social play with its 
parent, the anguished embarrassment of an 
adolescent, the nuances of social interaction 
of a board of directors meeting or a cocktail 
party, is too often nothing but the failure 
to distinguish statements and the systematizing 
uses to which they can be put, from the social 
phenomena referred to by those statements. 20 
(ii) Conclusion 
If social science theory is impossible in principle, it has not been 
demonstrated so far. Nevertheless, there are two lessons arising from 
our discussion over and above the problem of the meaning of theory. 
First, even if educational theories are possible and we had access to 
them, they would not ensure absolute and unassailable certainty. Second, 
the reason why certainty is impossible and, perhaps also, the reason 
why we encounter such difficulty in generating educational theory is, 
as Mounce is quite right in pointing out, the enormous complexity of 
factors which influence human decision-making and action. 
4, Is Educational Theory Important? 
21 
20Philosophy 
of Social Science (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice- 
hall, 1966T, pp. 69-70. 
21 
An abbreviated version of this and the section that follows is 
published in The Journal of Educational Thought under the title 'Fvnortc 
and Control of the Curriculum, -Vol. l?, no. ^, P. ugust, 
1979, pp. 129-39. 
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(a) Against the Need for a Theory 
Even if we presume that educational theories are possible in princi- 
ple and overlook the difficulties of actually producing a satisfactory 
theory of education and of finding genuine experts in it, there remains 
a problem to which both D. J. O'Connor22 and D. I. Lloyd23 have pointed. 
They claim that a sophisticated theory, one in the context of which it 
would be appropriate to speak of experts, is simply not needed in educa- 
tion - certainly not as in medicine or engineering. Both make similar 
claims. 
First, they contend that there have been many successful curriculum 
decisions which have not been preceded by developments in educational 
theory. Teaching and learning, they claim, have gone on throughout the 
ages apparently without teachers giving too much thought to the under- 
lying concerns of their art; and before any significant theoretical 
activities in education were begun. 
24 
O'Connor points out that this is 
quite in contrast with medicine or engineering. Development in both, 
and the logical possibility of it, was a consequence of progress in the 
natural sciences. In education, he says the theoretical investigations 
- largely a product of recent years - did not precede practice but, 
rather, followed the enormous increase in the number of schools, teachers 
and students in this century. 
25 
Clearly, on this view, theoretical 
endeavours are just frills to the practices of schooling. 
Second, it is claimed that social scientific (educational) theory 
is too recondite for practical needs. O'Connor draws a parallel between 
teaching and cooking, the point being that one no more needs to under- 
stand the complex psychological processes (etc. ) in children in order 
to teach well or make practical decisions about it, than one needs to 
know the chemical reactions among combined ingredients in cooking. 
26 
Lloyd stresses the familiar view that common sense about human 
behaviour and personal associations, born of one's life-long observa- 
tions and common conceptual scheme, is sufficient to enable one to make 
judgments about educational activities without having to call upon 
theories spun out by social scientists. What is needed, he thinks, is 
22O'Connor, 
op. cit. 
23D. 
1. Lloyd, 'Theory and Practice' in Proceedings of the Philosophy 
of Education Society of Great Britain, Vol. X, 1976 , pp. 98-113. 
241bid., 
p. 101. 
25O'Connor, 
op. cit., pp. 60,62. 
26Ibid., 
p. 64. 
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'reflection'. By that he means thinking about past situations - recal- 
ling the details, noting similarities and dissimilarities and consider- 
ing the ethical dimension - all of which are done in an attempt to sort 
out what was done from what might have been done bearing in mind all of 
the relevant practical and ethical considerations. From this, presum- 
ably, one benefits the next time similar circumstances occur. One's 
reflections can be called upon for guidance in avoiding past mistakes 
and to suggest new avenues. The principLal distinguishing feature between 
this and theorizing is that a rigidly set pattern for future action in 
similar circumstances has not been set as would be the case in adopting 
a theory. Rather, the essential items for making up new plans when the 
occasion arises have been generated. 
27 
Through reflection of this sort, 
flexibility can be maintained. 
(b) In Support of Theory 
On the first of these two points, it may be argued, as Hirst 
28 does, 
that the practical activities of teaching done so successfully in the 
past, may not have been done in any reasoned way. Success, that is, 
may have been contingent upon favourable circumstances, e. g. unusually 
bright students, happy accidents on the part of the teacher in choosing 
certain techniques or materials, etc. In other words, curriculum 
decision-makers and teachers may not have had reasons for their actions, 
or even been aware of the importance of having reasons. 
As to O'Connor's remark that educational theory has followed, not 
preceded educational practice (unlike medicine and engineering), one 
might point out that even in the allegedly more recondite fields of 
medicine and engineering some form of primitive practice existed (logi- 
cally and practically) prior to theoretical advances in the sciences. 
29 
Education may indeed be awaiting its Newton! 
27Joseph Schwab in 'The Practical : Arts of Eclectic'.. School Review, 
79 (1971) , pp. 
493-543 proposes, as wel 1, a pract i cal rather than 
theoretical approach to curriculum. His concern is largely to show the 
eclectic nature of practical decisions and the importances of contribu- 
tions from a wide range of disciplines. I am very much in agreement 
with Israel Scheffler who applauds the central idea of diversified ap- 
proached to curriculum but finds fault with the understanding of theory 
in relation to practice. Much of Scheffler's commendation and criticism 
of Schwab is similar to mine of Lloyd. See Scheffler's 
'The Practical as 
a Focus for Curriculum' , Reason and Teaching 
(London: Rout ledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1973), pp. 181-97. 
28Hirst, 
op. cit., p. 73. 
29Hirst 
also makes this point on p. 73. 
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There is a certain seductiveness about the second O'Connor-Lloyd 
claim. For it seems plausible to suppose that teaching and cooking 
share the mundane quality of being more in need of technique than 
theory, save perhaps in certain troubled areas such as special educa- 
tion. Add to that Lloyd's notion of 'reflection' - recollection of 
past practice, common-sense and flexibility in future dealings - and 
the case looks quite reasonable indeed. 
I would not want to say that such a view is anti-intellectualist - 
indeed it is probably conceived as being a realistic admonishment to 
those. who would over-intellectualise. But it certainly is needlessly 
pessimistic and lacking in foresight. It is an attitude no doubt 
similar to that taken in the past to a great host of practical human 
activities which have at one s tage been mori bound and l ate r transformed 
by developments in the natural and social sciences. Open heart surgery, 
space exploration and psychoanalysis would be examples. The O'Connor- 
Lloyd position, it seems to me, is typical of that held by skeptics in 
the early days of any theoretical venture. In this case its blindness 
is to the enormous potential, or so the opt iými st would allege, of 
psychology, sociology and philosophy. 
There is, too, an objection which can be raised to Lloyd's concept 
of reflection. The thrust of his programme is antithetical to theoriz- 
ing. But he has not, I am convinced, presented us with an alternative. 
Instead of doing away with theorizing and its application to practice 
he has simply redescribed the act of-theorizing and given it a different 
label. 
Bearing in mind the account given earlier of a 'theory' 
(i. e. a 
theory is (i) a logically interconnected set of hypotheses, 
(ii) confirm- 
able by observation, etc., (iii) refutable, 
(iv) explanatory), consider 
this example of what I take Lloyd to mean by a typical case of reflec- 
tion. A classroom teacher, mentally reviewing his last term experiences 
with a disruptive child, decides that his approach 
has been wrong. The 
child is known to be neglected and mistreated 
by his parents, and not 
particularly well liked by his fellow students; so 
it has been supposed 
that the child's disruptiveness has been an attempt, at once, 
to rebel 
and to draw attention. Gentle and 
loving treatment by the teacher to 
remove the sense of neglect and the motive 
for rebellion has been the 
teacher's reason for various things 
done in the classroom towards this 
end, e. g. extra personal attention and 
appointment to positions of 
responsibility in class, such as monitor. 
The teacher's reflective 
assessment is that this 
has failed; that the child has seen these kind- 
nesses as signs of weakness and 
taken advantage. It is now felt by the 
I 49 
teacher that much firmer, yet scrupulously fair, treatment would at 
least contain the misbehaviour. 
This piece of reflection, t contend, is simply a layman's contribu- 
tion to educational theory. It has all the ingredients. The conclusion 
is, in some sense, a guide to a certain range of classroom actions. The 
hypothesis about human behaviour in respect of a child's reactions to 
loose and tight discipline would presumably be consistent and compatible 
with other theories and beliefs (e. g. about learning, motivation and 
ethics) in an interconnected network comprising what could be construed 
as the teacher's own theory of education (condition (0]. The teacher 
evidently rejected the earlier hypothesis on the basis of observations 
about its lack of success, so presumably the present hypothesis could 
be rejected if it proves unsuccessful, or kept if it works. The hypo- 
thesis, therefore, can be confirmed by observation (etc. ) and is refu- 
table [conditions (ii) and (iii)]. Finally, the hypothesis when added 
to other beliefs explains this sort of behaviour [condition (iv)]. 
In short, what constitutes the theorizing, constitutes Lloyd's reflec- 
tion. 
The second flaw in Lloyd's invective against application of theory 
is in supposing that the correct application of theory necessarily 
forces the details of the situation to which it is being applied into 
the mould of the standard conditions, or assumed circumstances, when 
the theory was constructed. Granted, some details must be forced. 
Since no two situations are ever exactly alike any application of a 
theory would have to accommodate some difference of detail. What is 
important though (and I am sure Lloyd would agree with this) is the 
extent to which situations differ. If significantly, then of course 
the theory cannot be app 1i ed - at 1 eas t not in the given form. Perhaps 
when called for, the theory, or the plans and policies 
developed from 
it, could be amended. If not that, then dropped altogether. 
A behav- 
iourist token-reward system, for example, might be amended in respect 
of its reward system or eliminated entirely 
if unsuccessful. Flexi- 
bility can be maintained; indeed must be! 
Lloyd's criticism of inflexi- 
bility seems to be a rather better objection 
to unwise applications of 
theory than to applications per se. 
Now one could go on to claim that 
if all rational curriculum 
decision-making involves at least the assumption of theories, 
if not the 
construction of theory itself, then conceivably 
expertise, qua the 
rigorous and erudite investigations of 
institutional experts, is desirable. 
I would oppose this. It is not that 
I am in the least antagonistic 
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towards theoretical examination of curriculum matters; quite the 
contrary. It is, however, something to do with the class of individuals 
we are calling institutional experts which makes me think they are not 
particularly desirable decision-makers in the practical spheres of 
curriculum. 
5. Experts and Educational Decisions 
Why, then, should institutional experts not be the decision-makers? 
The reason is not that theory is redundant to curriculum decisions as 
O'Connor and Lloyd believe. Nor is it because an educational theory is 
impossible in principle or practice. Rather, despite the desirable level 
of rigour and erudition that experts bring to theory construction, in- 
stitutional experts, and I stress the adjective 'institutional', are un- 
able to satisfy the condition of adequate access to data with two con- 
sequences (a) they are not always able to ascertain the compatibility 
of contextual details to the activity and (b) they are either unable, 
or do not incline, to ensure the consistency of programme and procedure, 
and, items in each. 
The 'adequate access to data' condition is, of course, a pragmatic 
requisite of the knowledge condition. So, an inability to satisfy the 
former results in an inability to satisfy the latter. Now the particular 
difficulties that arise in regard to access must be worked out, but 
before, I would like to mention the remaining condition of competency - 
the 'abilities condition'. 
(a) The Abilities Condition of Competence 
Cognitive and affective abilities required for drawing conclusions 
and sticking to decisions even under pressure are, to be sure, attributes 
" that some adults- have in greater measure than others'. But in looking 
at large social groups (of adults) such as parents, teachers and 
insti- 
tutional experts, there appears to be no reason to suppose that the 
latter are in any way incompetent or inferior to either of the 
former. 
Indeedý insofar as the career of an educational expert entails an con- 
siderable amount of decision-making, one would 
think that such abilities 
would not only develop, but would be prerequisite 
for, the occupation 
(unlike, say, parenthood). Whether affective abilities would 
lag behind 
their cognitive counterparts for any reason would 
be a matter of pure 
conjecture. 
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(b) Knowledge and Adequate Access 
Two problems arise: the first has to do with the concept of expert 
and the second with those we label institutional experts. The first 
can be answered satisfactorily; the second cannot. 
(i) Experts and knowledge 
First, experts who make decisions, qua experts, require a theoretical 
backing, a body of knowledge from which alternatives and justifications 
can be drawn. Unfortunately, there is no full-blown educational theory 
at present, even if we assume it is possible; and in areas where some 
pieces of theory do exist, there are often competing and irreconcible 
claims. Freudians and behaviourists, for example, can both account for 
a lack of success in teaching straight forward propositions. However, 
their accounts are not only at odds, but as irreconcilably so as is the 
political anarchist with the communist. 
The problem is, of course., not with the notion that an expert is 
someone with superior knowledge, but with agreement on what counts as 
'superior knowledge' . The Freudian may agree that the behaviourist is 
an expert 'but within the wrong school of thought! '. Given this sec- 
tarian feuding, one might feel that 'experts-as-curriculum-decision- 
makers' presumes a level of agreement which is highly unlikely. To 
make things worse, if all manner of curriculum decisions are to be 
given up to bodies of experts; and if what is to be decided has to be 
an amalgam of interdisciplinary opinion, e. g. as amoung the psycholo- 
gists, sociologists and philosophers; then values, conceptual schemes 
and theoretical orientations may not be shared -a situation which belies 
harmonious decision-making further still. 
Can this objection be answered? In part it depicts a scenario at 
odds with the ideal in three ways: (a) there is no complete theory 
(b) we do not know which theory is correct where we do have theories 
(c) considerable disharmony among various contributing fields is pre- 
sumed. This is, perhaps, overly pessimistic. In some parts of the 
world, most notably those where Marxism is strongest, the circumstances 
for expert decision-making are better on all three counts - though this 
is not necessarily desirable from the point of view of those who 
decry 
the theory (Marxism). The point is, powerful 
(though admittedly not all- 
pervasive) theories exist, where consensus about 
their truth, and co- 
operation from related disciplines is, or seems 
to be, apparent to some 
extent. So, a more optimistic picture 
for the possibility of expert 
decision-making is concei-vable. 
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Added to this must be the observation that if theories provide the 
epistemic backing for decision-making, and their paucity rules out 
experts, then does it not also rule out all other decision-makers? Even 
if it deflates the case for experts, and it surely does to some degree, 
we are not, however, forced to suppose that it sinks them. Erudite, 
though ecclect i c, competencies can often promote decision-making through 
increasing the range of alternatives to be considered. Justifications 
may be far more difficult, but compromise is not impossible. In sum, 
if sectarian feuding is to count as a devastating objection to experts, 
it must with other decision-makers as well. 
(i i) Experts: centrality and standardization 
Second, and more compelling, is the argument that the social group who 
aspires to control curriculum, who we have labelled institutional ex- 
perts, are unsatisfactory, not because they are experts as such but 
because of certain defining empirical characteristics. 
To start, a reminder of some conceptual apparatus developed earlier. 
First, a practical decision is a choice among alternatives based on a 
justifying principle. And, a full account of an alternative includes 
(a) a theoretical description of the action proposed (b) consideration 
of the usual consequences of implementing such a proposal (c) projection 
of the consequences likely to occur in the particular case at hand. 
(b) and (c) are called pragmatic outcomes. Second, curriculum decisions 
either take place within activities or are about the activities them- 
selves. Every activity has a structure: it has a programme and it 
has procedures. The components within each of these structural cate- 
gories must be consistent with one another. That is, within the pro- 
gramme the principles must be consistent with the description, and 
within the procedures the various formal and informal rules must be con- 
sistent with one another. Equally, within an activity the structural 
categories, and the components within each, must be consistent. 
The 
various rules of procedure, that is, must be consistent with the 
descrip- 
tion and principle of the activity as stated 
in the programme. Clearly, 
and this is very important to note, any piecemeal 
decision-making about 
either programme or procedures in an activity must 
take into account the 
other components in order to preserve 
internal consistency. An addi- 
tional fact about activities and decisions 
is that they take place with- 
in a context -a context that has two 
dimensions - namely conceptual 
and material. The former concerns the sharing 
of concepts of partici- 
pants in a particular activity and 
the relation between those concepts 
and the concepts necessary to understand 
the activity; and the latter 
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deals with the economic, social, political, environmental, etc. condi- 
tions in which a particular activity takes place, and those in relation 
to the condition which are necessary for such activities. Now there 
are two important points to note. First, when we say that certain con- 
ceptual and material conditions must prevail for an activity to take 
place we mean that those conditions must be compatible with the occur- 
rence of such an activity. Second, elements of context, both concep- 
tual and material, and be different in varying locations and in any 
location it can shift over time. We have referred to these as concep- 
tual plurality and conceptual dynarri_ism, respectively. The obvious 
point about decision-making here is that whenever there is to be a 
change or amendment made to an activity or whenever there is a question 
about whether or not the activity should take place on a given occasion 
or in a given place, the question of contextual compatibility will be 
central. 
Bearing these points in mind, the problem I have with expert 
decision-making is that I doubt their ability to maintain internal con- 
sistency when making piecemeal decisions about and within activities of 
education, and I doubt their ability to discern compatibility between 
context and activity. Their failure, therefore, will be to maintain 
the unity of the macro activity. This I want to attribute to an in- 
ability to satisfy one of the conditions of competence, namely 'access 
to data'. And I think they will not satisfy this because of the two 
features I described sometime ago as being characteristic of institu- 
tional expertsýnamely, the tendencies to centralize decision-making and 
to standardize plans. 
Centralization of decision-making may have many advantages, such 
as gathering together highly competent individuals who can be provided 
with the stimulus, time, and research facilities to look more deeply 
into school problems than would otherwise be possible. But if adequate 
consideration of alternatives is dependent upon anticipated consequences, 
both standard and particular outcomes, one wonders just how well the 
centralized decision-maker will fare in gleaning contextual details. 
Probable consequences can be predicted to some extent in the light of 
generalizations from the social sciences and upon past experience with 
similar situations. But this really only provides information about 
usual or standard consequences, and this is often not enough. 
There 
must be some way of ascertaining the likely outcomes 
in the particular 
case at hand. This of course rests upon 
familiarity with the concep- 
tual and material contexts. Simple physical 
detachment can make this 
difficult even when contexts are homogeneous and stable. But in recent 
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years with the encouragement given to social, ethnic and religious 
minorities, changing material conditions from redistribution of wealth, 
population movements and decline, and increases in the quality and 
quantity of teachers and general educational resources, and the addi- 
tional fact that education is now available to so much wider a clientele 
than in past generations, details of local contexts seem more impor- 
tant to decision-making and yet less available to the centralized 
decision-maker, now than ever before. In Britain one need only con- 
sider the effects of the enormous immigrations from Commonwealth coun- 
tries during the 1960's on the social complexion of cities like Man- 
chester to see part of the point. In a country as inordinately diverse 
as Canada the matter is compounded many-fold. To put it more succinctly, 
ours is a generation of shift and plurality in both conceptual and 
material context. These are details often requiring first-hand obser- 
vation. So each step that the centralized education expert takes 
away from direct view of the local context, the less likely he is to 
gather the information necessary to assessing the consequences of 
alternatives and hence to making competent decisions. This situation 
worsens as the expert becomes increasingly centralized and as the two 
contexts become more and more diverse. 
Now, of course one must be fair here to educational theory. Even 
from a central vantage point a good deal can be said about, for example, 
human learning, which deals with the logical structure of learning and 
hence does not depend upon local contingencies. Much of the work of 
Piaget, Kohlberg, Bruner and, perhaps, Skinner, would seem to fall 
within this category. But insofar as a complete educational theory must 
guide practice there are difficulties even with this. For even if we 
agree that, say, children must pass through an invariant sequence of 
psychological stages to reach maturity, there is still the matter of 
how to bring this about which does depend upon other factors such as 
motivation, available stimuli, and so on, which are contingent upon 
conceptual and material contexts. 
The problem of centrality, it should now be clear, is that whatever 
is decided about an activity - whatever changes are made to its structure 
or whatever is to happen within the existent structure - the context 
must be compatible. However, it is not at all obvious that the institu- 
tional expert, in virtue of being centralized, will be able to determine 
with accuracy, the details of context. Hence compatibility cannot be 
assured. 
With standardization the problem is not the inability to gain 
access to contextual data, for by this stage in decision-making, 
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assumptions about standard conditions, or conjectures about local 
variations, have already been made. The difficulty is now that practi- 
cal decisions, such as those to do with compulsory curricula, prescribed 
lesson content, standard textbooks and appropriate teaching methods, 
will be rigid and fixed. 
30 In consequence, if there is on the one 
hand, significant contextual plurality (either conceptual or material) 
among the different schools to which these standardized policies apply, 
then even with flexible applications, they may be inadequate. Equally, 
if over time contexts shift, there is the same result. 
And, on the other hand, if the decision is intended as a change to 
the structure, that is the programme or procedures of the macro activ- 
ity or any of the micro activities, an even worse situation arises. For 
there is not simply one single type of schooling (i. e. macro activity) 
with a standard set of micro activities comprising it. There are many 
types of schooling, or versions of a single type. Consequently, if 
the decision-maker treats all schools as if they have the same structure 
and makes a uniform change, there is no guarantee that such a change 
will be consistent with the structure of any of the macro activities 
other than those used as a model by the decision-maker. For example, if 
the decision-maker insisted that all schools should adopt a course in 
sex-education there may well be schools against whose principles this 
runs. In such cases, this standardized decision would bring an element 
of internal inconsistency to the school's programme. 
in short, standardized policy decisions are applicable only to a 
roughly homogeneous population. So if it is true that institutional 
experts usually standardize policies and other decisions, and if it is 
true that there is not contextual homogeneity, it is doubtful that in- 
stitutional experts should control the curriculum. 
6. Conclusion 
Combined, I think cent ra 1i zat i on and standardization badly wound 
the case for institutional experts. The medical analogy here does not 
30Perhaps this is true, not because details of local context are 
unavailable, but because 'policy' making often has a political element, 
which forces changes for non educational reasons, sometimes resulting in 
standardizations that were not originally intended. By that I mean 
policies often must be approved and ratified by various administrative 
and representative bodies. Unlike the creation of a theory and extrap- 
olation of practical offshoots, policies of certain kinds must be 
marketed. A government research body, for instance, must make 
it accept- 
ab. le to the government minister who in turn has party politics to con- 
sider, not to mention pressures from constituents and supporters who 
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speak of the victim's death because that would overstate matters .In 
extremely homogeneous macro activity contexts, where all relevant cir- 
cumstances were, traditionally, utterly predictable, neither centraliza- 
tion nor standardization nor the combination would stand against insti- 
tutional experts. Situations of this sort are very rare though. In 
Canada and the United States, cultural, ethnic, religious and political 
diversity is considered highly desirable - hence to be promoted, and to 
a large extent through education. Even in Britain (and elsewhere in 
Europe) heterogeneous school populations have existed in the past. 
The class structure saw to that. Nowadays, the Canadian analogy 'cul- 
tural mosaic' is coming to apply in Britain in consequence of an enormous 
influx of Commonwealth immigrants having vastly different cultural back- 
grounds. So, while not bullet-proof, the central ization-standardization 
objection is reasonably tenacious. 
But who does it hold against? Institutional experts are by defini- 
tion those who (a) have superior knowledge and understanding in relevant 
fields (b) are centralized (c) standardized. All experts in education, 
one might retort, do not meet these conditions. An individual classroom 
teacher might well fulfill (a) ; and not (b) or (c). The same goes for 
remedial specialists, psycho-analysts, and others. Indeed, a body of 
academics, civil servants and ex-teachers could be formed (such as a 
revised Schools Council) which could make investigations of local situa- 
tions with an eye toward macro activity decision-making which may or may 
not be standardized, depending upon judgments about contextual homo- 
geneity. Condition (a), but not (b) or (c), would be satisfied. 
The first point to make is that my objection to experts has been 
based on (b) and (c), and that (a) is unquestionably desirable. The 
alternative experts to those in institutions escape the criticisms. In- 
deed, they should. 
Second, ought they, then, to control curriculum? For the most part 
they have not shown any inclination to do so. Reading specialists and 
child analysts usually endeavour to diagnose and remediate or treat 
problems or illness within individuals or small groups; not 
take on 
macro, or even most day-to-day micro, activity 
decisions. As to the 
other option, independent bodies such as the 
Schools Council has not 
been a prominent contender for control of curriculum. 
Such a group, 
though, has interesting possibilities. Ifa 
large portion of the member- 
ship were teachers, not just former teachers, and 
it endeavoured to 
might include book or_ curriculum materials publishers. 
The result can 
sometimes be a very much 
different policy than was submitted. 
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keep in contact with regions and schools not directly represented, a 
happy combination of knowledge and experience might be reached, and 
curriculum control a reasonable consideration. It has a way to go yet, 
though. (And, sadly, there is nothing remotely like this in Canada. 
Centrally determined curricula are made in each province by a handful 
of 'curriculum specialists' who rarely have any contact with the ethni- 
cally diverse schools which will have to implement their decisions). 
Perhaps we should end on a prudential note by recalling that the 
conditions of decision-making competence merely suggest who might be 
competent. We are not, as it were, logically compelled to support any 
one of the candidates, or indeed, reject any of them. And since in 
different locations and times, the individuals comprising the alterna- 
tive decision-making groups (i. e. students, parents, experts, etc. ) are 
different, so may be their epistemic credentials, hence competence. A 
clear preference now may be otherwise later, and vice versa. Equally 
a clear preference in one location may not be so in another. It is im- 
portant, therefore, that we never lose sight of the competence conditions 
and be willing to shift allegiance if need be. 
Chapter IX 
PARTICIPATION 
1. Introduction 
If it is political man's natural inclination to want a say in 
decisions that affect his life, then it is hardly surprising that he 
should want to take part in curriculum decision-making. Therefore, it 
remains for us to examine a local form of involvement in which students 
and, more importantly their parents and other members of the local 
community, that is to say residents of the geographic area serviced by 
the school or schools within which the questions of decision-making have 
arisen, seek to engage themselves along with the school staff and its 
head in determination of curriculum. For students and parents can 
surely see an important connection between curriculum and individualistic 
interests such as the formation of one's 'world view', coming to under- 
stand the academic disciplines and preparations for a career and perhaps 
leisure as well. The local community, too, has interests. 
1 
Its com- 
mercial existence depends upon having residents whose skills are appro- 
priate to local needs, e. g. factory workers and managerial personnel in 
an industrial region and agricultural workers and planners in rural 
areas. Equally, local cultural identity, whether it be ethnic, linguis- 
tic, religious or something else, is of concern. Both can be directly 
and profoundly affected by school curriculum: math and science more 
obviously prepare commercial people than Latin and Greek, and local 
history and teaching in a native language can help sustain a community's 
identity whereas their absence might let it fade. In consequence, 
participation, sharing, in curriculum decisions by students and parents 
and members of the local community is thought to be important. 
I 
Indeed, 'community schooling' is predicated on the notion that 
communities have identifiable needs and that schools can 
in various ways 
satisfy those needs. Generally speaking, such schools emphasise 
teaching 
about their in geographical community - 
its institutions, people and 
particular problems, wants and needs. 
And, attempts are made to avail 
the resources of the school - classrooms, sports 
facilities, library, 
etc. - to public use. In addition, a great many of 
these schools have 
adopted plans for shared decision-making 
between school and community. 
The procedural arrangements and scope of 
decisions vary. (Shared 
decision-making in community schools is, perhaps more widespread 
in 
North America than in Europe, since, in the case of the 
former, it is 
very much a matter of tradition that 
the community, through elected 
school board officials who 
formally govern all school decision-making 
and parent-teacher associations which are 
entirely informal and without 
15P 
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Entitlement to participation is sometimes claimed as a moral or 
political right. But very often the justification is more pragmatic. 
Two popular lines of argument are that (a) beneficial consequences for 
both students and the community as a whole result from the very activity 
of participating in decision-making, and (b) more competent decision- 
making will result from some form of participatory arrangement involving 
the community et al than without them. 
3 
We will examine both lines of 
argument and show that neither can satisfactorily justify participation. 
First the meaning and form of participation will be examined. Then, 
second, the justifications will be stated; and, third, criticised. 
2. Meaning and Form of Participation 
Participation is a vague term. It is, quoting the Random House 
Dictionary, 'to take or have a part, as with others'. On its own, 
this is not very helpful. If one thinks of curriculum decision-making 
there are numerous ways in which a part could be taken: different parts 
and different ways of taking part. Suppose we agree that all parents 
who have children in a particular school and all members. of the local 
community ought to have a say in deciding the curriculum. How, first, 
is the say to be manifest? Are parents and community members to be 
invited to the school to join in a general meeting in which the issues 
are to be hammered out, thereby having a direct say? Or, is there to 
be representation of parents and community on a committee which is in 
charge, something which is common in community schools (particularly 
in North America). Second, is this say to be a voice in the final out- 
come, such as a vote on a policy which if carried will be implemented, 
legal power, should take part in running schools. ) 
Although an enormous literature on community schooling has grown 
up in recent years, most of it not very erudite. Two useful exposes are 
Cyril Poster, School and Community (London: Macmi lli an, 1971) and 
The School and the Community, presentations made to an international 
conference of the Centre for Educational Research and Innovation, for 
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1975. 
2See, for instance, Graham Bond, Parent-Teacher Partnership (London: 
Evans Brothers, 1973) ; Don Davies, ed. , Schools Where Parents Make a 
Difference (Boston: Institute for Responsive Education, 1976); Charlotte 
Ryan, The Open Partnership (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1976) ; Philip and 
Susan Jones, Parents, Unite! (Wyden, 1976); Martin Buskin, Parent Power 
(New York: Walker, 1975); and R. I. Berridge, The Community Education 
Handbook (Midland, Michigan: Pendell, 1973). 
3See D. Bridges 'What's the Use of Meetings?; Proceedings of the 
Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain, Vol. IX, July 1975, 
pp. 7-25. 
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or is it something secondary like a solicited opinion or commissioned 
report which will be taken into account when the actual decision is 
made by someone else, as for example when a school head asks teachers 
or parents for their reactions to the possibility of introducing a 
sex-education course or when the head asks teachers and parents to form 
a committee which will look into and report on the new courses to be 
added to the curriculum? To put it briefly, is it an actual decision- 
making role or a consulting role? If the latter, is consultation to be 
mandatory, that is, members of the community et al must be consulted; 
or is it to be discretionary, which means that the decision-maker may 
or may not ask for opinions, reports, etc., as he chooses? Third, on 
what is one to have a say: all curriculum decisions, macro activity 
decisions, micro activity decisions, some combination of each or some part 
of one or the other? 
Another sort of problem encountered in talk about participation is 
that the word is rather cavalierly interchanged with 'collective', 
'democratic' and 'group' decision-making. Collective decision-making 
is, I think, the broader term; and participation, i e. having a say, 
is what collective decision-making enables individuals to do. Collec- 
tive decision-making is usually contrasted with individual decision- 
making, and by coming to decisions collectively (rather than only one 
person deciding) it is possible for other individuals (or their repre- 
sentatives) to participate or have a say in the making of those decisions. 
Now given that participation can take many procedural forms, such 
as having a say in the final decision and consultation, and many versions 
of each, it would seem quite natural to ask of any of those forms if it 
is democratic. That a form of participation is said to be democratic, 
may be taken as a description or perhaps justification for it; for 
presumably one could be involved in the making of a decision and have 
one's views disregarded or ballot counted as less than those of others, 
and still be regarded as participating in decision-making, though 
perhaps not democratically. Finally, one could participate in the 
making of a decision, and democratically so, without being in a group. 
One participates in the making of a decision if one is consulted, as 
when a parent's opinion is solicited by the head, or when one casts 
a ballot where one has had no prior contact with others in connection 
with the issues, as a hermit could do at election time; yet in neither 
case has a group come together to deliberate the issues and then 
decide. 
For group decision-making usually refers to a physical assemblage 
(though 
one could imagine bizarre arrangements where persons are not physically 
together, yet are in a group, such as a multi-telephone 
hook-up) which 
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discusses matters - has a meeting. 
Our concern is with collective decision-making, hence participa- 
tion. Democratic and group decision-making are set aside because quite 
reasonable attempts are sometimes made to justify participation on the 
basis of both beneficial consequences and improved decision-making 
competence whether or not that participation is seen to be democratic 
or carried out in groups. It could, for example, be argued that if 
members of the (e. g. business) community were consulted by the schools, 
or had a limited representation on curriculum committees, they would be 
able to make a valuable contribution, though their participation may 
be neither fully democratic (e. g. in terms of representation or weight 
given to opinions) nor in groups. 
A further and very important point is that attempts to justify 
participation are nonsense unless some specification is given of the 
sort of decisions to be made and who are to be the participants. As 
a matter of logic, there is not simply participation, some entity adrift 
in the universe, there is participation person or persons, and in 
something. Our concern of course is with community members, parents 
and so on and in curriculum decision-making. But notice, on the matter 
of justification, that what would make a plausible case for participa- 
tion by a community of intelligent and educated people might not suffice 
for counterparts with fewer epistemic credentials. Equally, objects- 
of-decision differ in content, so what must be known to decide about one 
may differ from another (cf. textbook selections versus the colour of 
school uniforms) . 
3. Justifications for Participation 
We face two problems in producing justifications for participation. 
First, we must make what some regard as the rather dubious assumption 
that individuals will be motivated to participate if entitled. Many 
industrial and educational participation schemes have not had the desired 
effects because of the indifference of participants, failure to come to 
meetings, etc. We will not, however, pursue this further since it is 
conceivable that in future this could change - perhaps if participation 
was greatly encouraged by industry and the schools. Second, it is not 
at all clear that any single line of argument would necessarily suffice 
for different forms of participation - i. e. support for mandatory consulta- 
tion may not be support for full participation. We will deal with this 
problem as we go along. 
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(a) Procedural Benefits 
Some people are convinced that the very act of participating in 
school decisions has consequences that are beneficial to the partici- 
pants . The point is not that the decisions made will be in any way 
more competent, but, rather, that engaging in the decision-making pro- 
cedure is advantageous. One finds, particularly in the popular liter- 
ature, a great many alleged procedural benefits, as I will call them; 
but we will deal with only a representative three. 
First itis sometimes alleged that the ethos of the school - the 
attitude toward the school staff, to schooling and to learning on the 
part of all members of the educational community including teachers and 
students - would be greatly improved, or maintained at a high level, if 
everyone had a share in decision-making. Students, for example, might 
be more motivated to learn if they had some say in the content of 
courses or the way they are taught. They might, for instance, be 
consulted on their preference of novels to be read in literature class 
or have a vote on the destination of class field trips in history or a 
say in whether the social studies class is to be mostly formal lectures 
or individualized self-study projects. The teaching staff might feel 
rather more like professionals than hired help if they were invited to 
take part in curriculum policy making, rather than have it determined 
by, in many British schools, the head or in North American schools by 
the schoolboard or government. And parents might feel less like dis- 
regarded and ineffectual outsiders and hence less hostile toward the 
school, if they were invited to participate. Indeed, Charlotte Ryan 
found, on visits to numerous community schools in the American North- 
east where parents were involved in the running of the school, that the 
parents felt less animosity toward the school after participation had 
begun. 
4 
The second procedural benefit often claimed is that a child's 
moral, political and intellectual development would be enhanced by 
practice in determining his or her own curriculum as well as managing 
student government affairs. Jasper Ungoed-Thomas maintains that through 
democratic participation children learn about democratic institutions 
and how to function within them. Moral education is promoted as well 
as political because in following democratic procedures children 
acquire virtues such as respect for others, independence of mind and 
4The Open Partnership, op. cit., p. 17. 
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responsibility to the community. 
5 Scrimshaw says intellectual disposi- 
tions such as confidence are developed; 
6 
and Bridges indicates the 
likelihood of intellectual development resulting from having 
to contemplate alternative points of view; to 
subject hypotheses, or have hypotheses subjected 
to criticism; to take into account adverse and 
often conflicting evidence and arguments, to 
defend and justify points of principle; to take 
the interests of others into account - and all 
this under the further discipline, which purely 
academic deliberation commonly escapes, of 
having to produce some kind of decision and to 
accept a share of the responsibility for its 
consequences .7 
This line of argument could apply to adults as well. Through partici- 
pation in school decision-making why could not parents come to under- 
stand democratic procedures more fully, attend more to the interests of 
others and sharpen their abilities to deliberate and debate? The 
Taylor Commission which strongly recommended participation, suggested 
that parental apathy and undemonstrated competence in educational 
decision-making was largely due to insufficient opportunity to practice. 
Here would be the opportunity to practice. 
Third, active decision-making involvement in schools by community 
members could possibly militate against 'anomie' and 'alienation' - 
lack of direction and feeling of powerlessness. The argument is that 
modern society has lost its sense of 'community'. Value of the family, 
sharing, concern for others, friendship, and so on have been eroded by 
the growth of mass society, of huge governmental and industrial -bureauc- 
racies. These highly impersonal edifices have not only washed away 
what were formerly thought to be absolute social values, leaving indivi- 
duals ethically adrift, but they have come to dominate economic and 
political life to the extent that individuals no longer feel in control. 
The valueless drifting feeling is often called anomie and the power- 
lessness, alienation. They are diametric opposites: the former, a 
lack of governance by social and moral rules; the latter, an inescapable 
governance of political, economic and social life. Robert Ashcroft has 
suggested that active participation in schooling decisions by parents, 
50ur School (London: Longman, 1972), Chapter two. 
6' 
Should Schools be Participant Democracies? ' in D. Bridges and 
P. Scrimshaw ed., Values and Authority in Schools 
(London: Hodder and 
Stroughton, 1975). 
70p. 
cit., p. 17. 
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indeed all segments of the community, might contribute significantly 
to the reawakening of community mindedness, that is, to the anchoring 
of social values, and to the restored feeling of individuals' powers 
of self direction. 
8 
For, in deciding about schooling, one is not only 
active in the decision-making process per se, but is making decisions 
(in the case of macro decisions) which may have a bearing on the future 
of the community and perhaps even society as a whole. 
There could, of course, be numerous other additions to this list, 
but many of them, insofar as they describe incidental and contingent 
benefits to participation in virtue of engagement in decision-making 
procedures, would be open to the same sort of cri ticism- I wi 11 level 
at those already stated. So, we wi 11 cons i der, now, some items in the 
second line of argument. These, unlike the first, have as their ma in 
contention the view that collective decision-making is 1 ikely to result 
in more competently made decisions than would be the case otherwise. 
(b) Improved Decision-Making 
David Bridges has presented four justifications for participation. 
One of them was included under the heading 'educational benefits' and 
was discussed in the preceding section. Bridges is concerned to defend 
collective decision-making against a single person deciding, and he 
makes specific reference to students and teachers being involved in 
policy matters which might well be handled by the head. It is unclear 
whether he intends participation to be limited to those he specifies 
and again unclear whether he has in mind a specific range of decisions 
for them. Since there does not seem to be any emphasis on a restriction 
of eligible decision-makers or permissible range of decisions we will 
treat his position as applicable to community members and parents as 
well, and to both macro and micro decision-making. 
There are, however, some limitations of scope. It is not collec- 
tive decision-making in all forms that he is supporting but rather group 
decision-making, and in which there is discussion of the issues. 
9 In 
addition, he wants to stipulate that the sort of 
'discussions' that he 
is concerned with are only those which meet certain normative conditions 
such as those in which there is willingness on the part of all parties 
8'School 
as a Base for Community Development', School and Community, 
op. cit., pp. 25-6,29-30. 
90p. 
cit., p. 8. 
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to learn from the exchange of ideas and to modify, even change, their 
points of view. The intention in giving this normative account is to 
separate 'discussions' from other forms of group talk such as command, 
rhetoric, brow-beating, and so on. 
10 
Although Bridges is primarily concerned to justify such things as 
committee meetings., to show them more advantageous than simply leaving 
matters to the head, at least the first two of the arguments to be 
presented, as well as 'educational benefits' which has already been 
examined, have (limited) application more broadly, as will become evi- 
dent, to forms of participation where there is at least some exchange 
or transmission of information. Indeed Bridges seems to be aware of 
the broader scope in the latter sections of his paper where he consid- 
ers literary discussion -a non-group form of participation.. One 
obvious area of applicability, if we consider these arguments (the 
first two anyway) as having broader scope, is that consultation, a non- 
group form of participation, will be at least partly covered. We turn 
now to the arguments. 
(i) Accumulated input 
Bridges maintains, in the spirit of Aristotle 
11 
and Mill, 
12 
the 
view that 'the group is likely collectively to have access to more in- 
formation, ideas and points of view or policies than any one member of 
13 
the group has individually. ' Even dull or uninformed members may at 
sometime have something to add, and simply in virtue of their meagre 
potential for contributions the group as a whole is that much enriched. 
Evidently Paul Feyerabend would agree. He remarks: 'There is no idea, 
however ancient and absurd, that is not capable of improving our know- 
ledge'. 14 Presumably therefore, if a school were deciding whether or 
not to implement a cafeteria curriculum for its more senior students, 
members of, say, the business community might be able to contribute 
significantly, despite perhaps weak pedagogical knowledge, by suggesting 
problems to which this manner of curriculum selection might give rise 
from the point of view of the commercial world if students fail to take 
courses in, for example, mathematics. 
100p. 
cit., pp. 9-10. 
11 Politics (Book III; Chapter XI, paragraph 14). 
12'On Liberty `, '(1859) , Utilitarianism 
(London: Fontana, 1962), p. 14A. 
130P. 
cit. , p. 11. 
14Aga i nst Method (London: NLB, 1975) , p. 
17. 
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Now what is being argued is not that the group necessarily has 
greater resources than those of any one individual. 
l5 
For it may be 
that in fact one member of the group knows what the others know, and 
more. Even in a question of determining the interests (i. e. needs, 
and/or wants) of group members, where they as individuals might be 
said to know better than any other single individual , it would be 
possible, at least in principle, for that one member to determine, per- 
haps through prior con-. sultation, the interests of the others. Nor is 
he arguing that if the group had greater resources than its individuals 
it could exploit them. 
16 
Perhaps the group would not be temperamentally 
suited, or be unable to agree on a procedure for arriving at decisions 
(e. g. voting vs. consensus). Rather, his view is that the collectivity 
is likely to be more richly endowed epistemically than any of its parts - 
contingent, of course, upon certain facts about those involved. 
(ii) The hypothesis refutation theory 
Leaning heavily on Karl Popper's notions of conjecture and refutation, 
17 
Bridges explains that at some stage in decision-making it is necessary 
to have hypotheses suggested (conjecture) , and then subjected to attacks 
(refutation) from the group - the idea being to see how the hypotheses 
hold up under criticism. 
18 
Bridges grants that the conjecture may be 
more in the province of expert opinion - something brought to the group 
for Scrutiny - but that, unquestionably, refutation is an essential part 
of decision-making, and a part that can be played by even the most in- 
tellectually humble. For an observation, even made unwittingly, can 
be sufficient to cast doubt on a theory or proposal. 
So, a situation could be envisioned in which, upon expert advice, 
consideration is being given to different series of reading texts. The 
preferred series, it is maintained by the many, is unavailable because 
it is out of print. It takes only one, if otherwise uninformed, individ- 
ual to have seen it currently available in the window display of a 
local distributor to refute the popular conception and contribute signi- 
ficantly to the acquistion of the preferred series. 
150 
p. cit., p. 1 1. 
16 [bid. 
17See Conjectures and Refutations: the growth of scientific know- 
1e (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962Y. 
18 
P. cit., pp. 12-13. 
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(iii) The accommodation consensus model 
Here Bridges wants to show that discussion can be an extremely efficient 
means of getting to the truth or of coming to agreement. His point, 
following Michael Polanyi19 is that unfettered discussions permit a 
rapid interchange of information and opinion through pronouncements, 
quick rebuttals, inserted opinions, alternatives, amendments, and so on 
- all done informally as the discussion proceeds. 
20 
This almost in- 
stantaneous accommodation of one person's views by the others and use 
of them as a jumping-off point for restatement of the position, etc. 
can be likened to the mutual adjustment of the hundreds of cars pouring 
in and out of the Marble Arch roundabout. Each driver finds a path 
through the roundabout by accommodating himself to the like manoeuvres 
of the other drivers - braking, accelerating, edging to the right, then 
left - thereby taking advantage of every opportunity to hasten progress. 
The point here is that through the independent functioning of hundreds 
of drivers simultaneously, hour after hour and day after day, an in- 
finite number of efficient patterns emerge - more patterns at any rate 
than could be plotted by a traffic designer - in consequence of which 
one can safely say that collective decision-making is, in terms of 
efficiency, superior to a single individual making decisions, 
In order to bolster this view, Bridges recounts Polanyi's analogy 
of several people making a jig-saw puzzle: each individual watches the 
overall progress and waits for just the right moment to make his contri- 
bution, so as to further the progress without getting in anyone's way. 
Polanyi uses this analogy to argue against centralized decision-making 
in science, and his point there as, Bridges' is, here, is that to cen- 
tralize would cause the operations of those being decided about to slow 
down or stop until such time as the centralized decision-maker 
finished 
deliberating about and directing one person's operation and moved on to 
the next. To say it once again, the point is one of efficiency: the 
many can do more! 
The parallel is, of course, with discussion, just as the traffic 
roundabout and puzzle-making function more efficiently without strict 
and external (unitary) control, Bridges claims 
that discussions will 
function with equivalent efficiency if they are not tightly reined 
by 
(the unitary control of) a chairman who wants 
to proceed step-by-step 
according to his own conception of 
the best means to solve the problem 
19See The Logic of Liberty (London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1951). 
20Op. cit. , pp. 
13-16. 
16A 
at hand. In other words, truth or agreement can be efficiently and 
profitably pursued by the mutual accommodation of individuals working 
together, contingent upon, and this is important, the willingness of 
those participating to be responsive to the others - to give them 
attention when deserved - and upon the number of participants and 
dissidents being conducive to such an exercise. 
4. Criticisms of the Proposed Justifications 
We turn now to an examination of both lines of argument. Neither, 
I will suggest, provides very solid backing for the claim that curric- 
ulum decisions ought to be determined by some form of participation. 
(a) Procedural Benefits 
The first line of argument upheld the view that simply by engaging 
in the procedures of participation individuals stood to gain education- 
ally (i. e. politically, intellectually and morally) ; the school ethos 
could improve; and members of the community might come to feel less 
the anguishes of anomie and alienation. 
This is a causal argument: participation in collective decision- 
making procedures causes changes in school ethos, education and anomie- 
alienation. But the causal relation holds only if certain contingent 
conditions of circumstance and individual human response are satisfied. 
The circumstances, the procedures, must not be replete with hostility, 
mendacity, power mongerinq, manipulation, apathy, indifference and patron- 
age , for these would not be conducive to bringing about the des i red 
results - i. e. the procedural benefits. (Remember, participation does 
not logically imply democratic procedures or principles). Equally, 
human responses to stimuli - resulting from engagement in the decision- 
making procedures -- are dependent upon psychological readiness. Ethos 
and anomie-alienation will not be abated if participants are mistrust- 
ful, intimidated and apathetic, and educational benefits will not result 
if students (or whoever) have no concept of procedural rules, etc., 
fail to understand the purpose or value of the decisions, are afraid to 
speak out in group (e. g. debate), and so on. Since these contingencies 
cannot be guaranteed in every instance of participatory 
decision-making, 
this line of argument does not necessarily justify participation. 
As an example, take the case of a school that is to have decisions 
about course offerings 
(e. g. Is history to be taught? If so, which 
histories? ) to be determined by a school council on which there are 
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representatives of the teaching staff, students, parents and members 
of the community - as is the case in many community schools. Suppose 
there is a bitter division between those who strongly believe that 
much of the history taught in the school should be local history and 
not world history, and those who feel that such parochial nonsense will 
have disastrous effects on the students' understanding of! world 
politics, etc., and a further division between both of these groups and 
others who feel that history, regardless of content, ought to be op- 
tional. Now it does not seem unreasonable in the least to suppose 
further that all parties may not only fail to agree, but as well may 
in the course of meetings (possibly several), generate an atmosphere in 
the school community of hostility, closed mindedness and disinclination 
to continue with collective decision-making. In such an environment it 
would hardly be surprising if the school ethos deteriorated, the lessons 
of democracy were learned by no one and feelings of alienation and 
anomie were not abated. For in situations like this, the circumstances 
are not really conducive to producing the procedural benefits mentioned; 
and participants, if they are to benefit, must be, among other things, 
sufficiently mature and stable psychologically to ward off threatening 
personal attacks. As well, participants must see this as an exercise 
in which flexibility, logical argument, and so forth are essentials. 
Otherwise they will be personally incapable of deriving the benefits. 
Now, I would not for a moment suggest that such benefits are impossible 
consequences of participation, only that they are not necessary - i. e. 
are contingent upon circumstances and personalities. 
This line of objection however, is open to the complaint that it 
portrays collective decision-making as occasioned"by ill-will and dis- 
harmony; that if existent participatory arrangements were surveyed, 
workable arrangements would be seen to prevail. Hence, if it is 
usually the case that participation yields procedural benefits, then 
participation is (usually) justified. 
There are two points to be made. First, to justify participation 
on the basis of a causal relation that usually holds is, albeit weaker 
than a necessary relation, nevertheless prima facie satisfactory. 
Jus- 
tifications can be inductive as well as deductive. But with 
inductive 
justifications in this case a problem arises. How could we develop a 
reliable empirical test for ethos, alienation and anomie? 
On the one 
hand, we would have to rely on reports 
from members of the community 
and others. What observed 
behaviours would indicate incontrovertibly 
an improved ethos 
(and not something else)? On the other hand, how 
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could we be sure that part i cipat ion and nothing else was the cause of 
the benefits? For instance, school ethos (along with a general feeling 
of well-being) might improve to some degree if, in an economically de- 
pressed urban area, a large new and profitable industry began, which 
alleviated unemployment and family tensions that often accompany poverty. 
In consequence of this difficulty I would suggest that a justification 
along these lines would be rather flimsy. 
The second point is by far the more important. Even if acceptable 
empirical tests for procedural benefits could be created; and even if 
they showed that wherever some form of participation in curriculum 
decisions was instituted the procedural benefits did indeed result with 
impressive frequency, one could still ask whether these benefits pro- 
vided an adequate justification for participation. I would answer no: 
first because there is no guarantee that the actual curriculum decisions 
thus made would be competent, and that the i 11-consequences of incom- 
petently made curriculum decisions could well outweigh the benefits of 
participation; and second, an attendant point, because the benefits of 
participation could reasonably be derived in other ways, without thereby 
risking the undesirable outcomes of poor curriculum decisions. 
The reason why procedural benefits are given short shrift in the 
company of curriculum consequences is that the former are secondary to 
the purpose of schooling, whereas the latter are central. For regardless 
of which view of schooling one takes, it must surely have at its core a 
serious concern for the transmission of knowledge and understanding 
(our preoccupation with curriculum would be pointless otherwise) . 
Admittedly, school ethos and anomie-alienation are important to the 
pract i cal poss ibi1i ty of schooling; but unless the malfeasance of both 
is such that schooling is prevented on their account, and clearly we 
have not been portraying them as such, then secondary they remain. 
'Educational benefits', i. e. political, moral and intellectual, as we 
discussed them are indeed a part of the knowledge and understanding to 
be acquired; but there is much more besides that could be 
lost if par- 
ticipatory decision-making is incompetent. Would curriculum decisions 
suffer by allowing participation? I suggest they would; 
but will defer 
a demonstration of this to the next section, since 
in it we are intend- 
ing to consider claims about improved competence resulting 
from partici- 
pation. 
There is yet a further point to be added in support of this conclu- 
sion which I mentioned earlier, namely 
that the benefits could well be 
derived anyway, without risking the costs of participation. 
This being 
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so, the risks would hardly be warranted; and in this event even further 
ground is taken from under the claim that these procedural benefits will 
justify participation. This is hardly the place to set out a range 
of school activities that could bring about the benefits discussed, but 
it might be worthwhile to mention some examples. School ethos, first, 
might be improved by sincere attempts on the part of the school to 
explain policy to parents and members of the community. The usual means 
by which this is done (often half-heartedly) is an open night to which 
parents are invited; but something rather more imaginative and effec- 
tive could surely be tried. Indeed, community schools are more or less 
committed to the principles of close relations with. the community and 
hence must, in virtue of the credo, find ways of maintaining, at very 
least, a satisfactory ethos. As for the educative advantages of par- 
ticipation (i. e. political, moral and intellectual), surely such things 
as mock parliaments, debates and the like, would develop these qualities 
as well as actual participation in curriculum decision-making. Concern- 
ing anomie and alienation: as mentioned earlier, the problem is rather 
too large to deal with here; and simple suggestions would be pretentious. 
A closing word about procedural benefits as a justification for 
participation:. it should be noted that there is quite a difference be- 
tween the two main forms of participation, namely having a say in the 
final outcome and being consulted. The importance of this distinction 
is that the i 11-consequences of incompetent decision-making, vis a vis 
the quality of decisions, made, would not seem likely in the case of 
consultation, since the participants' opinions in the matter can be 
assessed by someone who is competent (assuming there is someone who is 
competent) and then be either accepted, in whole or part, or rejected. 
The objection from incompetence would thus be dropped. However, while 
I would have no further objections, on the face of it, to consultation, 
it still remains the case that the alleged procedural benefits would 
not adequately justify consultation per se, for the reasons given earlier. 
(b) Improved Decision-Making 
This line of justification was intended to establish the epistemic 
superiority of collective decision-making over 
decision-making by an 
individual (bearing in mind that the third argument 
had specific appli- 
cation to group discussions). 
Howeve r, it fails. It fails to demonstrate 
that groups will necessarily 
be more competent decision-makers than 
individuals. And, it fails to show that the collectivity of 
concern to 
us - namely, some combination of 
teachers, students, parents and members 
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of the local community as in a council where all groups are represented 
- will even likely be more competent than either an individual or a 
specified group such as educational experts or teachers. 
(i) Accumulated input 
Bridges himself points out that the accumulated input view will justify 
participation only if certain contingencies are met, namely, if it is 
not the case that one participant knows more than all of the others 
together, and if the group is not prevented from exploiting its 
resources of knowledge (e. g. because its members are temperamentally un- 
suited). But it is the necessity of these contingencies having to be met 
that gives away the force of the argument. For how could we ever be 
certain that both contingencies would be met in every possible partici- 
pation group? Plainly, we could not. 
Nevertheless, Bridges thinks that despite being an empirical argu- 
ment, it is strong. This, to my way of thinking, is entirely dependent 
upon who the decision-makers are and what they are deciding. We have 
discussed at length, in previous chapters, the severe limitations of 
the various categories of participant when deciding on their own, and 
I do not believe that their competence is sufficiently bolstered when 
they (or their representatives) are taken together. The fallacy is in 
thinking that the knowledge of a group of people accumulates like money 
in a bank (cf. his two analogies: 'contributions to the feast' and 
'treasure trove') . True, data 
(or information) accumulates; but unlike 
with money, where more of the same is definitely desirable, duplicated 
knowledge is not. Furthermore, for information to be of value it must 
be central to the object-of-decision. No such problem exists in the 
case of accumulating money. to consequence, it seems reasonable to 
suggest that, barring the vastly superior knowledge of one member, the 
group may be richer in breadth of knowledge - knowledge of both 
theoretical descriptions and pragmatic outcomes of alternatives, and 
of j us ti fi cations. But what about depth of understanding or centrality? 
Our previous invectives against laymen as curriculum decision- 
makers focussed to a large extent on the superficiality of their 
know- 
ledge - on their lack of a sophisticated understanding of the 
important 
matters, i. e. centrality, and of the 
intricacies and subtle problems to 
which they give rise, i. e. depth. 
Now the serious mistake in the 
'accumulated input' view, and the fallacy just mentioned, is to think 
that this problem can be overcome by, 
for example, adding more informa- 
tion sources to the group. That would simply add 
to the stock of data 
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and at best extend the breadth of knowledge. Nor can the problem be 
overcome by insisting that educational experts (whether they be insti- 
tutional experts or members of the teaching profession) be a part of 
the group. For groups are not competent decision-makers in virtue of 
the sum total knowledge of the group. They are competent insofar as 
they are able to come to agreements. And the fact that an expert is 
able to see the depth and cent ra 1i ty of matters is not to say that he 
can ever make others understand in order to secure agreement. For 
instance, it takes quite a high level of intelligence to comprehend 
possible relations between education and the good life, as would have 
a bearing on some macro activity decisions, or to understand some psycho- 
logical explanations of a student's readiness to read or solve mathe- 
matical problems at a certain level, as would relate to some micro activity 
decisions. Equally, the ability to understand problems, explanations, 
and so forth is dependent upon having considerable knowledge in rele- 
vant areas; and it is not at all obvious that laymen will possess this. 
The irony is that in a group, knowledge useful to decision-making only 
accumulates if it can be shared by a majority (or a large enough portion 
of the group to carry a decision); and it only accumulates in this way 
to the point where it becomes too recondite for the 'majority', after 
which the group's accumulated decision-making knowledge no longer 
measures up to the sum of knowledge of its individual members. 
As I said before, the force of this objection rests heavily on the 
composition of the collectivity and nature of problems being tackled. 
A harmoniously working group of institutional experts and teachers might 
be ideal for most curriculum decisions; indeed I will support this in 
the next chapter. But the composition of such a group is quite differ- 
ent than we are interested in here: our concern is, after all, largely 
with parents and members of the local community. Still, the latter 
ought not to be ruled out entirely. From the standpoint of competence, 
at any rate, the community et al could decide macro issues such as the 
principles (e. g. aims) of school programmes in which they have a legitimate 
interest - this being an area of decision-making in which experts are 
impossible (as we discussed in a previous chapter). Equally, some micro 
decisions, such as a choice among resource materials which the teachers 
have determined to be of equivalent pedagogical value, could be made, 
without fear of ill-consequence, by the group. 
Precisely which decisions 
across the range of curriculum the group ought to 
have jurisdiction 
over would depend on piecemeal assessments of the groups competence in 
light of its composition. One form of participation on which these 
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objectives would not fall would be consultation. Because final decisions 
would be made, and non central or duplicate information rejected, either 
by one person or a group (e. g. teachers) whose claim to epistemic com- 
petence is higher, il l-consequences of 'amateur' decision-making would 
not be felt. In any case, one reason why consultation is desirable is 
that it does allow for data gathering (e. g. a teacher wanting to know 
about the home life of a student) which is, of course, the mainstay of 
the 'accumulated input' argument. 
A retrospective problem arises here. If participatory decision- 
making is as acceptable from the standpoint of competence, as is, 
for example, parental control of such matters as final selection of 
aims or curriculum materials (under certain circumstances), who then is 
to be entitled? Since the issue is no longer about competence it is 
beyond the scope of our investigation. It becomes, then, a moral issue, 
if parents claim a (moral) right to governance of their children 
or a political issue, if the community. can be said to have title to 
determine such matters as school aims when they, the community, will 
have to live with the consequences, i. e. of children educated in one 
way (e. g. having certain skills and understandings) rather than another. 
In summary, the accumulated input view will not necessarily justify 
participation by the community, parents, etc. in curriculum decisions 
because the strength of the argument is dependent upon certain contin- 
gencies about the participants, which cannot be guaranteed. Moreover, 
the plausibility of the view even as a support for participation in the 
general case is undermined by a simplistic and inaccurate account of 
the use of knowledge by decision-making groups. What emerges from our 
discussion is that information, or data, the provision of which is the 
alleged value of the accumulated input view, is useful, but is only a 
part of the knowledge required for decision-making. So even if a group 
benefits from this input, the very fact of it does not thereby justify 
group decision-making. What it does go toward justifying is consulta- 
tion., the main purpose of which is to acquire information. 
(ii) Hypothesis refutation 
A species of the accumulated input view, this theory suggests a purpose 
to which incoming knowledge from diverse sources can be put, namely to 
falsify or cast doubts upon the truth, cogency or plausibility of a 
proposition. Though Bridges does not mention it, this view shares one 
of the contingencies of its predecessor: one member of the group can- 
not know more than all of the other members taken together. 
It is 
conceivable, after all, that no other member of the group 
has information 
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to refute any of the hypotheses being considered which has not previously 
been considered by one of its members. For this reason the hypothesis 
refutation view will not necessarily justify participation by (any group 
of) parents, community members, etc. 
Of course, by reversing this point, it could be argued that in any 
group there is always the possibility of one of its members having some 
new piece of information to refute the hypothesis under consideration; 
that unless we specify in advance that no members of the collectivity 
have such knowledge, this view always has the potential to justify 
participation. Now, to respond, it is unarguably true that groups may, 
though not always, have this capacity to generate such information. 
But, first, are the collectivities we are concerned with likely to have 
this capacity in curriculum matters, and if so which ones? Second, if 
they do, in specific curriculum matters, would this fact alone justify 
participation (in those matters)? 
No, on both counts. On the first point: macro decisions about 
the programme of a school - about its aims, purposes, etc. - and micro 
decisions about procedures - about what to teach, when and how (about 
which activities should take place) - can only be made, competently, 
in light of considerable practical and theoretical knowledge. (We have 
discussed this at length before). 'As argued in the proceeding section, 
depth, breadth and centrality of understanding is not likely to be 
possessed by laymen, other than perhaps in macro decisions about which 
among alternative schools they ought to send their children to or which 
school programme a given community ought to adopt for the school it 
supports, or micro decisions about the destinations of school field 
trips, once equally acceptable alternatives have been ratified by the 
teachers. If, in the other areas of curriculum the layman is not espe- 
cially competent then the information he provides to refute hypotheses 
will be pedestrian. But since 
decisions are, for the most part, not 
about pedestrian matters, the occasions when the layman contributes 
significant information to refute hypotheses are likely to 
be few and 
possibly fortuitous even then. That a particular series of mathematics 
texts is appropriate, or that a particular child needs reading remedia- 
tion, are matters, hypotheses about which, 
involve areas of knowledge 
from which the layman is not likely to 
be capable of drawing, even for 
the limited purposes of refutation. 
Now the objection is not that parents and community members 
have 
no information useful to hypothesis refutation. 
Often they have, though 
they may not be aware that it has this use. 
For instance, we have 
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discussed the importance of contextual knowledge (material and concep- 
tual) to curriculum decisions; and it is quite obvious that parents 
et al could provide valuable knowledge about, for example, a particular 
child's perception of the school, e. g. whether it is a place of intimi- 
dation and imprisonment or pleasantness and enlightenment, (i. e. con- 
ceptual context) or a child's economic and social circumstances, e. g. 
the family's ability to pay for essentials such as clothing, food and 
books and his relations with siblings and peers - something which might 
have a bearing on his ability and inclination to learn at school (i. e. 
material context) . However, the significance of each report can be 
determined only by someone who understands the subtleties of the issue. 
So the layman may well contribute to the refutation of an hypothesis 
rather than personally refute it. 
To answer the second question: even if parents et al could be 
shown to be in possession of a considerable amount of-knowledge that was 
useful to refutation of hypotheses (assume, for example, that they were, 
themselves, well educated and informed about schooling), would this, 
then, justify participation? I think it would not justify a form of 
participation in which they were responsible for the actual making of 
decisions, but could support consultation. I take the former view be- 
cause decision-making typically involves considerably more than presen- 
tation of information to test hypotheses. Even if hypothesis formula- 
tion is left to experts who bring proposals to the meeting to be worked 
out in detail , there is still the need to take these theoretical 
des- 
criptions of alternatives and surmise the pragmatic outcomes, reformu- 
late the descriptions, and much else besides, which requires considerably 
more sophistication in awareness of the problems than is possessed by 
someone who simply has information which may or may not have a bearing 
on the issues. In short, competent decision-makers need more than this. 
On the other hand, the very fact that this information could be useful 
suggests that decision-makers should have access to it - to accept it 
or reject i t. Indeed one condition of competence is 'adequate access 
to data'; and this condition could be fulfilled, without any attendant 
disadvantages to the overall quality of decision-making, if those in 
possession of this knowledge were available 
for consultation. Mandatory 
consultation, however, would be too strong 
because decision-makers 
could thereby be impelled to receive trivial, 
irrelevant or duplicated 
information which could impair their efficiency without a corresponding 
gain in useful knowledge. 
Discretionary consultation is therefore 
supported. 
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(iii) Accommodation consensus 
This view purports to justify a form of collective decision-making, 
group decisions (e. g. meetings), by arguing that 'many minds' working 
toward a common end by mutually accommodating one another are more 
efficient than, and epi stemi cal ly superior to, one mind. So, committees 
are more competent decision-makers than single persons. This, I think, 
is not necessarily true. Indeed, in order for accommodation consensus 
to work at all effectively, very careful selection of the participants 
would be essential. 
As Bridges notes, groups will be mutually accommodating contingent 
upon (a) participants willingly responding to others, i. e. taking their 
arguments seriously (b) participants being limited in number to a size 
compatible with the undertaking (c) the range of dissidence not being 
too great. The very fact of these contingencies prevents this argument 
from justifying the value of all meetings; and (a) and (c) keep it from 
supporting any meetings in which there are, for example, either strong 
political reasons for some participants remaining intransigent, ((a)), 
or even two fundamentally opposed positions ((c)). If, in a particular 
school, the curriculum decision-making body had argumentative members 
or strong representation from any militant interest group with an axe 
to grind, so to speak, e. g. marxists, feminists, or Blacks, then not just 
a single meeting but all meetings of that body could well proceed very 
slowly, and painfully so. 
A further contingency assumed by this view is that participants 
will be sufficiently intelligent and knowledgeable to function efficient- 
lyº. The finesse with which central London drivers negotiate the Marble 
Arch roundabout or jig-saw puzzle-makers integrate their efforts are 
practiced arts. Fill Marble Arch and the jig-saw puzzle team with 
first-timers and see how efficient they are! In curriculum the situa- 
tion is worse because, more than a pedestrian skill 
(such as driving 
a car or putting together a puzzle), there is needed special knowledge 
of curriculum and requisite intelligence. Many laymen may not meet 
the former condition, some laymen and students 
(if they are allowed on 
the decision-making body) may not meet the latter. 
Some of the initial plausibility of this argument comes 
from the 
analogies used to describe it; but neither 
is entirely appropriate. 
Polanyi's puzzle-makers clearly have a single-minded purpose 
toward 
which the many can contribute productively, without political 
undercur- 
rents, pointless arguments and getting side 
tracked, all on the way to 
a destination which may not be clearly 
defined at the outset, as when 
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a committee meets to redesign a curriculum without having a clear 
idea of the options. And, while puzzle-makers and meeting participants 
see completion of the overall endeavour as their objective, drivers in 
the roundabout are concerned only about their own progress. This leads 
to a further point. Bridges applauds the traffic roundabout because 
an infinite variety of patterns are created by those who pick their way 
around. This is more than a single traffic designer could plot. But 
an infinite number of patterns do not necessarily i. rtply maximum effi- 
ciency. A single designer might quickly and easily plan an orderly 
and limited series of patterns which enables traffic to circulate far 
more quickly than the frantic chaos currently allows. 
In sum, the accommodation consensus theory is highly unconvincing. 
It might be used to explain why some committees work so well, but one 
suspects they are relatively rare. 
5. Consultation 
If community members, parents, etc. ought to participate directly 
in curriculum decision-making, it has not been demonstrated (except for 
certain macro and micro decisions). Consultation seems another matter 
though, because those who are competent to decide could filter incoming 
information, accepting or rejecting as necessary. Given the importance 
of contextual data, which parents, students and members of the local 
community could readily supply, and to which teachers and others would 
not otherwise have direct access, consultation seems prudent. I say 
prudent rather than necessary, implying that discretionary and not 
mandatory consultation is called for, because, although it is a necessary 
condition of competence that contextual and other knowledge be sought, 
and a pragmatic condition of that competence that there be adequate 
access to data, it is not of logical necessity 
(or at least not obvious- 
ly so) that contextual knowledge be gleaned through direct reports 
from the agents. So consultation would not be the only means by which 
such knowledge could be acquired, and to insist upon mandatory consul- 
tation could subject decision-makers to undue repetition, etc.. of detail, 
and corresponding Impai rment of efficiency. Nevertheless, it seems a 
strong likelihood that discretionary consultation would 
be an important 
means of fulfilling the 'access' condition of competence, and 
by exten- 
sion part of the knowledge conditions. 
Chapter X 
CONTROL OF THE CURRICULUM AND THE COMPETENCE OF TEACHERS 
I. Introduction 
Teachers, in consultation with all members of the educational 
community, especially the institutional experts, ought to have control 
of most curriculum decisions. It very much depends upon the nature of 
the decision whether control ought to be in the hands of general bodies 
such as national or provincial assemblies or local education authorities 
or individual schools; or whether individual classroom teachers ought 
to decide;. or whether matters ought to be left to subject specialists 
at any of these levels. But whatever the case, among the alternative 
decision-makers under consideration teachers are the most competent; 
though support for them is rather more on the basis of lesser of evils 
than embodiment of an ideal. 
By a teacher we will mean anyone who is professionally employed 
to plan lessons, instruct and be responsible for the academic progress 
of students in schools which are either supported or recognized by the 
state. This, therefore, would eliminate those who teach in unrecognized 
alternative schools (e. g. free- school). fringe schools (e. g. language 
schools) and colleges and universities. 'Teachers' from the latter two 
types of institution have, quite obviously, different concerns vis a vis 
schooling; and the often radical views of the former make assessment of 
their competence and schooling objectives difficult as a group, since 
they often have little in common with one another. Mention of competence 
brings up the question of epistemic credentials and qualification as a 
teacher. Relevant university degrees and professional training certif- 
icates would be obvious parts of a normative condition for qualifica- 
tion as a teacher; indeed increasingly they have become practical re- 
quirements for appointment. But, they are not, nor are other normative 
conditions, unless specified later, to be regarded as necessary condi- 
tions (logical or practical) for individuals who are called teachers. 
Clearly, some individuals professionally employed as teachers 
do not 
have these credentials; and our objective is to show that the teaching 
profession, as it is, is the most competent 
decision-making alternative. 
Finally, claims about teachers, their organizations and professional 
activities, will apply only to those 
in advanced Western nations, i. e. 
Western Europe, United Kingdom, Australasia, Scandanavia, the United 
States and Canada. These nations, and, perhaps, exceptions not mentioned, 
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share a relatively high level of educational understanding and develop- 
ment of school institutions. Claims about the competence of teachers 
are more or less uniform throughout (though with some exceptions) ; but 
this could not be said about teachers in, for example, the third world 
which does not have a long tradition of concern with mass secular educa- 
tion. 
The case which we wil l now make for teachers is based upon fulfill- 
ment of the conditions of competence. It will be the business of this 
chapter to show how these conditions are satisfied. 
2. Teachers and the Conditions of Competence 
To determine competence we have developed a range of considerations 
that form a three-sided matrix: conditions of competence, activities 
and contexts in and about which decisions are to be made and potential 
decision-makers. The only remaining alternative, teachers, do not 
ideally satisfy the requirements of all points in the matrix but, because 
they are significantly better than the others or any combination of 
them, we are, at least on the basis of competence, obliged to suggest 
them as curriculum decision-makers. 
(a) The Abilities Condition 
The abilities condition, which includes cognitive abilities such 
as foresight, clarity and rigour and affective abilities such as the 
ability to stick to decisions even when under personal (e. g. verbal) attacks, 
is not satisfied of logical necessity by virtue of employment as a 
teacher. It is at least possible that such employment could be given 
to a moral coward with little if any foresight, etc. Indeed, criticisms 
are from time-to-time made against teachers to the effect that they are 
unmotivated and unintelligent. One accusation is that the teaching 
profession is a refuge for individuals with insufficient ambition and 
competitiveness to have a career in, for example, the business world; 
and the other is that if teachers did not 
lack so much in-intelligence 
and imagination they would either take up more 
lucrative and challenging 
positions in business or pursue their academic 
interests to far more 
esoteric levels in the academe. 
Both are empirical speculations and neither makes much sense. 
There 
is no reason to suppose that the ideals of 
helping professions, namely 
a genuine desire to assist others, 
in this case to help them learn, are 
not present in a majority of teachers. 
And even if it were true that 
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teachers are less competitive, etc., and that for many lower middle- 
class children teaching presents an opportunity for noncompetitive 
social-class mobility, it would not follow that teachers are not able 
to stick to decisions or are lacking in any other affective abilities 
important to teaching. Equally, it is patently false to say that in- 
telligent people always enter the business world or the academe. Both 
require talents of intellect, but so does teaching. An unfavourable 
and unfair comparison is often made between the highly successful 
businessman and a rather humdrum unimaginative teacher. The creative 
and resourceful teacher is often overlooked. It is often forgotten as 
well that intelligence goes along with interests; and so just as there 
are intelligent people who are interested in business problems or re- 
search, there are intelligent people who are interested in teaching. 
(b) The Conditions of Knowledge and Access to Data 
The value of particular knowledge to curriculum decisions is depen- 
dent upon the nature of the decision to be made, i. e. the object-of- 
decision and the context in which and the activity in-or about which the 
decision is being made. To assess the value of teachers' knowledge we 
must therefore consider it in con j uct i on with the decisions in question. 
We will relate general types of knowledge, i. e. theoretical descriptions 
of alternatives and justifications and pragmatic outcomes of proposed 
alternatives, in light of the principles that make it valuable, i. e. 
centrality, depth and breadth, to the areas of knowledge in which teachers 
are supposedly initiated (e. g. knowledge of the disciplines and teach- 
ing methodology), and all of this to the specific categories of objects- 
of-decision in activities and contexts. 
(i) Macro activity decisions 
Macro activities, e. g. football, chess and schooling, are composed of 
programmes - description of the overall point of the activity, principles 
of governance, main objectives, etc. - and procedures - rules of per- 
formance. The programme and procedures must be consistent with one 
another. Such activities are composed of subordinate or micro activi- 
ties, each having a programme and set of procedures of 
its own but which 
are consistent with those of the macro activity. 
The macro activity of 
chess, for example, would be composed of such micro activities as 
'castling'. The latter has its own programme and procedures but they 
have no meaningful existence independent of the 
former. Schooling, a 
more pertinent example, 
has the characteristic structure, and is a macro 
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activity which means that its programme, procedures and constituent 
micro activities are not always the same, unlike chess which is unchang- 
ing (for the most part). There are different versions of schooling. 
Grammar schools, comprehensives and free-schools do not have the same 
programmes, procedures or micro activities (though there is consider- 
able similarity, otherwise they would not all be recognizable as 
schools). The fact of this 'openness' of schooling gives rise to an 
important macro activity problem, namely determining the structure and 
composition of schooling. Should Grammar School X turn comprehensive? 
Should Comprehensive School Y change one of its central principles, 
e. g. should it endeavour to shape its curriculum to the wants of the 
local community? Should Community A devise an alternative school - some- 
thing unique? In relation to this sort of problem our question is: 
should teachers make the decisions, and if so, what part of the teaching 
profession, e. g. local teachers, national assemblies or whom? 
If a teacher is epistemically superior to adult laymen, it is in 
virtue of a high level of educat ion (usually a university degree) , 
professional training (as in a teacher's college) and experience which 
is often under the scrutiny of colleagues, school inspectors and school 
heads. In past years, particularly in Britain, primary school teachers 
have not usually been university educated; though this is somewhat im- 
proved in Britain and significantly so in North America. (In Alberta, 
Canada, for instance, a four year B. Ed. or its equivalent is now manda- 
tory for teaching in either private or state supported schools. ) In 
consequence of this, and the rather dubious value of scrutiny by col- 
leagues, etc., claims of epistemic superiority should be moderate. Per- 
haps the strongest claim would be that some of the lost ground could be 
made up by collective teacher decision-making. That is, where some in- 
dividuals are lacking in education or experience, a collectivity such 
as the teaching staff of a school or the teachers within an education 
authority might lessen the deficiency. Either a majority may be well 
educated and experienced or those who are well educated and experienced 
may have an uplifting influence, epistemically speaking. The latter 
point is similar to the 'accumulated input' notion discussed in the 
previous chapter. Its principal failing when applied to community 
membership was that the prospects for uplifting the laymen where not 
encouraging because they would lack understanding in the areas of know- 
ledge that form the backdrop for curriculum decision-making (e. g. subject 
knowledge, knowledge of educational theory and teaching methodology). 
This seems less worrisome in the case of teachers whose professional 
occupation - is to attend to such matters. 
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Yet, unaided teachers ought not to make certain macro decisions. 
Whether Grammar School X ought to go comprehensive or Community A ought 
to adopt some version of a freeschool or a comprehensive school are 
questions not ultimately answerable by appeals to competence. The 
choice is between forms of schooling; and we have no universal educa- 
tional criterion (in virtue of which the teaching profession could be 
competent) to show one as more 'educational' than the other. Granted, 
we share a vague concept. We could rule as unsatisfactory alternatives, 
that, for example, had no significant connections with knowledge and 
understanding. We could say they were not even schools. In addition 
we could eliminate school alternatives whose programmes and procedures 
were internally inconsistent or procedures antithetical to sound peda- 
gogical practice. But problems would still remain. A grammar school 
supporter might suggest that students acquire more academic competence 
than in a comprehensive. The reply might be that comprehensive schools 
are more egalitarian. What objectively demonstrable criterion do we 
use in ranking these principles? Free schools might be said to foster 
broad knowledge, and comprehensives in-depth. Which is preferable? 
There may be a powerful criterion to act as the justifying principle 
for such decisions which we simply have not yet discovered. But until 
we do, and someone becomes competent in its use, macro decisions of 
this sort must be left to the body politic (whether national or local 
is another matter). 
I 
But note: it is the final resolution of the matter that requires 
a value judgment which is beyond studied competence. It is the selec- 
tion of a justifying principle and the application of it that goes 
beyond competence. But the suggestion and clarification of central 
principles seems very much the sort of activity which sociology, psychol- 
ogy, history and, most especially, philosophy of education are con- 
cerned with. Presumably the experts in relevant fields would be most 
competent. Equally, alternatives must be stated. Theoretical descrip- 
tions, the characterizations of the alternatives, fall surely within 
the range of the relevant educational expert; and to some extent this is 
true of teachers. The educational theorist might give an accurate 
ideal 
I John White has argued that the state ought to have. control of 
such matters. See 'Teacher Accountability and 
School Autonomy' in 
Proceedin s of the Philosophy of Education Society of Great 
Britain 
Vol . X, July 
1 976, pp. 58-78.1 argued against White and in favour 
of more localized control in Journal of 
Philosophy of Education, 
Vol. 12,1978, pp. 63-8. 
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characterization of comprehensive schooling, while experienced teachers 
could describe them as they actually exist. The point is that in prac- 
tice comprehensive schools may manifest themselves in a form somewhat 
different than an ideal type. So a community, for example, in deciding 
whether to adopt a policy of comprehensive or free schooling would 
surely want the alternatives realistically described. Some combination 
of teachers and experts, on the face of it, would seem to maximize com- 
petence. Then there is the matter of pragmatic outcomes: prediction 
of the consequences of implementing the various alternatives. Since 
pragmatic outcomes are heavily dependent upon conceptual and material 
contexts, and these are local, teachers, especially local teachers, 
would be best able to gather the relevant data. (At this point we see 
an application of the condition of competence we have named 'adequate 
access to data'. ) It would seem, therefore, that even choices between 
alternative macro activities are largely products of competent deliber- 
ation, and those in which teachers have an important part. And when we 
say 'teachers' and wonder if this is to mean local or more centralized 
groups, the answer must surely be that it depends upon the particular 
teachers we are dealing with. The decision-making arrangement should 
be whatever maximizes their competence, and this will vary between 
locations and times since the teaching profession is not completely uni- 
form. What is sought is a suitable marriage between two strengths: 
access to contextual data and knowledge of subject, teaching and theory. 
In some regions where the ep istemi c credentials are strong, the more 
decentralized the better since that would maximize the 'access' advan- 
tage. Where local teachers are not so epistemically well endowed, 
greater centralization (though not too much so as to lose the advantage 
of 'access') would broaden the base from which decision-making knowledge 
could be drawn. 
There is another important type of macro activity decision. New 
types of schooling are conceived, and existent types are revised. In 
each there is determination of either programme or procedures (hence 
specification of constituent micro activities), and sometimes both. In 
the category of alternative schools, newly imagined descriptions, 
principles and objectives comprise the programme, and specific rules 
to determine school activities are newly devised or dramatically re- 
arranged. This is an example of the 
former. Of the latter, an example 
would be the changing of a comprehensive school 
to create a different 
version of the same thing. With certain additions 
to the programme 
and adjustments to the procedures a community school could 
be created. 
If, to the traditional comprehensive programme were added the principle 
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that the school should determine and service community needs, certain 
new micro activities would be added, and the consequence would be a 
new version of comprehensive schooling. 
In large measure, the teaching profession is competent to handle 
these matters. Again it is the argument from knowledge and experience. 
lt is, perhaps, at its strongest in decisions about procedures because 
teachers are usually better trained to teach and deal with a particu- 
lar subject area (more the former than the latter in North America and 
vice versa in Britain, at least in the case of secondary school teachers) 
than they are knowledgeable and speculative about the macro activity 
as a whole. The level of question would be: 'Assuming that procedures 
must conform to programme and principles x, y and z should there be a 
procedural rule that makes subject a compulsory or student activity b 
forbidden? '. Modern teacher training frequently involves itself to 
some extent with dealing in these matters. So the teaching profession, 
if so trained, would be a reasonable choice as decision-maker. Now de- 
centralized control is desirable for reasons of access to contextual 
knowledge; but too much localization can have a disadvantage in some 
matters. For example, if the question of making subject a compulsory 
came up in a particular school, the teacher who specializes in a might 
be rather tempted to look more at the benefits of having his or her 
subject assured a place on the curriculum than at the degree to which 
it is consistent with the principles of that type of schooling or the 
best interests of the children. So it might be wise not to leave the 
matter solely to the teacher of a. A more objective decision-making 
base, say the whole staff of the school (or whatever seems appropriate, 
consistent with both objectivity and 'access') might maximize competence. 
In closing, it might be suggested that consultation by teachers, local 
or otherwise, with institutional experts on theoretical matters and with 
students, parents and members of the community where contextual infor- 
mation is sought, could provide depth and breadth to the store of teacher 
knowledge. 
Concerning programme decisions, decisions about the principles of 
a schooling type or indeed the imagining of a new type of schooling, the 
teaching profession has not so strong a case. In favour of teachers, 
one might point out that teacher's colleges usually ensure that their 
students study in the areas of history, sociology or philosophy of educa- 
tion, areas which investigate the nature of schooling; 
hence, to some 
extent prepare student teachers 
for this sort of concern. In addition, 
for those individuals who are imaginative enough to conceive alternative 
forms of schooling, the school, any school, could provide a milieu 
in 
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which to think creatively. The 'situation' of schooling, the intimation 
of principles, purposes, alternatives and practical problems to be over- 
come, would be ever in view. Granted, one can be creatively stymied 
if buried in one's 'situation'. But for those not buried by it, the 
familiarity can favourably contrast with the ignorance of those who are 
ever on the outside. This being true, members of the teaching profes- 
sion can reasonably be seen as capable of making creative programme 
decisions. 
What has to be remembered though is that our question is not 'who 
ought to have the final say about implementing alternative schools? '. 
This would reduce to the first of our macro activity questions. Rather, 
it is 'who is competent to conceive of the alternatives?. Now what 
we have shown about teachers so far is that they are in a position to 
think creatively and they have at least some of the relevant knowledge. 
But having the opportunity to think creatively is not actually doing 
it. Some people are more creative than others. Entry into the teach- 
ing profession, through a teacher training college or otherwise, does 
not guarantee that one will be able to create alternative schools, con- 
ceptually speaking. And alternative conceptions of schooling have not 
in the past generally been created by a collectivity of teachers. They 
have come from individuals such as Pestalozzi, Herbart, Froebel , Homer, 
Lane and A. S. Neill who were not only teachers but inventive thinkers 
besides. It would be a mistake therefore to say that teachers, qua 
teachers, are exceptional decision-makers in this category. Indeed, it 
would seem rather more likely that experts in educational foundations 
subjects who stayed closely in contact with schools would have a better 
combination of knowledge and creative intelligence (cf. Dewey and 
Skinner). 
In sum, one could say about teachers and macro activity decisions 
that their obvious competence lies in applications of two strengths: 
knowledge and experience and access to contextual details. The combina- 
tion suggests decentralization; but only to the point where more is 
lost in knowledge (in view of weaknesses of some teachers) than is 
gained in data. And competence aligns with the type of macro 
decision 
being made. With regard to procedures, teachers seem more competent 
than others. This is not obviously so, 
however, in the creations of 
macro activity alternatives. Finally, selections 
between competing 
macro activities are not, ultimately, 
to be determined by appeal to the 
principle of competence. 
Interim steps, though, such as clarification 
of alternatives and 
justifications are matters of competence. Educat ion- 
al experts are probably 
best suited to propose theoretical alternatives, 
187 
but teachers, in view of their access to data are best able to complement 
this with specification of pragmatic outcomes. 
(i i) Micro activity decisions 
If one procedural rule of a macro activity is that all students at a 
particular level must study geography, then there is a micro activity, 
the study of geography, that must be decided about. What is its pro- 
gramme and procedures to be? Programme decisions would be the like of: 
'What general description is to be given the geography course (or 
courses)? ' That is: 'is it primarily to inform students about topo- 
graphical features of specified regions? ' or 'Is it to inform and 
demonstrate interrelations between climate, soil, vegetation, popula- 
tion, land use, industries and politics? '. Once the general descrip- 
tion has been decided there are, then, questions about aims. If the 
second description was adopted one could then ask if the central aim is 
to make the student aware of these interrelations in specified regions 
or to develop in him the ability to discern relations of this sort in 
any region he investigates. Then: 'To this end, what behavioural 
objectives are planned? '. Further: 'What is the purpose of studying 
geography thus described? '. Procedural decisions, i. e. decisions about 
the rules and directives of the micro activity of (in our example) 'the 
study of geography', would include: determination of the specific 
topics within the general area of interrelations between climate, soil, 
vegetation, etc. and politics; and it would include considerations of 
the order in which the topics are to be introduced and the methods of 
introduction (e. g. lecture, discussion, discovery, etc. ). 
Predictably, one line of argument is that in a micro activity 
involving the teaching of a subject (though there are other kinds of 
micro activity such as the administration of the school in non curriculum 
matters) specialist teachers in the subject areas would have 
both rele- 
vant academic and professional training and access to contextual 
data. 
This is quite plausible; though its force lessens 
in instances where 
teachers are not university educated in their subject. 
Fortunately, the 
educational level of teachers has risen quite considerably 
in recent 
years. However, where academic or professional training 
is weak, there should be 
consultation with those more qualified, such as 
other special ist teachers or 
relevant experts. 
(Mandatory consultation is less desirable than dis- 
cretionary. consultation 
for reasons mentioned in the previous chapter; 
but if it can be demonstrated that marginally qualified 
teachers do not 
avail themselves of these outside 
sources, it seems reasonable that some 
sort of government guidelines should 
require it. A justification for 
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this could be formulated in terms of fulfillment of the competence 
conditions, most especially the knowledge condition. ) 
In addition, there is the question of fulfillment of the access 
condition and whether this is best done by allowing each classroom 
teacher to make his or her own micro activity decisions or whether there 
should be at least some collective deliberation, for example, by all of 
the geography teachers in the school. Strictly from the standpoint of 
access it would seem likely that classroom teachers should make their 
own choices, but two points intervene. First, access must balance with 
knowledge; and it is likely, though obviously not of logical necessity, 
that combined professional opinion will increase the latter. Of course 
too much decentralization would be at the expense of the former. Second, 
since the micro activity (of the study of geography) might involve more 
than one teacher as would be the case if a secondary school had a geog- 
raphy department, with several" members and course offerings, who 
wanted to have a coherent (geography) programme in total, a collective 
decision-making arrangement would seem called for, if not on grounds of 
competence then of democracy, unless one party was quite clearly epi s- 
temical ly superior to the others. 
Barring the second problem and returning to the first: the balanc- 
ing of access and knowledge would depend in part on the actual micro 
decision. Whereas determining the geography programme for a school 
demands considerable subject understanding (that a marginally qualified 
student might not have), some procedural decisions are relatively less 
esoteric. For example, when deciding how to teach geography there 
could arise the question of how long the lessons should take. This 
would depend largely upon the attention span of the children, given the 
room temperature, time of day and ability of the teacher to hold interest. 
Local information is clearly the most important factor; hence the matter 
is best decided by the classroom teacher. 
To this point we have been discussing decisions about micro activi- 
ties: these are questions that determine what the activity is going to 
be. There remains to be considered another group of questions: deci- 
sions within the micro activity. That is, questions arise 
in application 
of programme and procedures. if the programme of 
'the study of geography' 
is to involve an investigation of the interrelations 
between climate, 
soil., vegetation, etc. and politics, and procedurally 
it has been estab- 
lished that England, Scotland, France, Spain and Italy will be investi- 
gated with this in mind and 
in the stated order; then if a decision has 
to be made as to which country to study on a given occasion, 
the choice 
among the alternatives 
(i. e. England, etc. ) can be made by application 
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of the procedural rule 'the order of countries to be studied will be.... ' 
as a justifying principle. Generally stated, within an activity deci- 
sions can be made by applications of rules (or principles of the pro- 
gramme where there are not explicit rules). 
Ep i stemi c competence would require, for the most part, a thorough 
understanding of the programme and procedures of the micro activity; 
that in combination with knowledge of the material and contextual con- 
texts. Since it is in the former that teachers are professionally 
trained, and the latter to which they have direct access; it seems 
likely that local teacher decision-making would be desirable. The ideal 
combination of knowledge and access would depend, as usual, on the ex- 
tent of the teacher's understanding of the rules, etc. So, whether 
classroom teachers are given control over all such matters, or have 
certain restrictions, should be contingent upon circumstances. For 
surely there are some rule applications that are very difficult and on 
which the teacher, if not required, should consult with colleagues or 
experts. Evaluating students' work and classroom misbehaviour would be 
of this sort. For example, if the rules concerning evaluation of geog- 
raphy projects- are very general and a student, instead of: submitting 
the expected essay, produces a scale model of some description with a 
taperecorded explanation, a decision must be made as to whether or not 
this accords with the evaluation rules. A teacher might be wise to con- 
sult with, for example, the department head. Rules of behaviour may 
require that severe cases be expelled from class for some period of 
time. Does a particular indiscretion warrant expulsion or not? Again, 
competent decision-making might hinge on discretionary consultation. 
(c) The Argument from Experience 
There is a second line of argument that I would now like to offer 
in support of teachers having control of decision-making both about and 
within micro activities of schooling where curriculum is concerned. 
It 
is an application of an argument made in an earlier chapter that connects 
competence in a particular activity to an understanding of the activity. 
It is the argument from experience. 
(i) Experience and significance 
In an activity (schooling, or any other), one acts on 
the basis of prior 
decisions - selections among alternatives. 
Even habitual acts were 
decided about at one time. And one does not 
decide to do just anything; 
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one' s alternatives are restricted, suggested, guided and influenced by 
the nature of the activity. Some of this function is carried out by 
formal rules. When serving, the tennis player must toss and hit the 
ball above his head. This is the rule. He must stand behind the base 
line. He must hit over the net and into the diagonally opposite service 
court. These are rules. The net must be three feet high, the court one 
hundred and fifty-six feet long, etc. More rules. It is an informal 
rule, though, that guides the server when he serves with spin on the 
ball and to the opponent's backhand. It is a bit of putative strategy 
that belongs to the game of tennis. That one should serve deep into 
the service court so as to make it difficult for the opponent to move 
to the net is an informal rule - some strategy - but a bit more subtle. 
One could tell a very long story about informal rules: about 
the layer upon layer of increasingly subtle directives. But this would 
be to repeat the discussion of an earlier chapter. Suffice it to say, 
the informal and formal rules are the structural component of an activi- 
ty that we have called procedures; and a participant may know these in 
greater or less breadth, depth and centrality. The competent tennis 
player would know a great range of strategies; he would understand pre- 
cisely and profoundly; and he would know which range applied, and exactly 
when each applied. 
Procedures derive from (i. e. must be consistent with) the pro- 
gramme: the programme - the description, principles and purposes - 
unifies the procedures and gives them external justification. The 
procedures - the formal and informal rules - make sense and are under- 
stood by the participants in light of the programme. In tennis, ser- 
vice rules and strategies of service are understood as part of a game 
called tennis, a game which can be described, etc. as such-and-such. 
Procedures, what to do and when, can be many and various; and they 
are understood in their number and range, as part of the activity, 
in 
virtue of one's understanding of the particular sort of activity that 
it is - of the programme. So, the 
better one understands the programme 
- the greater one's depth, 
breadth and centrality of understanding - the 
richer and more plentiful are the suggestions, 
intimations and nuances 
that justify existent procedural 
directives and generate new (and 
consistent) ones. 
The better one understands the programme, the more subtle and pro- 
found one's conception, the better one understands 
the procedures. But 
there is more. Deciding just what 
to do and exactly the right moment 
in which to do it is dependent upon more 
than an abstract conception of 
the game. It is dependent too upon understanding 
the context. For the 
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tennis player to see the strategic advantage of putting top-spin on the 
ball under certain circumstances he must understand how tennis players 
usually think when in those circumstances - i. e. what they anticipate 
from the opponent and how they think they ought to react to a ball with 
top-spin. It is partly in virtue of knowing this, the conceptual 
context, that they see as advantageous, and as a directive rule, the 
proposal of top-spin. The other important part is understanding the 
material context. As a rule it is advantageous to use top-spin under 
the given circumstances because one knows that players with certain 
physical attributes have at their disposal this or that way of physi- 
cally reacting, and so on clay or grass courts a ball with top-spin under 
bounce thus or so. And the application of this rule on any given occa- 
sion depends upon the contextual details on this occasion. 
The quality of decisions made within an activity, and the com- 
petence of the decision-maker, are tied to knowledge of the act ivi tv- 
knowledge of the structure of the activity, its programme and procedures, 
and the material and conceptual contexts. This much has been established 
(here or in an earlier chapter). How, then, does one acquire this know- 
ledge? How does one come to satisfy this knowledge condition of com- 
petence? Through experience? 
Tennis could be learned about, at least in part, indirectly from 
a book or a tennis player. Once could read or be told that tennis is 
a racquet game played in a court by two or four persons who drive a 
ball back and forth over a low net. Learning the programme of tennis 
could begin with such a description and could proceed to accounts of 
purposes, aims, principles and so forth. Procedures likewise. Indeed, 
it seems logically possible that a neophyte could be told everything 
about the programme, procedures and contexts of tennis - everything 
at least that could be put into propositional form. It could be learned 
by imagining each described situation. Of course it would be tortuous. 
every single detail would need to be explained. For if our neophyte 
had never seen a tennis serve, every single action, each movement of 
the body, racquet and ball, would have to be described in such detail 
that the learner could see it through his mind's eye. Now confirmation 
would of course be denied to the learner if he were never actually to 
witness a tennis match. For without this he would never 
know whether 
or not his imaginings were accurate. 
(Strictly speaking, this is not a 
problem for his claim 'to know' tennis: we 
do, after all, make know- 
ledge claims about propositions of which we 
have only indirect evidence. 
We accept historical propositions on the 
basis of testimony and scienti- 
fic claims about protons and black 
holes which are impossible to observe 
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directly .) 
Hoiever, serious doubts can be raised about the quality of the 
learner's understanding. Even if he could repeat on demand each and 
every proposition he had been told, i. e. the entire corpus of previously 
stated propositions about tennis, it is not at all obvious that the 
meanings he would attach to them from his imaginings would be accurate 
or very rich. For the descriptions of, for example, a tennis serve, 
would be in concepts he otherwise understood. To speak of tossing 
the ball overhead and hitting it with the racquet, one must have some 
notion of tossing a ball. If he had no prior experience of 'tossing', 
this concept would have to be explained by reference to others. The 
more remote his experience from racquet games the more difficult the 
explanation and description. And where notions such as tossing have to 
be subdivided into other notions for purposes of explanation, they would 
have to be perfectly restructured in the imagination of the learner 
to form the conceptualization in question. If it is logically possible 
to comprehend the full significance of these propositions, and I am 
not sure that it is, it is certainly unlikely. 
This difficulty is partly remedial. Observation of a tennis match 
would lend significance to the propositions. Details omitted from the 
description could be thus filled in; and the explanations of tennis ser- 
vice would then have a more concrete backdrop. However, the full signi- 
ficance of propositions could not, logically could not, be thereby 
gleaned. 
In the cases of some propositions, experience in the activities 
and actions to which they refer is necessary to understanding more fully 
their significance. That a tennis ball hit with top-spin is difficult 
to return, is a proposition which is not fully comprehensible to someone 
who has not actually tried to return such shots. That the American 
tennis player, Roscoe Tanner, can serve 140 miles per hour is a statistic 
which lacks an important dimension of meaning, according to those who 
have had to face it. That running long distances, playing hockey, doing 
philosophy and painting can all be enjoyable are things which no amount 
of description can make one appreciate in the richest sense. The point 
is not that descriptions will never be sufficient to make one feel as 
the participant would feel. It is not a psychological point. It is 
that understanding is a matter of degree, i. e. one can understand more 
or less, and that understanding past a certain level is impossible with- 
out actual experience. 
2 
`Michael Oakeshott in Rationalism and Politics. (London: Methuen, l9 2), 
pp. 7-12 distinguishes between technical and practical knowledge. The former 
is propositional knowledge and the latter is of the sort I am referring to 
here. 
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A second point about experience and understanding is that not only 
must one experience some things in order to fully understand them, but 
one must have considerable prior understanding in order to fully ex- 
perience something. The experience of Roscoe Tanner's 140 mile per 
hour tennis serve would be very different for an individual with a 
rudimentary knowledge of tennis than for one with no knowledge whatso- 
ever. The latter would experience it as, perhaps, an act of aggression, 
intimidation or under some description of a spherical object being hit 
at one as part of a game where ne i the r this act nor the game are clearly 
understood. The former, on the other hand, would experience it as a 
tennis serve: a clearly understood action which has certain qualita- 
tive characteristics which are part of the micro activity of serving, 
within the macro activity of tennis. What makes it possible to compre- 
hend this action as a tennis serve with these characteristics, i. e. 
possible to be experienced as a tennis serve, is an understanding of 
the micro activity, macro activity and relation between the two. In 
other words, the action is only recognizable and of significance in the 
light of the activities of which it is a part: the meaning of the 
former derives from the latter. Now, once the action is understood in 
this way, once it is given this preliminary recognizance, it turns 
back on itself and enriches one's understanding of the initial proposi- 
tion: 'Roscoe Tanner can serve 140 miles per hour. ' The point is, to 
fully understand some things in or about an activity they must be ex- 
perienced. But the logical possibility of comprehending the experience, 
of experiencing it as a such-and-such, is dependent upon some prior 
understanding of the activity of which it is a part. Of course, this 
mutual dependence does not mean that we are forever prevented 
from under- 
standing the activity because we need direct experience of 
it but cannot 
get it without understanding. Rather, it is a 
full, or in-depth, under- 
standing that depends upon direct experience. 
(By 'full' and 'in-depth' 
here, I do not mean logically complete. For there always would exist 
the logical possibility of further dimensions or aspects 
to be under- 
stood. ) 
John White in-Towards a Compulsory Curriculum 
(London: Rout ledge 
uch as 
Kegan Paul, 1973 Chapter Three, argues that certain subjects 
s 
mathematics and philosophy cannot 
be understood without first having 
some initiation into the concepts 
that arepeculiar 
Mtocthose dactivities 
or subjects. His is argument 
subjectsp orr activities which are made from his. t think- concepts 
up of them can be understood more and 
less. fully. 'Significance' is the 
key to this. So, where he would say that experience 
is necessary to 
understand a concept, I would explain 
why this is so - in terms of 
significance. 
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i i) Experience and teachers 
The experience argument favouring teacher decision-making within and 
about micro activities draws on this analysis. Decision-making depends 
upon knowledge of the activity; in some cases in-depth knowledge depends 
upon direct experience; therefore, decision-making in some cases depends 
upon direct experience. Furthermore, since direct experience is only 
meaningful in light of some understanding of the activity, those best 
able to benefit from experience are those who are familiar with the 
activity. Consequently, from the standpoint of knowledge, those most 
competent in decision-making will be those who have some knowledge of 
the activity and who have direct experience of it. My contention is 
that, for many micro activity decisions, teachers will be most compe- 
tent because of having both relevant knowledge and experience. 
Returning to the earlier considered matter of a school deciding 
about the programme and procedures of a geography course (a decision 
about a micro activity), a question arises about the importance of ex- 
perience to knowledge of alternatives and justifying principles. In 
making a programme decision about a geography course, suppose two al- 
ternative aims between which there must be a choice are (a) teach the 
skills of geographical investigation without a systematic exposition 
of the climate, population, land use etc. of any particular country 
(b) teach the details of climate, etc. of a particular country without 
emphasis on the means employed by the geographer to obtain this infor- 
mation. In (a) the aim is to teach students to be geographers, if not 
very sophisticated ones, and in (b) the aim is to teach students about 
the geography of a particular country. 
Now a choice among alternatives involves consideration of pragmatic 
outcomes. What will likely happen if (a) is chosen, or (b)? This gives 
rise to the questions: Will students be sufficiently unmotivated by 
either of these to make teaching it unlikely to succeed? Will they be 
so motivated to learn one rather than the other that it would be, from 
the pragmatic standpoint vastly preferable? Are the students who will 
take this course in an adequate state of readiness to learn, i. e. do 
they have the prerequisite concepts? There are other relevant questions, 
of course; but just taking these it seems reasonable to wonder if, for 
instance, the prospects of studying the geography of some country of 
little immediate concern to them are so boring to the students in ques- 
tion (bearing in mind their intelligence social background, etc. 
) that 
teaching it would be hopeless -a waste of time. Against this, children 
might be thrilled by the very idea of 
learning to be geographers. But 
then geographical investigation involves prior scientific understandings 
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of the relations between vegetation, soil and climate and between sur- 
face land formations and subterrestrial formations and about cartography 
- schematic depiction of land masses. Will the students in question 
have this prior scientific knowledge and will they have the conceptual 
development to comprehend cartographic representations? Answers to 
these questions have a significant bearing on the desirability of the 
alternatives (on the basis of 'ought implies can') ; and the information 
needed to answer them depends upon having 'adequate access to data' 
- i. e. being close enough to the students to determine their probable 
reactions. But having access is only part of the story. Access places 
one in a position to get the information; but I am suggesting that a 
direct experience of the situation would give added significance to the 
meaning of what is otherwise only a superficial observation. On the 
motivational point, for example, the proposition that students seem 
resistant to the study of one country's geography is not valuable unless 
the significance of the resistance is understood - i. e. unless the 
qualitative aspects of the resistance - its nature, intensity and prob- 
able duration - can be discerned. This is a matter of judgment: an 
ability to sense the quality of the resistance based on knowledge of the 
activity of the study of geography and experience with students and 
their attitudes toward the study of geography. By understanding the 
structural components of the activity of the study of geography - i. e. 
the programme and procedures -a state of affairs to which the resistance 
of students can have application is adumbrated. Indeed it would be 
nonsense to speak of resistance unless it were resistance to something. 
Then to know that students are resistant to that version of the activity, 
i. e. to that programme, is a very important piece of information in 
deciding whether or not to adopt that version of the activity. To have 
had direct experience with the particular students in question and the 
rejection of the course now proposed would greatly assist in answering 
the questions: What is the significance of this resistance? How impor- 
tant isit to the study of this course? But to have experience with 
these students in relation to this course would be ideal. Usually we 
have to settle for 'these' students or students like them, and 
'this' 
course or one that is similar. Still, 
it is the direct contact that 
informs best, even under these circumstances. And on the point about 
assessing readiness to learn, e. g. prior conceptual 
development: having 
direct experience with the children enables one 
to determine the signi- 
ficance of such things as a poor understanding of the scientific 
founda- 
tions of 'learning to be a geographer' . 
This is not to say that direct 
experience will inform everyone. 
A solid understanding of the activity 
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is a necessary prerequisite. Nor is it to say that experience is suf- 
ficient even with activity knowledge. Rather it is to say that exper- 
ience is at least one of the necessary conditions in grasping the signi- 
ficance of circumstances that have a direct bearing upon decision-making. 
Decisions about micro activity procedures (e. g. about content and 
methods of presentation) can be shown to have much the same connection 
with experience. Student motivation and readiness have an important 
bearing on the topics one selects to teach and on the methods. The 
significance of assertions about such things as motivation and readiness 
to the practicability of alternative topics and methods is, as I main- 
tained with respect to programme decisions, logically dependent for a 
'full' accounting upon experience. For instance, having selected a geog- 
raphy programme, there remain procedural matters such as the directives 
that guide content. 'In the study of British geography students must 
concentrate on England'. Or:, 'Concentration must be on Scotland'. Which? 
In part, the answer is dependent upon the pragmatic outcomes of each 
alternative. And experience is vital to assertaining this. Equally, 
directives that guide the methods of study, e. g. lecture, discovery, etc. 
depend upon the students and the type of course. 
Now I want to say something rather more general about that in which 
experience is necessary for a fuller understanding. First, activities 
are complex interrelations among procedures, and between them and the 
programme. To understand the activity it is necessary to understand the 
structural interrelations. To understand any part of the structure 
(as a structural element of a particular activity) it is necessary to 
understand the whole structure. Experience is necessary for a full 
understanding in both. That in tennis one should follow the procedure 
of lobbing the ball over the head of the opponent who has come close 
to the net, is something which cannot be seen as important by anyone 
who does not understand the relation between the rule and the programme 
of tennis, namely preventing the opponent from having clear opportunities 
to stroke the bal 1 so it cannot be returned. But someone who has exper- 
ienced the devastating consequences of not managing to do this is in a 
better position to see that the procedure is not just 
important but is 
'extremely' important. The qualitative nature of 'extremely' important 
here is simply not comprehensible independent of experience. 
Similarly, 
the extent to which the procedural 
directive 'All philosophy students 
must study formal logic' is 
important to the programme of the study of 
philosophy is, at a very sophisticated 
level of understanding, under- 
stood only by those who actually 
do philosophy. For it is only by doing 
phi losophy that one comes to sense 
the value of understanding logic in 
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this circumstance and in that, or inapplicability of the symbolism in 
this sort of inquiry and in- that. So, to restate the point, one could 
never have a sophisticated understanding of an activity without actually 
having experienced it. Second, the pragmatic outcomes of selecting 
any alternative are dependent to some degree on an assessment of the 
conceptual and material contexts: ' the aggregate of participants' con- 
ceptual schemes and the economic, social, psychological, etc. circum- 
stances in which the activity takes place. The points in our geography 
illustrations about conceptual prerequisites and motivation were con- 
ceptual and material context issues, respectively. Since experience 
has been shown vital to an understanding in these areas, no more need 
be said. 
Experience is therefore the key to (i. e. a necessary but not suf- 
ficient condition for) discerning the significance of relations between 
structural components of an activity and of actions and events taking 
place within the activity. It is through experience that we apprehend 
significance. Since part of what we mean by understanding an activity 
is seeing the significance of its internal relations and actions and 
events that occur within, it follows that experience of and within an 
activity is necessary to understanding. Furthermore, since understand- 
ing an activity is essential to an activity decision, experience is 
essential to activity decisions. My claim with regard to teachers is 
that in virtue of experience (and of course prerequisite knowledge) 
their understanding of many micro activities is superior to that of 
parents, institutional experts, etc., and they are, in consequence, 
likely to be better decision-makers. Of course, more needs to be said 
about to whom it is that 'teachers' refers. 
New teachers have very little direct experience. Teachers who have 
taught one subject do not necessarily have experience in another sub- 
ject. The geography teacher, for example, may know very little about 
the teaching of mathematics. Teachers who have taught in one context 
(material and conceptual) may understand little of another context. For 
example, the circumstances of an affluent private school are quite 
dif- 
ferent than those of a state school in an impoverished and rundown com- 
munity. Clearly, therefore, the argument from experience requires 
judicious application. 
Micro activity programme decisions such as about the nature of a 
geography course, and procedure 
decisions such as about the means of 
study, e. g. individual discovery 
learning projects versus classroom 
lecture-'discuss ions, could profit from the direct experience of geography 
teachers and those other teachers who 
had had the prospective geography 
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students in other courses . The former could have an experience-enriched 
understanding of the activity of the study of geography, and the latter, 
some insight, through experience, into discernment of context, something 
obviously relevant to assessing pragmatic outcomes of alternatives. 
Some manner of combining experiences in a decision-making arrangement 
would surely be ideal. What form-this should take, however, is whatever 
best unites knowledge of activity with knowledge (hence experience) of 
context. Should micro decisions in this case, therefore, be made by all 
members of the geography department as a group in order that 'accump- 
lated input' be greatest? Should all teachers in the school be involved? 
Should only those teachers with direct experience of either geography 
of the prospective geography students have a say? I think the answer to 
these questions would properly vary from one school to another. An 
optimum balance of activity and context knowledge (informed through 
experience) might be reached in a small and particularly intimate school 
by all-teacher contribution. In another school, in which the geography 
teacher's strong suit is activity knowledge rather than context - i. e. 
she knows the content very well but does have difficulty getting to 
know the students, their likes and dislikes etc., and deciding how to 
deal with them, it might be preferable for there to be a consultative 
arrangement with teachers who have had the prospective students in past 
years. And, another factor that has a bearing is the type of decision. 
Some procedural matters, such as 'which teaching technique ought to be 
used with a particular group of inattentive students? ' requires activity 
knowledge of course, but a great deal more direct experience of context, 
i .e. the students. In this case the classroom teacher would be 
in a 
position to glean information of the most important kind; and his exper- 
ience would, prima facie, take precedence. 
Clearly, the argument from experience supports decentralized 
decision-making. It shows that the knowledge condition of competence is 
best fulfilled by those who, among other things, have direct experience 
of the activity and context of the object-of-decision. The support for 
decentralization, however, is not uncompromi zi ng. 'Knowledge' is the 
condition that must be fulfilled and although experience is a necessary 
prerequisite in practical decision-making, it is not always the case 
that we have experienced decision-makers and experience; and even when 
we do experience is not always enough. 
Perhaps such an argument demon- 
strates that if we are to deny entitlement 
to the decentralized decision- 
maker on grounds of competence there must 
be provided strong reasons. 
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3" Conclusion 
The argument for teachers as decision-makers is simply this. 
Central to the entitlement of a decision-maker in a practical activity 
is competence in decision-making. To be competent one must be able to 
choose, relative to an object-of-decision, an alternative course of 
action (or range of them) on the basis of a justifying principle(s). 
The alternative must be fully stated: a statement of alternative in- 
cludes a theoretical description and consideration of pragmatic outcomes. 
Furthermore, the more central these alternatives and justifying princi- 
ples to the object-of-decision, and the greater the depth and breadth 
of their presentation, the better for the quality of decision. Know- 
ledge of alternatives and justifications is dependent upon knowledge of 
. the activity in which or about which the decision is being made, and it 
is dependent upon understanding of the conceptual and material context 
of the activity. Knowledge, as a condition of competence, has two com- 
panion conditions. Decision-makers must have cognitive and affective 
abilities, e. g. foresight and confidence, in order to conceive of alter- 
natives and justification and to stick to difficult decisions even in 
the face of emotional pressures. And, decision-makers must have access 
to contextual information. 
The problem we have had to face has been 'Who best fulfills these 
conditions of competence? '. The reasonable possibilities seemed to be 
students themselves, parents, educational (institutional) experts, 
teachers or some combination of all of these. Students, in our inves- 
tigation, were found quite unable to fulfill either the abilities or the 
knowledge condition, and so it was determined that their part in curric- 
ulum decision-making should be quite minor. The case against the more 
senior students would, of course, not be as strong. Parents were not 
rejected outright. There is no obvious problem in their fulfillment of 
the, abilities condition and the conditions of both knowledge and access 
could, conceivably, be satisfied by some parents since the class 'parents' 
does not exclude individuals who may well have quite adequate knowledge 
credentials (e. g. parents who are also teachers), and some types of 
schooling such as community schooling invite parents 
into the classrooms 
and thereby give them access to relevant 
data about context. Still 3l 
taking the class 'parents' as a whole, it does seem rather generous, to 
say the least, to attribute to them a sophisticated 
knowledge of a school 
programme or its procedures, matters which are normally 
seen by the 
educational community as requiring a considerable amount 
of study (e. g. 
teacher education and research scholarship). 
Consequently, control of 
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most areas of curriculum should not be in the hands of parents - unless 
of course it could be demonstrated that in a particular community the 
parents were unusually well qualified. However, there is an exception. 
With regard to macro level decisions in which a choice is to be made 
between types of schooling - as when a community decides which sort of 
schooling they wish to support or a parent decides which sort of school 
to send his or her child to - there is no reason to believe that the 
final choice ought to be made by he who can boast of the strongest 
epistemic credentials. Granted the alternatives need to be adumbrated, 
the justifying principles clarified and the actual choice made consis- 
tent with the principles which allegedly justify it, but the choice of 
justifying principle among the range, and application of it, is some- 
thing which, if based upon competence solely, would require a moral 
expert. Since the very idea of a moral expert is highly questionable, 
it would seem that such matters are ultimately decisions based upon 
preference. So, if we assume that parents have a prima facie right 
to governance of their children, and we further assume that they are not 
incompetent choosers, it would follow that they should make such macro 
activity decisions. It should be noted, though, that my argument is less 
in favour of parents and more an admission that entitlement to such 
decisions cannot be settled ultimately by appeal to competence. Parents, 
it was also argued, could well be competent to decide about certain 
micro activity matters which do not require specialized knowledge or 
professional training. As for experts, the next alternative decision- 
maker we considered, it was claimed that in many macro and micro con- 
cerns they could provide theoretical descriptions of alternatives and 
clarify justifying principles, not make the final decisions. For, if 
competent decision-making depends upon a full understanding of alterna- 
tives, and that in turn requires knowledge of the pragmatic outcomes 
(i e. what usually happens when such a proposal is implemented and what 
is likely to happen in this case) ; and if determining pragmatic outcomes 
requires access to data, then if experts do not have it, they will not 
be competent. Since we were considering only those experts who could 
be characterized as institutional, that is, by definition, without 
access to data, they would not be competent. Doubts were also expressed 
about institutional experts on grounds that they tend to standardize 
proposals, something which does not take account of contextual variations. 
Finally, various participatory arrangements were rejected. 
With some 
exceptions, it was felt that the 
knowledge condition would not be satis- 
fied even with the abundance of contributions that group 
decision-making 
would entail. Proponents of collective 
decision-making often mistakenly 
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see quantity as opposed to quality of information as contributing to 
competence. 
Those most likely to satisfy the conditions of competence are 
teachers - in some cases individual classroom teachers and in some cases 
the combined knowledge of the profession. The mix of knowledge required 
to make curriculum decisions is a mix between knowledge of the schooling 
activity and its context and the broad areas of knowledge that form the 
backdrop to the range of macro and micro decisions of curriculum. Par- 
ticularly in the case of the former, the significance of information 
thus acquired cannot be apprehended in its richest sense without the 
recipient having direct experience. Since teachers do have more of this 
experience they (whether 'they' here refers to individual teachers or 
groups of them depends upon sort of experience we are talking about) at 
least fulfill a precondition of understanding the schooling activity 
in this rich, or full, sense. This applies not only to understanding 
activities but context as well. 
The plausibility of the case for teachers would surely be lost if 
too much was claimed. In consequence, heavy qualifications have been 
given. It would be tedious to see them stated again: suffice it to 
say that just as the ep i stemi c credentials of parents and experts can 
change over time or be different in different locations, so it is that 
the complexion of the teaching profession is neither static or uniform. 
Those who are competent in one time and place may not be in others; and 
vice versa. Therefore, the question 'Who is most competent to control 
curriculum? ' is always open. What endures are the conditions of compe- 
tence; they must be applied and reapplied. On this application, teachers, 
for some decisions the profession as a whole and others individual 
teachers or in small groups, appear to be those most competent to control 
the curriculum. 
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